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PROLOGUE 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
The ideas expressed and explored in this text accompany an extensive body of 
original artworks.  When considered together the exhibition and the text represent 
an attempt to listen to and feel the double pulse that exists in the complex 
interweaving of life into death and death into life.   
 
At the completion of my doctoral project, this ancient, rhythmic, gargantuan 
dilemma will, of course, remain unresolved.  I set out with that understanding. My 
aim here however is to draw together a very specific, perhaps unanticipated, and 
some would say idiosyncratic set of ideas, to create a plastic, adaptable 
framework that is useful in creative processes of identifying, reflecting on and 
participating in, the double pulse of life and death, both from within and without, 
both enacted and embodied. 
 
Whilst my project draws extensively from a diverse range of established scholarly 
traditions conventionally considered the realm of the humanities, I situate my use 
of them within the dynamic field of contemporary art practice.  I am, after all, first 
and foremost a maker of things.  The scholarly traditions hold ideas that I put to 
work in order to make things, or to put things in materially apprehensible 
relationships in space and time, in artistic contexts.  
 
Throughout this undertaking I have resisted the impulse to prioritise one over the 
other, neither the original artworks that I have made nor the theories that I have 
examined hold authority over the other.  I have done my best to keep the playing 
field level; concert rather than priority has been my guiding principle.  
 
My method is characterised by the mirroring apparent between the range and the 
diversity of the scholarly fields and histories that I draw upon in the written 
component of this undertaking, and the range and diversity of materials and 
processes that I have engaged with in my practical, studio-based thought 
experiments.  
 
It is the mirroring between the diversity and range of my chosen theoretical 
sources and the diversity and range of the materials and processes that I have 
worked with which enables these two ways of thinking to come together in a kind 
of kinetic, double-helix form. In short, my methodology is contingent on a sense 
of productive between-ness within each of the two realms that give overall shape 
to this research.  Between the realms, new ideas get generated.  I do not claim to 
extend particular scholarly-textual fields, rather I deploy these scholarly domains 
in order to generate new modes of understanding with regard to the material 
artworks that I put on display.  
 
By considering the theories explored on the following pages within a framework 
of art making, and more broadly, when engaging with both ancient and 
contemporary artworks, a generative loosening occurs within them, this loosening 
enables a broadening of the thresholds of their interpretation thus opening the way 
for their application beyond the limits of the specific fields from which they have 
emerged. 
 Broadly speaking, the issues central to this research have engaged artists, writers 
and thinkers throughout history and continue to in contemporary realm; whilst I 
have looked closely at a number of contemporary artists working with the nexus 
of our inner and outer worlds, it is because of the specificity of my quest, which 
focuses on the relationships between materials and remembering that I have taken 
the decision to refrain from analysis and critique of other contemporary artists’ 
works. By doing so I aim to bring another, less anticipated, set of sources to the 
ongoing discourse.  
 
Perhaps it is the sheer immensity of the core issue addressed by this doctoral 
undertaking that renders individual fields of inquiry incapable of offering 
resolution, and therefore perhaps it is only through the confluence of ideas arising 
from diverse fields that a new way forward - encompassing new ways of 
understanding the interplay between materials and memory - may become 
apparent. 
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We cannot know his legendary head 
with eyes like ripening fruit. And yet his torso 
is still suffused with brilliance from inside, 
like a lamp, in which his gaze, now turned to low, 
 
gleams in all its power. Otherwise 
the curved breast could not dazzle you so, nor could 
a smile run through the placid hips and thighs  
to that dark centre where procreation flared. 
 
Otherwise this stone would seem defaced 
Beneath the translucent cascade of the shoulders 
 
and would not glisten like a wild beast’s fur: 
Would not, from all the borders of itself, 
burst like a star: for here there is no place 
that does not see you. You must change your life. 
 
Rainer Maria Rilke 1 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rainer Maria Rilke, The Selected Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. Stephen Mitchell, trans. 
Stephen Mitchell(New York: Vintage, 1984). 60-61 
ABSTRACT 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
In this doctoral thesis I experiment with images of damaged ancient figurative 
sculpture, physical space and a specific set of materials in order to generate a 
fresh understanding of how one’s personal experiences mingle with the residues, 
presences and traces of others peoples’ pasts, presents and perhaps, futures. 
 
Two questions drive this thesis. How are materials and material culture caught up 
with remembering? And, how are the broken stone and bronze bodies of Antiquity 
entangled with our contemporary social dimension? 
 
First investigating early photography’s association with violence and then 
considering the material properties and qualities of ancient figurative sculpture I 
investigate the relationships between materials and remembering. 
 
This research then goes on to coin and explore the the concept of premembering 
which through the development of this thesis I have come to define as a 
distributed system of memory-related cognition that extends beyond the 
individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that embraces 
both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation. 
 
Then taking this highly personal and psychic sensation to a social level, I examine 
premembering as the materially triggered understanding of events, circumstances 
or conditions that one may have not directly experienced, but which one’s culture 
already knows and stores up for all its future participants.   
 Finally, considering this notion of premembering within the context of Michel 
Serres’ conception of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality (in 
relation to violence), I consider the contemporary socio-cultural legacies of 
damaged ancient figurative sculpture and question how, through the conflation of 
the properties, qualities and sensed histories of materials, premembering might be 
considered a future-shaping force that can be made manifest in original artworks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
This thesis accompanies a body of original photographic and sculptural works 
produced as part of this doctoral research. Through writing this thesis I aim to 
generate fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and 
remembering, and to shed new light on the contemporary social relevance of 
damaged ancient sculpture. 
 
Through a series of studio-based experiments involving nineteenth century, dry 
plate photographic negatives, contemporary digital and analogue photographic 
images of damaged Archaic, Greek and Roman figurative sculpture, and a specific 
set of materials, I aim to generate fresh understanding of how one’s personal 
experiences are caught up with the residues, traces and presences of others 
peoples’ pasts, presents and perhaps futures.   
 
METHOD 
 
Throughout this thesis I engage an inter-disciplinary methodology that is 
characterised by four distinct steps that draw together and synthesise, in new and 
productive ways, the perhaps unexpected combination of the diverse fields of 
Contemporary Art, Cognitive Archaeology, Social Anthropology and Memory 
Studies.  
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STEP 1. DISTINGUISH 
First I reveal the subtle distinctions that can be productively made between 
specific aspects of an otherwise singularly perceived term or concept. In relation 
to materials the distinction between their physical properties and socially 
constructed qualities is important; in relation to memory the subtle distinction 
between memory and remembering is critical.  
 
STEP 2. EXPLICATE 
Then I identify and analyse in detail the productive aspects of the new space 
between the separated yet related concepts or terms; namely how the individually 
experienced properties and the socially constructed qualities of materials conflate 
in material semiosis, and how memory can be understood as closely associated 
with the past while remembering is active in the immediate present. 
 
STEP 3. REORIENTATE  
Next I reorientate the productive, dynamic space between the newly distinguished 
concepts or terms, as a means of generating new ways of thinking about the 
relationships between them, thus revealing new meaning between them. 
 
STEP 4. SYNTHESISE  
Finally I deploy the relevant new meaning toward the overall quest of this thesis, 
which is to create fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and 
remembering, and to shed new light on how the broken bodies of Antiquity are 
caught up with the contemporary realm. 
	   3	  
 
***** 
 
In this thesis I examine the roles that the properties and qualities of materials play 
in human remembering. I propose that because remembering is an activity 
contingent on the commingling of temporal frameworks, finding new ways to 
think about remembering requires opening up avenues through which to consider 
not only how the pasts of others conflate with our own, but also how this 
conflation shapes individual and collective pasts, presents and perhaps futures. 
 
As I develop and explore these considerations, I contextualise the material 
implications of one’s experiences with the residues, traces and presences of other 
people’s pasts, presents and perhaps futures in relation to violence; specifically 
the ongoing cycle of mythic violence which I explore with the aid of the writings 
of Walter Benjamin.  
 
I want to make clear that although violence is a current which courses through this 
research, it is not the focus of this research, rather it functions as a kind of prism 
through which I examine the relationships between materials and remembering. 
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Fieldwork documentation. 
Colossal hand of Zeus.  
Marble. 2nd c. B.C.  
Attributed by Pausanias in 2nd c.A.D. to the Athenian sculptor Eukleides 
3481: National Archaeological Museum Athens. 
 
 
Extrapolating on Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence which concerns “the 
natural-historical cycles of the rise and fall of empires and states – of the 
establishment, augmentation and decay of institutions”,1 I use the term mythic 
violence to specifically mean the interdependent, visible and invisible forms of 
violence that manifest in individual and collective actions and systems, through 
which one unconsciously comes to care more about property than life.  
 
To make the generic, often misunderstood, broad term ‘violence’ more critically 
approachable, I employ Slavoj Žižek’s tripartite subdivision of the term into the 
three related subcategories - subjective violence, systemic violence and symbolic 
violence. I then deploy these precise terms to investigate the relationships between 
materials and remembering.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald(Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). 76 
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I begin at the beginning of modern photography and examine the emergent 
medium’s associations with subjective violence, systemic violence and symbolic 
violence, which as I see it, are the modes of violence that comprise the broader 
concept of mythic violence. Through this research I seek to expose the deeply 
embedded, and at times almost imperceptible relationships between these specific 
modes of violence and remembering.  
 
One aspect of my research focuses on the peculiar form of remembering 
(identified relatively recently in the field of Memory Studies) known as 
postmemory. I use the concept of postmemory in productive contrapposto to the 
fundamental premise of this thesis, which is that materials and material culture 
play a significant role in the cognitive process of remembering and in 
intergenerational memory transfer. Throughout this thesis my focus remains on 
the role that materials play in the highly personal, memorial processes that bind 
the living to the dead, and through which, I propose, the broken bodies of 
Antiquity exert their ongoing contemporary legacies and relevance. 
 
Absent memory, inherited memory, belated memory, prosthetic 
memory, mémoire trouée, mémoire des cendres, vicarious 
witnessing, received history, postmemory. 2 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the 
Holocaust(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 3 
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The terms above have been coined by various scholars working in the relatively 
new field of inquiry that we know as Memory Studies. Each entry in this list 
attempts to define a sense of “living connection”,3 a deeply felt and identifying 
relationship between those who had a direct physical experience of the 
unimaginable atrocities of the Holocaust, and those we call the ‘second 
generation’ or the ‘generation after’.  
 
I want to make clear that this doctoral thesis is not located in the important field 
of Holocaust Studies, nor does it focus principally on trauma, however some of 
the recent work done in field of Memory Studies, specifically that concerning “the 
ethics and aesthetics of remembrance in the aftermath of catastrophe”,4 can be 
applied to the central inquiry in this thesis.  
 
Social anthropologist Tim Ingold begins his discussion article “Materials Against 
Materiality” 5 with the following list of materials.  It is taken from the Table of 
Contents of a small book titled Artefacts written in 1964 by Henry Hodges.6 The 
book examines all manner of materials used by prehistoric people in making 
things. 
 
Pottery, glazes, glass and enamels, copper and alloys, iron 
and steel, gold, silver, lead and mercury, stone, wood, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid. 1 
4 Ibid. 2	  
5 Tim Ingold, "Materials against Materiality," Archaeological Dialogues, Cambridge University 
Press 14 no. 1 (2007). 
6 Henry Hodges, Artifacts: An Introduction to Early Materials and Technology(London: John 
Baker 1964).	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fibres and threads, textiles and baskets, hides and leather, 
antler, bone, horn and ivory, dyes, pigments and paints, 
adhesives. 7 
 
This list might also be read like a didactic panel on the wall of a contemporary art 
museum, outlining a range of materials used by a contemporary person in making 
an artwork. Although this list is short it spans a vast temporal distance, or as the 
contemporary French philosopher Michel Serres might say, it ‘commingles’ time.  
8 The medium of photography does much the same as this list, it commingles time 
while providing an indexical document of what was present and what happened. I 
expand on the idea of commingled time throughout the body of this thesis.  
 
STRUCTURE & THEMATICS  
 
This thesis is structured into 3 distinct parts, each part comprises two chapters, 
each chapter is followed by a detailed summary of that chapter, each chapter 
specific Summary In Conclusion provides an overview of the key concepts that 
have been examined therein, and explains how these concepts lead into the 
concerns of the following chapter. Throughout the text I draw attention, where 
pertinent, to my own creative practice, in order to show how the theoretical and 
practice-based investigations have informed and transformed each other 
throughout the full extent of my doctoral research.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid. 
8 Michel Serres, The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. Peter Cowley Mararet 
Sankey(New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008). 	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Part One concerns early photography, specifically its developing relationships 
with violence and its associations with memory in the period defined by the 
medium’s emergence in the 1830’s up to 1910’s. In Chapter One I use the portrait 
genre to examine how early photography became caught up with the new forms of 
social regulation and systemic violence that were coterminous with the medium’s 
rapid development. In Chapter Two I turn from early photography’s relationship 
with the problem of violence to early photography’s relationship with the issue of 
memory. I then examine how photography came to be caught up with death and 
acts of remembrance. Next I introduce and examine Henri Bergson’s conception 
of the passage from pure memory to memory image, as a means to distinguish 
between memory and remembering. This is achieved by highlighting the function 
of habit in each of these closely related yet distinguishable concepts. 
 
In Part Two I shift my research from photographic aspects of memory onto the 
material aspects of remembering. In Chapter Three I closely examine Michael 
Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowing and Marianne Hirsch’s conception of 
postmemory in relation to the habitual aspects of Bergson’s conception of the 
passage from pure memory to memory image. Then with the aid of Serres’ 
characteristic literary device, the variegated list, I introduce the concept of 
productive between-ness which should be understood as critical, not only to the 
range of theories concerning memory, materials and the body that I examine 
throughout this thesis, but also as reflective of the productive exchange between 
the theoretical and studio-based research that give shape to this doctoral 
submission. In Chapter Four, with the help of Cognitive Archaeologists Colin 
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Renfrew and Lambros Malafouis, and Social Anthropologist Tim Ingold, I locate 
my research into the relationships between materials and remembering in the 
social dimension. I distinguish the properties from the qualities of materials, 
thereby establishing the properties of a material as associated with the physical 
characteristics of a material, and the qualities of a material as the socio-culturally 
generated attributes of a material. This important distinction begins to foreground 
my questioning of whether acts of remembering are contingent on retrospectivity, 
and sets up my detailed analysis of Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory, 
which I then explore in the following chapter. 
 
Part Three focuses on Material Engagement Theory, and Serres’ writings on the 
historical associations between statuary and death. Through these two recent 
conceptual developments I bring the contemporary social dimension of ancient 
figurative sculpture to life. In Chapter Five I undertake a detailed analysis of the 
three working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory - the Hypothesis of the 
Extended Mind, the Hypothesis of Enactive Signification and the Hypothesis of 
Material Agency - drawing out the “constitutive intertwining of cognition and 
material culture”.9 I go on to introduce the important concept of material semiosis 
10 which describes the integration of the material and conceptual domains in 
meaning making. My detailed and lengthy analysis of the three working 
hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory foregrounds the issues of collectivity, 
complicity and intentionality which are explored in relation to the problem of 
violence through Serres’ writings on the historical associations between statues 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lambros Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material 
Engagement(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013). 89 
10 Ibid. 18 
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and violent death. In the sixth and final chapter of this thesis I turn my theoretical 
focus onto Serres’ premise that statues are not static objects, rather that they can 
be understood as the basis for knowledge of society, subject object relations, the 
world and more broadly our engagement with it.11 In this chapter with Serres as 
our navigator and the concepts of collective acceptance, complicity and 
intentionality as our coordinates, we time travel from 6th century B.C. Carthage to 
1986 Cape Canaveral and beyond. Though this analytical process I expose a 
remarkably unchanged collective response to violence that is made manifest in, 
through, around and indeed with statues. 
 
 
JM018: Dry plate negative. 17.8 x 12.9 cm.  
Marshall Collection. Photo-Archive, the British School at Rome. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Michel Serres, Statues. The Second Book of Foundations, trans. Randolf Burks, The Foundation 
Trilogy (Bloomsbury, 2015). 
	  	  
PART 1 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 1  
EARLY PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIOLENCE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The photograph is violent: not because it shows violent things, 
but because on occasion it fills the sight by force, and because in it 
nothing can be refused or transformed. 
 
Roland Barthes 1 
 
 
To possess the world in the form of images is, precisely, to re-
experience the unreality and remoteness of the real. 
 
Susan Sontag 2 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
As I have pursued my studio-based and photo-archive research activities it has 
become clear to me that the history of photography is caught up with violence.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard(London: 
Vintage, Random House, 2000). 91 
2 Susan Sontag, On Photography, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books, 1977). 164 
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In this chapter I examine and extend some established understandings of the 
relationships between photography and violence by focusing specifically on one 
conception of violence, mythic violence.   
 
In this thesis, I base my definition of mythic violence on the writings of Walter 
Benjamin. For Benjamin, mythic violence is related to the operations of the state; it 
concerns “the natural-historical cycles of the rise and fall of empires and states - of 
the establishment, augmentation and decay of institutions”.3  
 
In this chapter I explore the relationship between photography and mythic violence 
by focussing on two specific periods in the medium’s development. 
 
1. The turbulent months during which the new medium emerged (and began to 
exert social ramifications).  
 
2. The slightly later period during which photography became directly involved in 
the new social management and policing systems that were designed to establish 
and enforce an authoritative conception of social order.  
 
This chapter is structured as a violence-focused analysis of four photographically 
concerned texts. My analysis of these texts enables me to identify and examine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald(Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). 76 
For contextual framing of Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence in relation to and distinct 
from his conception of divine violence, see Benjamin W. "Critique of Violence." In Reflections. 
Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, edited by Peter Demetz, 277- 300. (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1986); in which he states “Mythic violence is bloody power over mere life for its 
own sake, divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living”. 297	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some specific examples of the ways in which early photography became caught up 
with a range of different forms of violence that I propose fuel the ongoing cycles of 
mythic violence.  
 
Before I begin my analysis of these key texts I point out that for Benjamin mythic 
violence is defined by repetition compulsion, which can be understood as an 
internally unstable iterative process that is created by the fundamental tensions 
between law and life, principle and contingency, precedent and novelty.4  To 
explain now in my own words, throughout this thesis I use the term mythic violence 
to mean specifically the interdependent, visible and invisible forms of violence that 
manifest in individual and collective actions and systems, through which one 
unconsciously comes to care more about property than life. 5 
 
It is necessary here to distinguish between some of the various forms of violence 
and to precisely define them. This specificity gives examinable form to the 
otherwise slippery, unwieldy, generic term ‘violence’. Throughout this chapter, in 
addition to the term mythic violence, I also use the terms subjective violence, 
symbolic violence and systemic violence. I use these classifications to describe the 
specific, related forms of violence that contribute to my conception of mythic 
violence.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid. 67 
5 My definition of mythic violence has parallels with Michel Serres’ First Foundation, which is 
explained in his book Statues: The Second Book of Foundations, Bloomsbury 2015. Serres’ idea is 
founded on the issues of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality, all of which are 
caught up in my definition of mythic violence. For my detailed examination of Serres’ First 
Foundation see Chapter 6. 	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In this thesis I base my understanding of these terms on the following definitions 
proposed by Slavoj Žižek, in his 2008 book, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections.6 
 
Subjective violence is the obvious, highly visible form of violence usually 
performed by a clearly identifiable agent. Common manifestations of subjective 
violence are “acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict”.7  
 
To aid deeper understanding of the complexity of this highly visible form of 
violence, and our responses to it, Žižek identifies two other forms of violence. He 
proposes that these two other forms of violence form the “background which 
generates such outbursts” 8 of subjective violence. The two other forms of violence 
are symbolic violence and systemic violence. 
 
Symbolic violence “is embodied in language and its forms”.9  Systemic violence is 
manifest in “the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our 
economic and political systems”.10 
 
Throughout this chapter I elaborate on these definitions as I apply them to the 
specific examples that I use to highlight the relationships between early 
photography and mythic violence.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Slavoj Žižek, Violence : Six Sideway Reflections(New York: Picador, 2008). 
7 Ibid. 1 
8 Ibid.1 
9 Ibid. 1 
10 Ibid. 2	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Four texts directly inform this chapter, three of the four are well-known, one is less 
well-known. I examine the well-known texts in direct relation to the less well-
known text by undertaking a process of comparative analysis, which is designed to 
provide fresh understanding of how the development of photography is caught up 
with various forms of social violence.  
 
The texts are Walter Benjamin’s 1931 essay “A Short History Of Photography”,11 
Allan Sekula’s 1986 essay “The Body and the Archive”,12 John Tagg’s 1999 essay 
“Evidence, Truth and Order: A Means of Surveillance”,13 and Sharon Sliwinski’s 
2010 essay “The Kodak on the Congo: The Childhood of Human Rights”.14 
 
Explicating the central concerns of this chapter, I also draw from other texts that, 
while important in the overall development of my research, fulfil a subsidiary role 
in this chapter. The additional texts are Eric Santner’s 2006 book, On Creaturely 
Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald;15 the 2012 collection of essays, Picturing Atrocity: 
Photography in Crisis;16 and Geoffrey Batchen’s 1997 book Burning With Desire: 
The Conception of Photography.17 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Walter Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography," (1931), 
http://scholar.google.com.au.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/scholar?q=walter+benjamin+a+short+h
istory+of+photography&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5. 
12 Allan Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," October 39, no. Winter (1986). 
13 John Tagg, "Evidence, Truth and Order. A Means of Surveillance," in Visual Culture: The 
Reader, ed. Stuart Hall  Jessica Evans (London: SAGE publications in association with The Open 
University, 1999). 
14 Sharon Sliwinski, "The Kodak on the Congo. The Childhood of Human Rights, in Autograph. 
Republic of the Congo," Autograph ABP, http://www.autograph-abp-
shop.co.uk/files/Newspapers/Harris_News_Sheet.pdf. 
15 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald.  
16Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis(London: Reaktion books, 2012). 
17 Geoffery Batchen, Burning with Desire.The Conception of Photography(Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997).	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In this chapter I examine precisely how early photography became caught up with 
subjective, symbolic and systemic violence, in the following chapter I explore how 
the issue of memory is entangled with the same forms of violence. Then in 
subsequent chapters I go on to examine the relationships between materials and 
human remembering. 
 
***** 
 
 
THE AUTHORITY OF WORDS / THE AUTHORITY OF IMAGES 
 
Photography is superficially understood to have been invented when the physicist 
François Arago announced in Paris to the French Academy of Sciences on January 
7th 1839, that his fellow Frenchman, Louis-Jacques-Mandé Daguerre had 
discovered a process to fix the image created in a camera obscura. 
 
Almost immediately a challenge to the authority of the French claim was issued in 
London. On January 25th 1939 at London’s Royal Institution, seventeen days after 
the Arago’s first announcement, William Henry Fox Talbot, made his claim to the 
title of ‘true inventor of photography’. That evening as the regular Friday lecture at 
the Royal Institution ended, all those in attendance were invited into the library for 
a special display of the visual outcomes of Talbot’s proto-photographic 
experiments.  
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Central to Talbot’s claim as the ‘true inventor of photography’ was the public 
display of a small collection of his photogenic drawings and contact prints; 
tangible, visual proof of the successful outcomes of a series of photographically 
determined, scientific experiments.    
 
We are able to identify a fundamental difference between the two claims to the 
authority of invention. The inherent tension between these two events resides 
beyond the obvious Anglo / Franco division (although it is likely to have been 
influenced by the political and economic implications). As I see it, the tension 
resides in the philosophical domain, in the very nature of how these 
announcements were made. Close examination of the series of announcements that 
Arago made demonstrate that initially he relied solely on language, both written 
and spoken. Talbot however combined his photographic images with language 
from the outset. This subtle, philosophically inflected tension foregrounds an 
important issue that concerns how the new medium emerged into the social and 
political context of the day. 
 
In the four announcements made by Arago between 7th January and 19th August 
1839 in support of Daguerre’s claim to the title of true inventor of photography, 
language was prioritised over images.  
 
Although Arago and his rival Jean-Baptiste Biot, the eminent French physicist 
working in the field of optics, had privately examined Daguerre’s early images, 
Arago elected not to reveal them in his process of championing the Daguerre claim 
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through the scientific and then the state institutions of France. Although images 
were at the very centre of this dispute it appears that Arago did not yet comprehend 
the power inherent in the fixed photographic image. 
 
Arago’s second announcement was made on the 15th of June 1839 and it escalated 
Daguerre’s claim to authority from the scientific community’s Academy of 
Sciences to the parliamentary institution the Chamber of Deputies; again it did not 
include the presentation of images.  
 
One hundred and seventy two days after Talbot’s public display of his 
photographically generated images, on July 16th 1839, Arago made his third 
announcement. It was at this announcement, again at the Academy of Sciences, 
that Arago first presented Daguerre’s photographic images. The third 
announcement was significant for two other reasons, firstly Daguerre was 
effectively distanced from his earlier partner in proto-photographic 
experimentation Nicéphore Niépce, who was effectively written out of provenance; 
and secondly any potential foreign claim to the title of true inventor of photography 
was undermined and discredited. 
 
Arago proclaimed:  
 
Had it been possible to disavow the importance of the 
Daguerreotype, and the place which it cannot fail to hold in the 
esteem of all men, all hesitation on our part would have ceased 
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when we should have beheld the pressing avidity of foreign nations 
in endeavouring to profit by an erroneous date, a fact held in doubt, 
pretexts of the most frivolous nature, to substantiate a claim to 
priority, to try to add the brilliant ornament which will always be 
formed by photographical processes, to the crown of discoveries 
which every one of these nations is wont to wear.18 
 
At the very inception of photography a subtle yet important issue emerged that has 
stayed with photography for a very long time.  From its emergence and during the 
very early days of the new medium’s development a conflict between the perceived 
authority of words and the perceived authority of images developed.  This conflict 
exerted a powerful effect on the development and proliferation of the new medium 
and shaped the functions that it came to fulfil within the rapidly modernising social 
context into which it was emerging. 
 
One of the images included in Talbot’s early photographic display was a small 
photogenic negative, titled Latticed Window (with camera obscura). This now 
famous image pictorially represents a gridded geometric formation, set on a 
slightly diagonal axis centred in a field higher than it is wide. The image is an 
interior view of a window frame in the hall of Laycock Abbey, Talbot’s family 
home. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid. 224 
This quotation originates in Francois Arago’s report to the Chamber of Deputies reproduced in 
Daguerre, Account, 30-31. Arago’s original statement to the Académie des Sciences is reproduced 
in Helmut and Alison Gernsheim, L.J.M. Daguerre: The History of the Diorama and the 
Daguerreotype (New York: Dover Publications, 1968.) Batchen explains that Arago’s official 
statement was pre-empted by newspaper reports such as H. Gaucheraud’s January 6, 1839 report 
in Gazette de France which is reproduced in Aaron Scharf, Pioneers of Photography: An album of 
pictures and words (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1975) 37	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 Although small, “not much larger than a postage stamp”,19 this photographic 
artefact presents vast historical, social and philosophical implications when we 
consider what is written on its mount-card. Although it was first presented to the 
public in January 1839, written on the mount-card is August 1835, a date four years 
prior to the commencement of Arago’s Daguerre announcements. 
 
 
Henry William Fox Talbot 
Latticed Window (with Camera Obscura) 1835. Negative and mount card. 
Reproduced at approximate actual size 
 
 
Today, Talbot’s Lattice Window (with camera obscura)is widely considered the 
earliest known photographic negative, and Talbot’s January 25th 1839 public 
display of photographically generated images is now widely accepted as the very 
first photographic exhibition.20  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Geoffery. Schaaf Batchen, Larry, "Monash University Art, Design and Architecture, Art Forum 
Lecture,"(2011). Schaaf 
This quotation and the following refer to a recorded conversation between Schaaf, L. and Batchen, 
G about the early work of Henry William Fox Talbot. The conversation was held in 2011at 
Monash University in Melbourne as part of the Art, Design and Architecture Art Forum series.  
This reference is drawn from Schaaf’s introduction to Latticed Window [with the camera obscura] 
William Henry Fox Talbot, 1835. Regarded by many photographic historians as our ‘touchstone’, 
it is the earliest documented paper photograph and the earliest photographic negative. 
20 Ibid. Schaaf	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Although today Talbot is considered the inventor of modern photography, the 
importance of his role in the conception, invention and development of 
photography remained buried, for a very long time, beneath another version of 
recorded photographic history.  
 
 
Henry William Fox Talbot 
Latticed Window at Laycock Abbey 1835. Positive 
 
 
 
THREAT / PROMISE  
 
In the early days of photography the new medium came to be publically perceived 
as both a threat and a promise. The photographic image’s natural realism 
contributed to this perception. As it emerged the medium became understood as a 
means for generating an irrefutable visual record of the circumstances of a moment 
in time, proof that something had happened at a specific time in a specific place.  
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As Allan Sekula suggests in his essay “The Body and the Archive”,21 it was the 
amount and diversity of photographic practices that proliferated in the medium’s 
early days that contributed to the medium’s dual perception of threat and promise:  
 
The sheer range and volume of photographic practice offers ample 
evidence of the paradoxical status of photography within bourgeois 
culture. The simultaneous threat and promise of the new medium 
was recognised at a very early date, even before the daguerreotype 
process had proliferated.22  
 
The context of threat leads to considerations of violence. To consider the 
relationships between early photography and specific forms of violence, it is 
necessary to examine both the social response to the new medium and the social 
functions that it came to fulfil within the rapidly modernising social context it was 
emerging into.  
 
In his well-known essay Sekula examines the British social context of the 1830’s 
and 1840’s to explore the threat / promise duality that is today acknowledged as a 
defining characteristic of early photography. He makes the important point that 
early photography was not pitted against a “static traditional culture”,23 rather that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive." 
22 Ibid. 3 
23 Ibid. 4 
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its perceived threat was founded in the fact that it had the technological potential to 
“outpace”24 already expanding cultural institutions: 
 
photography promises an enhanced mastery of nature, but 
photography also threatens conflagration and anarchy, an incendiary 
levelling of existing cultural order.25   
 
Here Sekula is referring to the nature of the early relationship between 
photography and high culture, specifically London’s National Gallery which, 
having been founded in 1824, moved into its neo-classical buildings on Trafalgar 
Square in 1839. Sekula is suggesting here that from its very inception, photography 
had a relationship of unease with the bastions of high culture. 
 
In August 1839, Arago made his fourth announcement regarding Daguerre’s claim 
to the title of true inventor of photography. This announcement took the form of a 
media frenzied, first public viewing of Daguerre’s images, thus making public the 
visual secrets of Daguerre’s process. In the same month a popular song circulated 
the streets of London,26 its verses highlight some of the social responses to the 
emergent medium. 
 
The song begins with the verse: 
    
O Mister Daguerre! Sure you’re not aware 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 4 
25 Ibid. 4 
26 Ibid. 4	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Of half the impressions you’re making, 
By the sun’s potent rays you’ll set the Thames in a blaze, 
While the National Gallery’s breaking.27 
 
The third verse of this popular song makes a direct reference to the 1839 New 
Metropolitan Police Act of British parliament. 28 Although the Act itself does not 
make reference to the new medium, the third verse of the song suggests a 
widespread public perception that the new medium had arrived with potential for 
authoritative intrusion into daily life.  
 
   The new Police Act will take down each fact 
  That occurs in its wide jurisdiction 
  And each beggar and thief in the boldest relief 
  Will be giving a colour to fiction.29 
 
Rapidly the new medium came to fulfil new functions with social, legal, medical, 
scientific and economic implications. The photographic apparatus was dramatically 
changing an already transforming world.  
 
The authoritative power implied by the new photographic realism was quickly 
realised through its new role as an irrefutable form of forensic evidence. Soon 
after, its potential for application to policing activities was realised, and thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Helmut and Alison Gernsheim, L. J. M. Daguerre. The History of the Diorama and the 
Daguerreotype(London: Secker and Warburg, 1956). 105 
28 "Metropolitan Police Act, 1839," The National Archives, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/2-3/47/contents. 
29 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive." 4 
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brought early photography into close association with the violence implicit to law 
enforcement and criminal transgressions.  
 
Although photographic documentation of prisoners was not at all 
common until the 1860’s, the potential for a new juridical 
photographic realism was widely recognised in the 1840s, in the 
general context of these systematic efforts to regulate the growing 
urban presence of ‘dangerous classes,’ of a chronically unemployed 
sub-proletariat.30 
 
Tracing this development, Sekula highlights the text that accompanies two plates in 
Talbot’s book The Pencil of Nature,31 which is richly illustrated with Talbot’s 
photogenic drawings combined with his textual meditations on each image. 
Combining images and text, the Pencil of Nature reveals many things about the 
emergent medium including the details of Talbot’s Calotype process, and it came 
to function as a “compendium of wide-ranging and prescient meditations on the 
promise of photography”.32  
 
First drawing our attention to a plate titled The Open Door (which represents both 
pictorially and allegorically, a broom leaning beside an open door), Sekula points 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. 5 
31 The Pencil of Nature was published in six volumes between 1844 -1846, it is considered the first 
photographically illustrated book. 
32 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive." 5 
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out that Talbot is claiming the “authority of the Dutch school of art for taking as 
subjects of representation scenes of daily and familiar occurrence”.33 
 
The 17th century Dutch Masters paintings that Talbot’s photographic image directly 
references were precisely the kind of cultural artefact that was being celebrated and 
collected by the recently established new national galleries and other high art 
institutions. In creating this image Talbot invests it with the culturally authoritative 
lineage of an established image making tradition. This is clearly evidenced by the 
following image comparison.  
 
  
William Henry Fox Talbot   Johannes Vermeer 
The Open Door 1844    Het Straatje (The Little Street) 1657 detail 
Salted paper print from paper negative  Oil on canvas 
14.3 x 19.4 cm    53.3 x 44 cm 
 
 
The second example Sekula highlights is Plate 111, Articles of China. This image 
reveals the emergence of a very different order of naturalism. The image Articles of 
China represents a collection of 30 objects made of china that are arranged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid. 5-6  	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equidistantly across four shelves.  In Talbot’s notes accompanying this image he 
reveals an acknowledgement of the forensic capacity inherent in his new process.   
 
 
William Henry Fox Talbot 
Articles of China (prior to June) 1844 
Salted print from calotype negative 14 x 18.2 cm 
 
 
(S)hould a thief afterwards purloin the treasure - if the mute 
testimony of the picture were to be produced against him in court - 
it would certainly be evidence of a novel kind. 34 
 
This example demonstrates that photography’s new found forensic function had 
been realised and it was quickly developed and put to work in the process of 
identifying and indicting criminals.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid. 6 
Here I draw directly from Sekula, the quotation is sourced from William Henry Fox Talbot, The 
Pencil of Nature, 1844, facsimile edition, New York, Da Capo, 1968, pl.6, n, p. 
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In his essay “Evidence, Truth and Order: A Means of Surveillance”,35 John Tagg 
examines the social frameworks existing in London at the time of photography’s 
emergence. He analyses the implications of the new medium’s application to 
policing activities through the genre of portraiture. This well-known essay occupies 
an important position in my research as its central theme addresses the symbolic 
and systemic violence inherent in the development and implementation of early 
policing photography, and the contemporary legacies of this that can be identified 
in the social structures that we to live with today.  
 
It is widely accepted that the proliferating industrialisation that occurred in the 
second half of the nineteenth century necessitated the presence of a diverse 
workforce in increasingly dense urban centres.  These new, dense and diverse 
conurbations generated a need that had not previously existed, a need for “practices 
of social obedience within the dangerously large urban concentrations which 
advanced industrialisation necessitated”.36 Tagg explains that the increasing need 
for social regulation was met by,   
 
more and more extensive interventions in the daily life of the 
working class within and without the workplace, through a complex 
of medical, educational, sanitary and engineering departments 
which subsumed older institutions and began to take over the work 
of private and philanthropic agencies.37 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Tagg, "Evidence, Truth and Order. A Means of Surveillance." 
36 Ibid. 245	  
37 Ibid. 245 
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The issue of force was also present in the newly emergent local state. Local police 
forces were conceived in response and enacted by the 1829 Metropolitan Police 
Act. Tagg examines the significance of this in relation to the living conditions of 
the emergent social circumstances and he describes the implications of this upon 
the very production of capital that necessitated its existence.  A vicious circle was 
forming. 
 
(L)ocal police forces and the administrative arms of the Poor Law 
were of central importance to the emerging local state, but even 
these could not operate by coercion alone. They depended on a 
more general organisation of consent, on disciplinary techniques 
and a moral supervision, which at a highly localised and domestic 
level, secured the complex social relations of domination and 
subordination on which the production of capital depended.38 
 
This socially turbulent process and the way that photography was quickly 
developed and deployed within “disciplinary techniques”39 and modes of  “moral 
supervision”40 can be considered in the context of Franz Rosenzweig’s conception 
of martial temporality, and in relation to Eric Santner’s conception of sovereign 
temporalisation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid. 245 
39 Ibid. 245 
40 Ibid. 245	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 Rosenzweig’s martial temporality is a form of temporality organised around the 
rise and fall of sovereign power, 41 therefore it has close associations with 
Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence.  For Rosenzweig sovereignty is “a 
political-theological ‘solution’ to the problem of positing meaningful units within 
and against the forward rush of time”.42 This means that for Rosenzweig 
sovereignty is “ultimately a mode of temporalisation”.43 Elaborating on 
Rosenzweig’s concept of martial temporality, Santner defines sovereign 
temporalisation as “a form of ban, which can mean, among other things: sovereign 
authority; the prohibition or punishment decreed by sovereign authority; spell; 
banishment; abandonment”.44 
 
In Michel Foucault’s language the presence of sovereign temporalisation can be 
considered as “a diffuse and pervasive micropolitics of power operating in the 
smallest gestures of everyday life”.45 This brings us back to Benjamin’s mythic 
violence, specifically the aspect of it that concerns repetition compulsion, which as 
already explained, is “an internally unstable iterative process created by the 
fundamental tensions between law and life, principle and contingency, precedent 
and novelty”.46 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 66 
This quotation and the following three are drawn from Chapter Two of Santner’s On Creaturely 
Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald; in which he elaborates on Rosenzweig’s idea of martial temporality 
first presented by Rosenzweig in his book The Star of Redemption. Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern 
der Erlo”sung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), 368; The Star of Redemption, Trans.William 
W. Hallo (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 332. Santner’s On Creaturely 
Life is a detailed study of the work of Franz Rosenzweig in relation to psychoanalytic theory.   
42 Ibid. 66 
43 Ibid. 66 
44 Ibid. 68 
45 Tagg, "Evidence, Truth and Order. A Means of Surveillance." 245 
46 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 67 
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In its new role within the policing apparatus, the emergent medium generated a 
new genre of photographic portraiture, one that was without precedent. This new 
form of portraiture developed in parallel with the booming business in honorific 
(most often familial) photographic portraiture.  
 
In much the same way that Talbot’s 1844 photographic image The Open Door 
claimed descendancy from an established pre-photographic image making lineage; 
the increasingly popular honorific genre of photographic portraiture claimed 
descendancy from the European, aristocratic painted portraits of the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The photographic documentation of 
suspected and indicted criminals was a coterminous development. It is important to 
acknowledge that the new genre of photographic portraiture did not evolve from 
the honorific tradition, rather it developed from and with a desired repressive 
function.47 Its potential for misuse represents its clear and direct associations with 
both symbolic and systemic violence, and demonstrates how early photography 
became deeply entangled in a double system of representation, a system “capable 
of functioning both honorifically and repressively”.48    
 
As the honorific photographic portraits of loved ones became more and more 
accessible to an expanding field of social classes, the social and cultural status that 
was previously only available to the privileged few who could afford to 
commission a painted portrait, spread to other groups in society and began to play 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive." 6 
48 Ibid. 6	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an important role in reshaping a long established hierarchical social order. Sekula 
puts it this way:  
 
Photography subverted the privileges inherent in portraiture, but 
without any more extensive levelling of social relationships these 
privileges could be reconstructed on a new basis. That is 
photography could be assigned a proper role within a new hierarchy 
of taste. Honorific conventions were thus able to proliferate 
downward.49  
 
Coterminous with this levelling of social relationships, photography’s relationship 
with law enforcement continued to develop, generating multiple forms of 
photographic activity each motivated by different social desires. These 
developments can be understood as attempts to reinforce or prop up the crumbling 
structures of social distinction that the new medium was actively eroding.  
 
During the 1880’s photography and statistics merged. Two examples of this are the 
Bertillon System and the Galton Composite,50 both of which were systems 
designed to identify and regulate the  perceived criminal type.  Detailed analysis of 
the Bertillon System and the Galton Composite are outside the scope of this thesis 
but it is important to acknowledge them in the context of this chapter. The 
following paragraphs are intended only as brief explanations of each of these 
photographic applications and they are provided here as examples of how as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid. 6 
50 Ibid. 18-19, 62  
 
	   34	  
photography developed it became caught up with the subjective, symbolic and 
systemic violence implicit to law enforcement and criminal transgressions.  
 
In 1879 the Parisian police official Alphonse Bertillon devised and deployed a 
system for identifying criminals based on aggregates of visual, textual and numeric 
data. It combined photographic portraits with anthropometric descriptions and 
standardised written notations creating “macroscopic aggregates” 51 or 
characterisations that were based on “microscopic individual records”.52 Bertillon’s 
cataloguing system was devised to identify and regulate the criminal other within 
the rapidly modernising, bourgeois nineteenth century society. It was the first 
modern system of criminal identification and as Sekula points out, traces of it 
continue to survive today:  
 
(I)t survives in the operations of the national security state, in 
the condition of intensive and extensive surveillance that 
characterises both everyday life and the geopolitical sphere. 53 
 
The English polymath Francois Galton invented a portrait typology aimed at 
presenting a purely visual photographic representation of the criminal type. Galton 
was also the founder of eugenics and his motivation for developing the now 
famously suspect composite portraits was based in his interest in lineage, heredity 
and racial betterment; all of which shaped his quest for a biological determinism of 
the criminal type. While the Galton Composite was an attempt to visually articulate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid. 18 
52 Ibid. 18 
53 Ibid. 62	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the generic evidence that supported the theoretical structure of eugenics, it also 
represents a deeper and more insidious violent desire; the desire to intervene in and 
control human society by means of controlled and regulated reproduction to be 
enforced under the guise of the betterment of humankind. Galton was greatly 
interested in this deep systemically violent ideology, and along with his 
development of the repressive and forensically functioning collective composite 
portraits of the perceived criminal type, he actively pursued and promoted a public 
policy that would prevent those deemed ‘unfit’ from reproducing while 
encouraging those deemed socially ‘fit’, to propagate.54  
 
While this systemically violent ideology may seem like a framework of thought 
that could only exist in the past, we need only to consider the current rise of the 
political far right and neo-fascism in western Europe and the rise of islamophobia 
on our own shores to be reminded otherwise. Sekula makes it very clear when he 
states: 
 
“Galton” lives in the renewed authority of biological determinism, 
founded in the increased hegemony of the political Right in Western 
democracies…Galton’s spirit also survives in the neoeugenicist 
implications of some of the new biotechnologies. 55  
 
Coterminous with early photography’s increasing involvement with systems of 
social regulation, it was developing new relationships with the medical industry. 	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Photography rapidly came to fulfil a function previously served by anatomical and 
medical illustration, the documentation of physical anomalies. In this way early 
photography became involved in establishing and delimiting the terrain of the 
other, defining both a “generalised look”56 and  “contingent instance of deviance 
and social pathology”. 57 
 
 The portraiture of suspected and convicted criminals was not the only 
photographic application to affect policing activities. The case of the 1871 Paris 
Commune highlights another instance where early photography’s two faces of 
threat and promise can be identified.  
 
On the 16th of May 1871 Bruno Braquehais captured a series of powerful social 
documentary images. His albumen prints, made from collodion negatives, 
represent the demolition of the Vendôme Column during the brief period of the 
Paris Commune. The Paris Commune was a popular social response to France’s 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Then, as today, the Vendôme Column 
commemorates the military conquests of the Emperor Napoleon.  
 
In 1871 the Communards declared the Vendôme Column, 
 
a monument to barbarism, a symbol of brute force and false glory, 
an affirmation of militarism, a denial of international law, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid. 7 
57 Ibid. 7 
I am drawing directly from Sekula’s description of the rapidly expanding applications of 
photography and the parallel development of honorific and repressive forms of early photographic 
portraiture. 
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permanent insult directed at the conquered by their conquerors, a 
perpetual attack upon one of the three great principles of the French 
Republic.58 
 
For the Communards the column was a powerful concrete symbol of systemic 
violence and they called for its demolition. Being a Communard sympathiser 
Braquehais set out to document a socially and politically important historic event.  
I identify the Communard’s toppling of the Vendôme Column as a clear example 
of what Žižek would describe as a subjectively violent outburst generated by and 
against a background of systemic violence.  
 
I also identify a double desire deeply embedded in Braquehais’ motivation, a desire 
motivated by his understanding of the power inherent in the photographic image. 
Braquehais wanted to not only record the unfolding events of the turbulent times, 
but also to generate reproducible, distributable ‘souvenirs’ of the event. By doing 
so he extended both the reach of the news, and I propose, in some sense the ‘life’ 
and ‘affect’, of the event. I find support for this premise in the writings of Roxana 
Marocci who in, The Original Copy: Photography and Sculpture 1839 to Today, 59 
states “it is quite likely that Braquehais intended to sell his pictures to the 
victorious Communards as souvenirs”.60  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Roxana Marcoci, Geoffery Batchen, and Tobia Bezzola, The Original Copy: Photography of 
Sculpture, 1939 to Today(New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2010). 127 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid.127 
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Bruno Braquehais  
Paris pendant la Commune, la destruction de la colonne Vendôme 1871 
(Paris during the Commune, the destruction of the Vendôme column) 
Albumen silver print from a collodion negative.16 x 21.5 cm 
Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris 
 
 
 
The Paris Commune was short lived and what came to transpire had not been 
anticipated by the Communards.  In a catastrophic inversion of the Communard’s 
desire, the systemic violence that had been the target of their subjective violence, 
triumphed; and very soon after their creation Braquehais’ photographs became 
caught up in the unexpected, externally enforced reversal of his desires. The 
intended function of these early social realist images was suddenly altered and this 
was played out in how they were eventually deployed.  
The intended status of Braquehais’ images as cultural artefacts documenting the 
toppling of a powerful symbol of systemic violence did not manifest as he had 
intended, rather they became active agents in the very apparatus of systemic 
violence that they originally sought to challenge. A few short weeks after the fall of 
the Communards “prosecutors would use his pictures for different political ends: to 
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identify and indict former Communards”.61 In what I consider an example the 
cyclical nature of Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence, the Vendôme 
Column was re-erected.62 
 
The inherent duality that is evidenced by the development of early photography’s 
repressive and honorific portraiture genres can be considered as reflective of the 
threat / promise duality that played out in the case of Braquehais’ Paris Commune 
photographs. What I am endeavouring to demonstrate through these examples of 
early photography’s associations with violence, is a pattern of correspondence 
between certain terms that, when paired and considered in the early photographic 
context, shed light on a pattern of dualities that characterise the emergence and 
development of early photography. 
 
Threat / Promise  
Repressive / Honorific   
 
Based on the pattern identified through my analysis of these well-known texts, I 
propose that these dualities are not the only dualities that can be identified in the 
emergence and development of the new medium. A direct line can be extended 
from the threat / promise duality, identified by Sekula, through the dual functioning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid. 127 
62 In 1844, prior to the toppling of the Vendôme Column, Talbot photographed the construction of 
Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square. Commenting on Talbot’s Nelson’s Column under 
Construction, Trafalgar Square 1844 L, Schaaf points out that what Talbot is actually 
photographing is “the social implications of the 1840’s, the building of public space, and that he 
(Talbot) is worried about what is going to come in terms of social unrest.” See Batchen, "Monash 
University Art, Design and Architecture, Art Forum Lecture." Schaaf 	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of repressive and honorific portrait genres, to the pairing of the terms memorial and 
violence, both of which can be now understood as being caught up with early 
photography.  
 
Threat / Promise  
Repressive / Honorific  
Violence / Memorial  
 
***** 
 
RESETTING SUBJECT VIEWER RELATIONS 
 
As I have already explained, the honorific photographic studio portraits made from 
1839 onward, with painted scenic backdrops, plush velvet curtains, miniaturised 
classical columns, potted palms and other simple props, have their pictorial and 
ideological inception in the tradition of painted portraiture. This is one of the ways 
through which the new photographic medium established a close relationship with 
the concerns of the memorial. 
 
At this stage in the development of my argument it is important to spend some time 
examining these honorific portraits as a means to better understand the complex 
social implications that extend beyond the obvious differences that exist between 
them and the repressive photographic portrait genre.  
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In his frequently cited 1931 essay “A Short History of Photography”,63 Benjamin 
examines two early honorific photographic portraits. One of the motivations for his 
analysis is to explain his concept of the image aura, and how an image aura can be 
created, destroyed, fragmented or lost. On the basis of his analysis of these two 
portraits he proposes the importance of a network of gazes (between the subject 
and the viewer) in establishing aura like qualities in a photographic portrait. 
 
In the following analysis I re-examine Benjamin’s reading of the two portraits in 
relation to another portrait. Although the third portrait is also familial in nature, it 
represents a very different portrait genre, one that is inflected with violence, the 
atrocity image.  
 
The portraits examined by Benjamin and used in the following analysis are The 
photographer Karl Dauthendey with his betrothed Miss Friedrich after their first 
attendance at church. St Petersburg 1857, (hereafter referred to as the Dauthendey 
portrait) and the unknown photographer’s 1888 Portrait of Franz Kafka as a boy, 
(hereafter referred to as the Kafka portrait). The third image used in my analysis of 
subject viewer relations is the 1904 portrait Nsala with the remains of his daughter 
(hereafter referred to as the Nsala portrait). 
 
In this comparative analysis I again draw together well-known subject material 
with less well-known subject material as a way of generating fresh understanding 
of the relationships between the repressive and honorific photographic portrait 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography". 
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genres; and to shed light on how this has led me to make associations between the 
terms memorial and violence. 
 
I begin the following analysis by drawing on Benjamin’s analysis of the 
Dauthendey and Kafka portraits through which he highlights the fragility of an 
image aura, and how easily it might be destroyed either by intention or 
unknowingly as an act of violence that registers either subjectively or symbolically. 
I then go on to analyse the Nsala portrait in the specific context of Benjamin’s 
notion of a generative network of gazes between subject and viewer, and his ideas 
regarding the confluence of temporalities, both of which he states are preconditions 
for the generation of an image aura. I then go on to discuss a very different set of 
subject viewer relations that are evidenced in the Nsala portrait. Lastly I question 
what implications these newly identified subject viewer relations have in the 
potential for generating an empathic relationship with an image aura that is 
generated by the confluence of modes of violence. What I will endeavour to 
explain through my analysis of the Nsala portrait, is that it is possible to generate 
an image aura (in the Benjaminian sense) not only through the confluence of 
temporalities, but by demonstrating their relationship with the confluence of the 
subjective and systemic modes of violence. 
 
In the Benjaminian sense an image aura can only emerge at the confluence of two 
temporalities, the temporality that is present in the making of an image and the 
temporality of being with an image. He also famously suggests that for an image to 
have an aura, what is critical in the moment of making is the correspondence 
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between the subject and the process, or in his words “object and technique”.64 
Benjamin described the aura of an image as “a strange web of time and space”.65 
He then goes on to say that what is critical in the temporality of being with an 
image, is the ‘resting’ with the image of something until “the moment or hour 
begins to be part of its appearance”.66 He elaborates:  
 
(O)n a summer noon, resting, to follow the line of a mountain range 
on the horizon or a twig which throws its shadow on the observer 
until the moment or hour begins to be a part of its appearance - that 
is to breathe the aura of those mountains, that twig.67 
 
 
I identify that as Benjamin’s concept of the image aura is contingent on the 
confluence of temporalities, it has parallels with Rosenzweig’s concept of martial 
temporality which is also contingent on the confluence of temporalities. As I have 
previously elaborated, Santner’s conception of sovereign temporality builds upon 
Rosenzweig’s conception of martial temporality. Therefore Santner’s conception is 
foregrounded by the common requirement of a confluence of temporalities, which 
is a precondition for both Benjamin’s image aura, and Rosenzweig’s martial 
temporality. As both Rosenzweig’s and Santer’s conceptions have a social 
dimension it is possible to consider Benjamin’s concept from a social perspective. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ibid. 207 
65 Ibid. 209 
66 Ibid. 209 
A parallel can be identified here between Benjamin’s ‘being with’ and image and Jan Verwoert’s 
concept of ‘radical empathy’ as he explains in Anti Materialist Materialisms, Into Cosmos-Artist 
week symposium- Adelaide Festival 2012 [Adelaide: Adelaide festival, 2012] 
http://www.adelaidefestival.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Artists'%20Week%20Day%20One%20-
%20Opening%20Keynote%20&%20Response.mp3 
67 Ibid. 209	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Identifying the commonality between Benjamin’s concept of the image aura and 
Rosenzweig’s notion of martial temporality, I acknowledge and employ Santner’s 
concept of sovereign temporalisation as a useful tool in examining the 
relationships between early photography, memory and violence. This is made 
possible because as explained, sovereign temporalisation is caught up with mythic 
violence, and for Santner, under the conditions of modern capitalism, mythic 
violence has somehow “penetrated the fabric of everyday life and has become a 
part of the ‘life cycle’ of capitalist production”.68 
 
To put this in simpler terms I return to the central concern of this chapter and point 
out that the emergence of photography was coterminous with the establishment of 
the institutions of modern capitalism, which according to Santner, occurred in the 
period during which systemic and symbolic violence began to penetrate the 
everyday lives of everyday people. 
 
Embossed on the mount-card of the Dauthendey portrait is the explanatory title The 
photographer Karl Dauthendey with his betrothed Miss Friedrich after their first 
attendance at church. St. Petersburg in 1857. In his analysis of this image 
Benjamin explains that Dauthendey’s wife committed suicide in the bedroom of 
their Moscow house where she slashed her arteries shortly after the birth of their 
sixth child. Analysing the formal visual aspects of the image he writes “She is seen 
beside him, he holds her, her glance, however, goes past him, directed into an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 76 
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unhealthy distance”,69 outside the frame. Benjamin’s analysis alludes to the idea 
that the camera has captured something unconscious in the subject, a sense of 
something that may come to bear.  
 
To put it another way, Benjamin is suggesting that the new medium had the  
capacity to capture the essence of something that is not yet consciously understood, 
something that has not yet been directly experienced. In this way he highlights a 
link between early photography and the yet to be realised drives of the unconcious 
which were central to the emergent of the practise of psychoanalysis. He puts it this 
way.  
 
If one concentrated long enough on this picture one would recognise 
how sharply the opposites touch here. This most exact technique can 
give the presentation a magical value that a painted picture can 
never again posses for us. All artistic preparations of the 
photographer and all the design in the positioning of his model to 
the contrary, the viewer feels an irresistable compulsion to seek the 
tiny spark of accident, the here and now.70 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography". 202 
70 Ibid. 202 
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Unknown photographer         
The photographer Karl Dauthendey with his betrothed  
Miss Freidrich after their first attendance at church St. Petersburg 1857. 
 
 
 
 
detail 
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Benjamin asks the viewer of the Dauthenday portrait to identify and enage their 
own sense of sadness or discomfort in seeing the expression on young Miss 
Freidrich’s face, he asks us to search for, or to sense, the clues of the future violent 
act of suicide that the image holds.  
 
It is a different nature that speaks to the camera than speaks to the 
eye: So differently that in place of a space consciously woven 
together by man on the spot there enters a space held together 
unconsciously.71 
 
Kaja Silverman has identified a misidentification in Benjamin’s analysis of the 
Dauthenday portrait.72 According to Silverman, what Benjamin missed is that the 
young woman in the image is Dauthendey’s second wife, therefore she is not the 
woman who killed herself in their Moscow bedroom. Silverman argues that 
Benjamin’s misidentification is “a motivated one that points to the limits of the 
subject’s agency in photography”.73  For Benjamin the new medium was 
characterised by the ‘spark of contingency’ made sensible through the network of 
gazes that are exchanged between subject and viewer. As Silverman explains, 
although this means that reading the Dauthendey portrait as ‘a portent of 
unhappiness’ is not entirely implausible, she argues that,   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ibid. 202 
72 Kaja Silverman, "Report from the Clark Symposium: Photography as Model," The Photographic 
Situation, https://thephotographicsituation.wordpress.com/2012/10/23/report-from-the-clark-
symposium-photography-as-model/#more-87. 
73 Ibid.	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this mode of double-seeing - the viewer who looks at the 
photograph and the subject who looks back - is what makes 
photography a potentially revolutionary force in human relations 
and interactions.” 74  
 
Benjamin uses the Kafka portrait to highlight and distinguish between  what we 
might call the performative aspects of the making of the image. In other words, 
between the physical experience of the subject as their portrait was being made and 
the implied social currency of the setting in which the image is made. He describes 
the early photographic studios in which the subjects stood motionless for the long 
periods required by early cameras as being “ambivalently between execution and 
representation, torture chamber and throne room”.75  In this description Benjamin’s 
chosen language can be seen as reflective of the threat /promise and  repressive / 
honorific dualities that Sekula identifies. The long exposure times required by early 
cameras to capture enough light to make a faithful image required subjects to 
remain motionless for long, sometimes painfully long, periods of  time. Domestic 
supports “balustrades, little oval tables and columns”,76 served to assist the subject 
in their journey into stillness, while the drapery, plush curtaining and exotic palms 
that were often incorporated into the image settings reflect the mise en scene of the 
genre’s painterly forebearers. 
 
Using the Kafka portrait as an example of the ‘weight’ of this, Benjamin states: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid. 
75 Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography". 206 
76 Ibid. 206	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There in a narrow, almost humiliating child’s suit, overburdened 
with braid, stands the boy, about six years old, in a sort of winter 
garden landscape. Palm fronds stand frozen in the background. And 
as if it were important to make these upholstered tropics even more 
sticky and sultry, the model holds a huge hat with broad brim like 
those Spaniards wear in his left hand. He would surely vanish into 
this arrangement were not the boundlessly sad eyes trying so hard to 
master this predetermined landscape. This picture in its 
immeasurable sadness forms a pendant to the early photographs in 
which people did not yet look out into a world as isolated and 
godforsaken as the boy here.There was an aura around them, a 
medium that gives their glance the depth and certainty which 
permeates it. 77 
 
Through these two early photographic portraits, Benjamin presents the idea that the 
aura of an image resides in the conflation of temporalities and the specific qualities 
and nature of the gaze between the subject and the viewer. In these examples 
Benjamin highlights a particular kind of gaze, the gaze of sadness. In these 
examples the gaze is not returned to the viewer directly, rather the subject’s gaze 
travels across and out of the frame thus penetrating the physical space of the 
viewer. Here the viewer’s interaction with the image is not premised on the 
meeting of the subject’s gaze, rather through what happens when the subject’s gaze 
pierces the physical domain of the viewer. I propose that through this specific form 
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of image interaction the viewer becomes somehow physically associated with, or 
implicated in, the sadness expressed in the subject’s gaze; my argument is that it is 
the subtle relationship between the entry of the subject’s gaze into the physical 
space occupied by the viewer that generates a special connection between the 
subject and the viewer, and that in this special connection resides the potential for a 
physically felt empathic response to the image. One predicated on wit(h)ness 78 
rather than on the idea of bearing witness. 
 
To put it another way, what I am suggesting here is that it is the non-directness of 
the gaze, the non-meeting of the gaze, the looking askance rather than directly at, 
that is most powerful in generating a bodily sensible empathic response to images. 
This idea has parallels with Žižek’s description of how to approach thinking about 
violence. In the introduction of his book Violence: Six Sideways Reflections he 
states: 
  
There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My 
underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying 
in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent 
acts and empathy with victims inexorably function as a lure which 
prevents us from thinking. A dispassionate conceptual development 
of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic 
impact. 79 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The concept of wit(h)ness has close association with Michael Polanyi’s conception of indwelling 
both of which are examined in detail in Chapter 3. 
79 Žižek, Violence : Six Sideway Reflections. 4 
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Returning to the juridical realism employed in the repressive typology of early 
photographic portraiture, I identify that as early as 1904 photography came to serve 
another evidential function. The photograph’s role as evidence which had 
originally been conceived and developed in relation to the identification and 
regulation of the criminal other, was then applied to the identification of a very 
different perpetrator of violence; the sovereign authority. In the following example 
photography had turned the tables. 
 
The Nsala portrait was made in 1904 by Alice Seeley Harris, a British missionary 
working in the Belgian King Leopold’s Congo Free State. It occupies a conceptual 
and stylistic position outside both the repressive and honorific portrait genres; 
rather it is located within another photographic genre, the atrocity image. 
 
The atrocity genre is often mistakenly assumed to have started with the images 
captured at the liberation of Nazi concentration camps at the end of World War II 
but the history of the atrocity genre extends further back toward the early days of 
photography. 
 
The Nsala portrait is a family portrait, it is also one of the earliest examples of the 
atrocity genre,80 and it was involved in one of the first public deployments of such 
images in a campaign of publishing and magic lantern shows designed to inform 
far distant audiences about the often invisible, painful human experience of 
systemic violence perpetrated by a sovereign authority. In fact these images are 
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considered by many as representative of the birth of the Human Rights 
movement,81 a public movement bound up with the issue of empathy, which 
according to Sharon Sliwinski, is inextricably bound to an aesthetic experience.82  
 
The conception of rights did not emerge from the abstract 
articulation of an inalienable human dignity, but rather from a 
particular visual encounter with atrocity.83 
 
These images were widely presented to the public in both Europe and North 
America in the early 1900’s, marking a significant shift in the representation and 
understanding of colonial violence, specifically in the Congo.84 
 
I suggest that these images and their extensive proliferation also illuminated the 
capacity for the impact of the intrusion of systemic violence into the daily lives of 
people, while simultaneously raising difficult questions for early twentieth century 
European and North American audiences, concerning complicity and notions of 
race, inequality and perceptions of savagery and the other. 
 
Throughout my following analysis of the Nsala portrait I draw from Christina 
Twomey’s essay “Severed Hands: Authenticating Atrocity in the Congo 1904 -
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Sliwinski, "The Kodak on the Congo. The Childhood of Human Rights, in Autograph. Republic 
of the Congo". 1 
82 Ibid. 4 
83 Ibid. 4 
84 Ibid. 1	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1913”,85 and Sharon Sliwinski’s essay “The Kodak on the Congo: The Childhood 
of Human Rights”.86 
 
 
Alice Seeley Harris 
Nsala with the remains of his daughter 1904 
Reproduced courtesy of Anti-Slavery International  
 
 
In this portrait we see Nsala of Wala seated on the floor gazing at the severed hand 
and foot of his five year old daughter Boali who was murdered along with her 
brother and mother by the militia associated with the Anglo-Belgian Indian Rubber 
Company (ABIR). These body fragments, wrapped in banana leaves and carried by 
Nsala into the mission where Harris worked, were all that remained of Nsala’s 
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86 "The Kodak on the Congo. The Childhood of Human Rights, in Autograph. Republic of the 
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daughter after a cannibal feast that followed the brutal murder of his son, wife and 
daughter.87 
 
The following lengthy quote is taken from Sliwinski’s evocative description of the 
image and it sets in place an important aspect of my argument concerning the 
relationship between photography and violence by highlighting the moment in the 
medium’s development at which it was realised that images representing the effects 
of subjective violence also articulate systemic violence: 
 
Harris’s image is remarkably calm given the story of its making. 
Nsala is seated centrally, sitting in profile on what looks like a 
thatched veranda, gazing at two small objects lying in front of him. 
A potted cactus is positioned at his back. Two other men look on 
from a distance, one stands with his arms crossed protectively 
against his chest. It is a formally posed, almost peaceful image. 
Painful scrutiny is required to make out the items in front of Nsala. 
The object closest to him appears to be his daughter’s foot, lying on 
its side, severed end tipped towards the camera: the object furthest 
is Boali’s little hand, resting palm side down. These tiny body parts 
explode the peaceful composition of the image and illustrate an 
uncanny inversion of the typical representation of injury; rather than 
a picture of a child with missing limbs, here Nsala poses with the 
remains of his missing child.88 	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Sliwninski goes on to make an important point in relation to the presence of 
absence at work in this image: 
 
(M)issing is not entirely the right word - Boali is more than simply 
absent from the scene - but then there are no words which could 
appropriately signify the palpable affect of her non-existent 
presence.89 
 
Looking closely at the composition of this photograph I identify an easily missed 
bodily association in the representation of the two subjects, the present subject and 
the absent subject. This subtle yet powerful resonance is created by the camera 
angle and the pose that Nsala is sitting in. Looking again at the image we notice 
that his left leg descends below the veranda that he is sitting on, effectively, in this 
view, amputating his left foot, while before him lay the remaining amputated foot 
and hand of his dead daughter. In a symbolic way the present living subject and the 
absent dead subject are connected. 
 
Considering the powerful and violent nature of the Nsala portrait in relation to 
Silverman’s commentary on Benjamin’s misreading of the Dauthendey portrait, I 
identify a very different kind of aura at work in this image, one that I propose is 
generated by the evidential confluence of subjective and systemic violence. 
Although as Silverman explains, the photograph is organised by a mode of “double 
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seeing” whereby the viewer looks at the photograph and the subject looks back, 
thereby photography becomes “a potentially revolutionary force in human 
relations”,90 I argue that it is not the only mode of seeing that makes photography a 
potentially revolutionary force in human relations, especially violent relations. As I 
have already proposed, it is not the direct return of the gaze that is most powerful 
in photographic images that are associated with the problem of violence. The Nsala 
portrait’s power resides in a very different gaze structure than either the 
Dauthendey or Kafka portraits. In this portrait the subject gazes at the remains of 
his daughter, he is gazing at the body parts that were once his daughter, he is also 
gazing into the space from which his once familiar gaze was returned. While he is 
gazing at the fragmentary remains of his daughter, her gaze is unable to be 
returned, rather it can only be remembered, he is gazing into a temporal rupture. 
 
In our looking at this photograph, we participate in that rupture as we enact the 
impossibility that is central to the power of this image.  As viewers, our gaze enacts 
the profound impossibility of Nsala’s gaze being returned by Boali’s. I suggest that 
herein resides the profound, visceral, empathic power of this portrait. In the 
network of visible and invisible gazes at work in this image, the viewer becomes an 
active participant by enacting a process that highlights a violently inflected 
impossibility. The viewer enacts one aspect of what has been lost. The viewer 
gazes at Nsala gazing into the rupture of loss and remembering. The profound loss 
that is the subject of this portrait is articulated entirely within the image and 
enacted by the viewer from outside the frame.  Here the viewer’s gaze pierces the 
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image in a reversal of the way the gazes at work in Dauthenday and Kafka portraits 
pierce the physical realm of the viewer. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION  
 
At the beginning of this chapter I proposed that the history of early photography is 
caught up with the issue of mythic violence. In order to explicate my argument it 
became necessary to distinguish between, and ascribe some precise definitions to 
the various forms of violence that come under the somewhat generic, and perhaps 
much misunderstood yet familiar term violence. There can be little meaningful 
consideration when terms are clouded. 
 
Throughout this chapter I have used the term mythic violence which, as suggested 
in the writings of Benjamin, is related with the operations of the state, and concerns 
the ongoing cyclical histories associated with the rise and fall of states and 
empires; of their conception, founding, development and decay. In my 
interpretation and use of his (Benjamin’s) term mythic violence throughout this 
doctoral research, I mean specifically the interdependent visible and invisible 
forms of violence that manifest in individual and collective actions and systems, 
through which one unconsciously comes to care more about property than life.  
 
To examine the way that early photography became entangled in this form of 
violence it was necessary to make some further distinctions regarding the generic 
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term violence. I turned to Žižek and employed his classification and terminology of 
subjective, symbolic, and systemic violence. Reiterating the meaning and 
importance of those terms, I again explain that subjective violence is the obvious 
and highly visible form of violence - crime, terror, civil unrest, international 
conflict - and that acts of subjective violence often erupt from a background of the 
less visible systemic and symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is embodied in our 
use of language and its forms, while systemic violence is related with the systems 
that we live with and by. These inherently violent systems are sometimes visible 
and sometimes invisible, and like most other systems often only become visible 
when they cease to function smoothly.  
 
With these precise distinctions I examined the socially turbulent months of the 
European summer of 1839 during which photography emerged. My detailed 
analysis of the volley of claim and counter claims that were fired back and forth 
between London and Paris (and indeed the very nature of how these reports were 
made) exposed the emergent medium’s association with symbolic and systemic 
violence, and revealed a subtle philosophically inflected tension that has stayed 
with photography right up to today. I am referring here to the tension inherent 
between the perceived authority of images and the perceived authority of words. 
As I have already demonstrated, this internal conflict, which I argue is endemic to 
photography, shaped the functions that the new medium came to fulfil within the 
rapidly modernising social context that it was emerging into. 
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As I progressed my research into the relationships between early photography and 
mythic violence I exposed and investigated a series of dualities that characterised 
the new medium. The first of these is the threat / promise duality that was 
originally proposed by Sekula in his essay “The Body and the Archive”.91 With 
Sekula’s help I examined the social response to the emergent medium within the 
British social context of the late 1830’s and early 1840’s, and I demonstrated how 
the emergent medium borrowed from a long lineage of established image making 
traditions that exerted a particular form of socio-cultural authority. I proposed that 
through this alliance with, and propagation of the cultural implications of well 
established and unfair social hierarchies, it can be seen to evidence both symbolic 
and systemic violence.  
 
Talbot’s notation accompanying Plate 111 in The Pencil of Nature, the 1844 salted 
print from a Calotype negative, titled Articles of China, can be considered as the 
first documentation of the forensic potential inherent in photography. “Should a 
thief afterwards purloin the treasure - if the mute testimony of the picture were to 
be produced against him in court- it would certainly be evidence of a novel kind.” 
92  
 
Drawing from Tagg’s well-known essay “Evidence, Truth and Order: A Means of 
Surveillance”,93 I then examined another of the important dualities that characterise 
early photography, the repressive / honorific duality. Examining the coterminous 
development of the repressive and honorific photographic portrait genres as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive." 
92 Ibid. 6 
93 Tagg, "Evidence, Truth and Order. A Means of Surveillance."	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means for explicating the social developments that were occurring in all sectors of 
bourgeois nineteenth century society, I examined how early photography became 
caught up with the social perspectives relating to the existence of a perceived 
criminal type, and how this became manifest in the development of systems of 
policing and law enforcement designed to regulate this type of person. While this 
information is not new information, in the context of this chapter it enabled me to 
productively extend the line of established dualities inherent in early photography 
from threat / promise, to repressive / honorific, and then onto violence / memorial. 
This is an important link to establish in the development of my theoretical and 
studio-based research which ultimately concerns the relationship between materials 
and remembering. It is important because it foregrounds the issues of complicity, 
collective acceptance and subject viewer relations, which I address in detail in 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. It may seem paradoxical that my quest for fresh 
understandings of the relationships between materials and remembering begins 
with an examination of the emergence of an image making technology - 
photography - it is important to acknowledge that it is my way in; and it is 
pertinent to appreciate that photographic activity has played a vital role in the 
studio-based research, the photo-archive based research and fieldwork that I have 
undertaken as part of this doctoral project.  
 
The term ‘fieldwork’ may at first seem oddly displaced in this context however its 
archaeological resonance is entirely appropriate given the subject matter of my 
research. 
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Making reference to Rosenzweig’s concept of martial temporality, and Santner’s 
concept of sovereign temporalisation, I highlighted what I consider to be a series 
of parallels between the repetition compulsion, which is central to Benjamin’s 
conception of mythic violence, and the social circumstances apparent in the 
immediate period of photography’s emergence. What I am referring to here are 
tensions between law and life, principle and contingency, precedent and novelty.94 
My analysis of the social considerations and the relations between the repressive 
and honorific photographic portrait genres supports this claim. I turned to 
Braquehais’ early social realist images of the Paris Commune to example one of 
the ways that the threat / promise duality inherent in early photography was played 
out, and introduced another important socially concerned photographic genre into 
my argument. 
 
Approximately halfway through this chapter I turned to the issue of subject viewer 
relations and used three examples to explicate what I call a resetting of the subject 
viewer relations. This resetting (or reorientating) of subject viewer relations is 
contingent on a kind of active and enactive participation of the viewer. I propose 
that this active participation is enacted through the way that the viewer’s gaze 
bodily enacts a represented impossibility. I explained this through my analysis of 
the Nsala portrait. My starting point for arriving at this important development in 
my research was the close examination of two well-known examples of the 
honorific portrait tradition. The Dauthenday and Kafka portraits discussed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 67 
I am referring again to Santner’s explanation of repetition compulsion, which is central to 
Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence.  
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Benjamin in his essay, “A Short History of Photography”.95 Considering these two 
well-known familial portraits in relation to less known familial portrait I effectively 
expanded the field of consideration of Benjamin’s conception of the image aura, 
the studium and the punctum. I thereby reconsider how a viewer is implicated in 
the subject matter of a photograph and thus open up a fresh way to consider the 
well-established premise that a network of gazes is central to the establishment of 
an image aura. Drawing Rosenzweig’s martial temporality and Santner’s sovereign 
temporalisation into association with Benjamin’s image aura, I highlighted a social 
dimension to Benjamin’s well-known concept. This newly identified social 
dimension is important in the next chapter of this thesis in which I examine the 
bodily implications of the relationship between memory and violence, which is my 
next step toward fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and 
remembering, specifically those materials that have borne witness to acts of 
violence.  
 
The following image was generated through my photographic fieldwork, it is part 
of a suite of photographic artworks titled Spectral Materialism, it examples how all 
forms of my practical, creative research have interacted with the theoretical 
investigations of this doctoral project.  
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Andrew Hazewinkel 
Spectral Materialism # 1. 2014.  
Pigment print on archival cotton rag. 44 x 66 cm. 
 
Source object: Head of a female statue. Marble. 2nd century B.C.  
Acropolis Museum Athens 
 
This image represents the badly damaged head of a 2nd century B.C. statue of a 
woman. It is a marble copy of a 4th or 5th century B.C. statue that most likely 
represents Aphrodite, but we can’t be sure. What interests me most about the object 
represented in this image (and indeed the image itself) is the way people appear to 
respond to it. The figure appears to be crying, this is uncharacteristic of classical 
statuary. Most people who physically approach this disembodied head appear to do 
so with a sense of empathy or what I call wit(h)ness; most people look into her 
eyes for a long time before moving away. It is important to note that most people 
remain with this disembodied head longer than the many other disembodied heads 
that populate the same gallery; this is the only one that appears to be crying. I 
propose that most people sense that they have looked into the crying eyes of a 
woman, a woman that has been crying for a very long time. However, those that 
take the time to read the didactic panel accompanying this transfixing ancient 
object soon discover that this painted marble sculpture originally had bronze 
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eyelashes and that the stain running down her cheek is most likely the result of the 
oxidation (over time) of her bronze lashes. This makes another important point in 
the progression of this thesis, which is evidenced by the fact that whilst I ‘know’ 
the physical material reasoning behind what appears to be such a dramatic 
expression of emotion, for me she is somehow still crying, and not. I am unable to 
shake this impression. It is as though this ancient object has cast a kind of spell, a 
spell that emerges from the confluence of temporalities and ways of knowing, both 
bodily (physical) and internal (psychical). 
 
In the following chapters I will explore the relationships between materials and 
remembering through the diverse fields of Memory Studies, Contemporary 
Archaeological and Anthropological Theory by applying the productive between-
ness that I identify between them to the body parts of Archaic, Greek and Roman 
figurative sculpture, which serve as the subject matter of many of the original 
artworks that I have made as part of this doctoral inquiry.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MEMORY AND REMEMBERING 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
The whole dynamic of our relation to the past is shaped by the 
subtle interplay between the inaccessible and the non-existent.  
 
Pierre Nora 1 
 
 
How are we to explain that memories return in the form of images 
and that the imagination mobilized in this way comes to take on 
forms that escape the function of the unreal.  
 
Paul Ricœur 2 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Through my studio-based research, photo-archive based research and 
photographic fieldwork, as well as my investigations of historical and theoretical 
writings, it has become clear to me that early photography’s relationship with 
memory is caught up with the issue of violence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory, 1984, extracts from Les Lieux de mémoire, vol 1, Paris 
Gallimard, 1984, 7 Vols 184 -192; trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Realms of Memory, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996, 4-5: 6-11 in Ian Farr, ed. Memory, Documents of Contemporary 
Art (London: Whitechapel Gallery and The MIT Press, 2012). 65 
2 Paul Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer(Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2004). 50 
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In this chapter I shift focus from the relationship between early photography and 
violence onto the relationship between early photography and memory. These 
entangled relationships are examined to create a historically defined framework 
that enables me to investigate the subtle yet important distinction between the 
broad issue of memory and acts of remembering. 
 
In this chapter I investigate the memory-related aspects of early photography by 
building on the ideas examined in the previous chapter that concern early 
photography’s association with subjective, symbolic and systemic violence. 
 
Drawing the issue of memory and the problem of violence together through the 
medium of photography is important in the development of my argument because 
it helps me to clarify the subtle but important distinction between memory and 
remembering, which I do with the aid of Henri Bergson’s writings on matter and 
memory. This resets my compass and establishes the direction for the following 
chapters of this thesis which ultimately concerns the relationships between the 
materiality of objects and acts of remembering. 
 
Scholars who examine the complex relationships between photography and 
memory have already generated an enormous amount of research. I wish to make 
clear that my intention in this chapter is not to directly extend the existing corpus 
of their research, rather I acknowledge its range and complexity as a foreground 
to the further development of the central concerns of this doctoral research. 
Therefore, in this chapter I engage with one specific hypothesis from the field of 
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Memory Studies and use it as a conceptual mechanism through which I shift my 
research focus from the photographic image onto the materiality of photographic 
artefacts and other related objects.  
 
The hypothesis that I am referring to is Bergson’s precise distinction between 
memory and remembering which is made through his conception of the passage 
from pure memory to memory image. In this chapter I examine his hypothesis in 
specific relation to materials, the body, and habit. This leads me to consider the 
residual marks of violent histories that can be found in material objects, 
specifically the stone and bronze of damaged ancient figurative sculpture. In 
subsequent chapters I go on to propose how these objects function in processes of 
memory-related cognition, and how they maintain relevance in the contemporary 
social domain.  
 
By shifting focus from the problem of violence to the issue of memory, and from 
the defining aspects of early photographic imagery and practices onto themes 
more closely concerned with material culture, I do not relocate my research. 
Rather, by doing so, this research reveals the complex entanglement between 
memory and violence whilst remaining firmly grounded in the terrain of the past 
made present. This important research development opens the way for me to 
directly address the central concern of this thesis, which is to examine the 
function of materials in the commingling of one’s personal experiences with the 
residues, traces and presences of other people’s pasts, presents and perhaps 
futures.  
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I begin by referring to Susan Sontag’s writing on the relationships between early 
photographic images, death, loss and mourning. I explore this well-known 
perspective through an analysis of two unseen images described in Roland 
Barthes’ final book Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography. 3 Then I draw 
the ideas of Sontag and Barthes together to help explain the subtle yet important 
distinctions between memory and remembering averred by Bergson. With the aid 
of Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image, I 
make the important distinction between memory and remembering crystal clear. A 
helpful starting point in understanding this complex issue is the knowledge that 
for Bergson the successive layering of habitual memory is associated with the 
past, and the non-habitual memory of action, or as I see it, the act of 
remembering, is more closely associated with the present.  
 
Distinguishing between memory and remembering has direct resonance with my 
studio-based research. It has enabled me to understand more thoroughly the 
correspondence between the two main creative disciplines that describe my 
studio-based research - photography and sculpture. And it helps me to see and 
analyse the associations between ancient objects and contemporary life. 
 
With the distinction between memory and remembering established, and having 
examined the physical, bodily implications of remembering, I conclude this 
chapter by introducing the concept of postmemory as defined by Marianne Hirsch, 
and the concept of indwelling as defined by Michael Polanyi, then in the 
following chapter I deploy these concepts to examine how the material trace, or as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard(London: 
Vintage, Random House, 2000). 
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I call it spectral materialism, is active in processes of memory and knowledge 
transfer.  
 
The way in which the driving quest of this thesis is linked by the two creative 
disciplines that describe my studio-based research is articulated by the simple 
diagram below. 
 
 
Figure 1. How my conceptual concerns emerge between my creative practices. 
 
 
The specific research activities that come under the category of Photography 
include:  
- Photo-archive based research. 
- Analogue and digital photographic field work.  
- Studio-based photography.  
- Video.  
- Digital image processing and printing.  
- Darkroom practices.  
 
The specific research activities that come under the category of Sculpture include:  
- Mould making. 
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- Casting. 
- Constructing. 
- Screen-printing.  
- Practical material research. 
 
 Some of the materials employed in this doctoral research include porcelain, 
silicone, glass, leather, steel, plaster of Paris, agate and carbon. 
 
The texts directly informing this chapter are the 1988 English translation of Henri 
Bergson’s 1908 book Matière et Mèmoire published in 1988 as Matter and 
Memory; 4 the 1981 English translation of Roland Barthes’ 1980 book La 
Chambre Claire published as Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography; 5 
Geoffrey Batchen (ed), 2009 book Photography Degree Zero: Reflections on 
Roland Barthes Camera Lucida; 6 Batchen’s 2004 book Forget Me Not: 
Photography and Remembrance; 7 Marianne Hirsch’s 2012 book, The Generation 
of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust; 8 and Susan 
Sontag’s 2003 book Regarding the Pain of Others. 9 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. (authorised by) Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott 
Palmer(New York: Zone Books, 1991). 
This translation was made from the 1908 (fifth) edition of the French originally published under 
the title Matière et Mèmoire. 
5 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 
6 Geoffrey  Batchen, Photography Degree Zero.Reflections on Roland Barthes' Camera 
Lucida(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2009). 
7 Geoffrey Batchen, Forget Me Not. Photography and Remembrance(New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press and  the Van Gough Museum Amsterdam, 2004). 
8 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the 
Holocaust(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
9 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003). 
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Other texts informing this chapter are Ian Farr’s (ed), 2012 book Memory: 
Documents of Contemporary Art;10 the English translation of Paul Ricœur’s book 
Mèmoire, l’historie, l’oubli published in 2004 as Memory, History Forgetting; 11 
and Paul Connerton’s 1989 book How Societies Remember. 12 
 
***** 
 
  EARLY PHOTOGRAPHY / DEATH 
 EARLY PHOTOGRAPHY / MEMORY 
 
It is widely understood that from its very inception, photography established a 
close relationship with the issue of loss, mourning and death, all of which are 
inextricably bound up with memory. 
 
 In the previous chapter I examined the coterminous development of the 
repressive / forensic and honorific portrait typologies that emerged with early 
photography. In this chapter I examine how each of these photographic genres 
played distinct roles in establishing the emergent medium’s association with 
death.  Briefly explained, the honorific portrait typology was associated with 
death through the issue of loss and the desire for ancestral remembrance. The 
repressive / forensic portrait typology was caught up with death through its 
entanglement with the violence associated with transgressions of and enactment 
of law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Farr, Memory. 
11 Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting. 
12 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, ed. R. Goody Dunn, J. Hammel, and E.A. Hawthorn, 
Themes in Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).	  
	   72	  
 
As already explained, the emergence of the honorific photographic portrait 
typology “subverted the privileges inherent in portraiture”13 by enabling a broader 
range of nineteenth century social classes to commission images of their loved 
ones, to keep close long after their loved ones had died. This levelling of long 
established social hierarchies was coterminous with the emergence of the 
repressive / forensic portrait typology which forged a different relationship with 
death. As this new genre developed it rapidly became an instrument of emergent 
policing practices and the legal apparatus that pursued the regulation of the 
socially perceived criminal type which often resulted in their execution, or at the 
very least the cessation of the mode of living that the malefactor had pursued 
before incarceration.  
 
In her well-known book Regarding the Pain of Others Sontag writes about early 
photography’s association with the memory and the mourning associated with 
loss:  
 
Ever since cameras were invented in 1839, photography has kept 
close company with death. Because an image produced with a 
camera is, literally, a trace of something brought before the lens, 
photographs were superior to any painting as a memento of the 
vanished past and the dear departed.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Allan Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," October 39, no. Winter (1986). 6 
14 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others. 24 
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Developing this theme in his deeply personal book Camera Lucida: Reflections 
on Photography,15 written shortly after the death of his mother, Barthes presents 
his evolving ideas regarding the relationships between photography, memory and 
loss. In the edition of Camera Lucida that I refer to throughout this thesis, Barthes 
includes a total of twenty-four images that support the development of his ideas.16 
However, the most significant image in the evolution of Barthes’ ideas concerning 
the relationship between photography, memory and loss, the Winter Garden 
Photograph, is not included; it has never been published.  
 
Of this historically important image Barthes declares: 
 
I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only 
for me. For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one 
of the thousand manifestations of the ‘ordinary’; it cannot in any 
way constitute the visible object of a science; it cannot establish an 
objectivity, in the positive sense of the term; at most it would 
interest your studium: period, clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, 
no wound. 17 
 
This pivotal image in the history of photographic research has never been 
published and thus it remains unseen by those of us working in this field, however 
it exists in our minds eye, our mental image of it is shaped only by Barthes’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 
16 Regarding the significance of images selected by Barthes for inclusion in Camera Lucida: 
Reflections on Photography specifically the use of Daniel Boudinet’s 1979 image Polaroid on the 
cover of the original French edition. See Batchen, Photography Degree Zero.Reflections on 
Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida. 15-17 
17 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 73 
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evocative description and response. Through his analysis of this now famous 
unseen image of his mother as a child, and his highly personal, at times painful 
response to it, Barthes arrives at the conclusion that photography and memory do 
not come together at all well. He expands this hypothesis by proposing that a 
photograph actually blocks memory. 
 
Not only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory (whose 
grammatical expression would be the perfect tense, whereas the 
tense of the Photograph is the aorist), but it actually blocks 
memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory.18  
 
Startlingly, it is approximately two thirds of the way through his frequently 
analysed text that he arrives at his key concept, that a photograph actually blocks 
memory.  To gain a better understanding of Barthes thoughts on the relationship 
between photography and memory I closely examine the beginning of this his 
final and best-known book.  
 
Barthes begins Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography by describing the 
inner or psychic experience that he had upon seeing a certain photograph, and 
how that photograph struck him in such a way that he was not thereafter able to 
escape it. Again, this important image in the study of the history of photography is 
not seen by the reader, rather, Barthes demands our imagining. 19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid. 91 
19 Barthes’ uses the literary strategy of calling us to imagine an image rather than expose it in the 
instance of the two defining images of his argument that a photograph actually blocks memory. 
With this in mind it is interesting to consider that Barthes’ dedicated Camera Lucida as an homage 
to Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Imaginaire; and that for Bergson memory and the imaginary are 
inextricably linked. There are also parallels with Žižek’s notion of the benefits of looking askance 
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I happened on a photograph of Napoleon’s youngest brother 
Jerome, taken in 1852. And I realised then, with an amazement I 
have not been able to lessen since: ‘I am looking at eyes that 
looked at the Emperor.’ Sometimes I would mention this 
amazement, but since no one seemed to share it, not even 
understand it…I forgot about it.20 
 
Here Barthes is describing a kind of psychic impression generated by his act of 
looking at an image of the eyes of a subject that once looked at another more 
distant subject, the Emperor Napoleon. We can say that Barthes psychic sensation 
occurred in place of the direct physical experience of looking at the Emperor 
Napoleon, which the passage of time denied him. 
 
Parallels with inherent differences can be drawn between Barthes’ powerful 
experience of looking at the Jerome portrait and, as analysed in the previous 
chapter, our experience of looking at the Nsala portrait. In Barthes’ experience his 
gaze is met by another’s gaze, his eyes meet another’s eyes that once looked at a 
subject that Barthes longs to see. In our experience of the Nsala portrait our gaze 
is not met, we gaze at the man who gazes into the space from which his gaze was 
once returned; he remains in search for the absent eyes of his murdered daughter. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
at violence, and that direct representation serves to lessen one’s understanding of the complexity at 
issue.	  
20 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 3 
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FAMILIAR AND IMPOSSIBLE 
 
Although Barthes himself was not able to look at the Emperor, seeing Jerome’s 
eyes and being struck with the idea that he was looking at eyes that had looked at 
the Emperor, Barthes perceived that he became somehow physically closer, 
perhaps even somehow connected with, or implicated in, an experience that was 
that was for him physically impossible. Barthes’ deeply felt psychic connection, 
or sense of wit(h)ness, is what ties together Barthes’ experience of the Jerome 
portrait and our experience of the Nsala portrait. 
 
Barthes’ psychic impression shaped his thinking about photography’s capacity to 
“touch him across time and space”.21 In this instance, the image of Jerome acts as 
a kind of psychic bridge, linking what Jerome had seen and Barthes’ could not.  
Barthes goes on to describe this special connectivity in physical terms, “a sort of 
umbilical cord links the body of the photographed thing to my gaze”.22 As 
Geoffrey Batchen has pointed out, it was Barthes’ perception of a physical link 
between a photograph and the thing that it represents, that led Barthes toward 
what he called an “ontological desire”,23 that, for Barthes, was essential to the 
apprehension of photography.   
 
I was overcome by an “ontological” desire: I wanted to learn at all 
costs what Photography was “in itself,” by what essential feature it 
was to be distinguished from the community of images. 24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Batchen, Photography Degree Zero.Reflections on Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida. 12 
22 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 81 
23 Batchen, Photography Degree Zero.Reflections on Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida. 14 
24 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 3	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I suggest that Barthes’ unshakeable psychic impression occurred at the confluence 
of familiarity and impossibility. Familiarity with the act of seeing, and the 
knowledge of the impossibility of seeing what Jerome had seen. In this example, 
the familiarity has bodily associations, specifically with the physical act of 
looking, and the impossibility, created by the passage of time, is experienced in 
the mind. In this example the conflation of the familiar and the impossible occurs 
within and without the photograph’s frame; it is experienced between the subject 
and the viewer. In the Nsala portrait however, the conflation of familiarity and 
impossibility is enacted by the viewer’s gaze. In this example familiarity is 
embodied in the viewer as their gaze enacts the impossibility of the present 
subject’s gaze being met by the absent subject’s gaze.  In this instance, enacted 
impossibility is caught up with the residues of subjective and systemic violence. 
 
In both of these examples we are reminded of Benjamin’s concept of the image 
aura and the role played by a network of gazes in generating it. In both examples 
one of the gazes present in the affective network remains unseen. There is a 
however a subtle yet important distinction between these two examples, one is 
sensed and the other is enacted. Barthes senses an impossibility that is his own, 
while the viewer of the Nsala portrait enacts the impossibility that is being 
experienced by the subject, or in other words, the viewer embodies and enacts 
what the subject desires. 
 
In relation to the Jerome portrait Barthes is both psychically and physically 
conscious of the presence of a specific kind of gaze, a hidden, removed, or 
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inaccessible gaze; one that is psychically sensed and understood, yet remains 
unseen.  For Barthes the sense of the invisible is of paramount importance, for 
him the unseen is most forceful, as he explains when he states that, “what is 
hidden is for us Westerners more ‘true’ than what is visible”.25 Elaborating on the 
idea of the inherent power of the unseen Barthes makes it most clear when he 
states: 
 
Is not the most erotic portion of a body where the garment gapes? 
In perversion (which is the realm of textual pleasure) there are no 
‘erogenous zones’ (a foolish expression, besides); it is 
intermittence, as psychoanalysis has so rightly stated, which is 
erotic: the intermittence of skin flashing between two articles of 
clothing (trousers and sweater), between two edges (the open-
necked shirt, the glove and the sleeve); it is this flash itself which 
seduces, or rather: the staging of an appearance-as-disappearance. 
26 
 
My analysis of the opening lines of Camera Lucida suggests that Barthes’ 
reflections on photography, and its association with the act of remembering, point 
to a psychic entanglement between a viewer and a photograph, one that triggers a 
psychic capacity caught up with the sensed but not necessarily directly 
experienced, or overtly displayed. If this is the starting point from which Barthes 
arrives at the notion that a photograph is not a memory and that photographs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid. 100 
26 The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller(London: Jonathon Cape, 1975). 9-10 
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actually block memory, perhaps we can say that remembering is best served by 
the absence of a photographic image.  
 
Batchen suggests that Barthes’ concluding claim that photographs block memory 
is based on the “presumed capacity of the photograph to replace the immediate, 
physically embracing experience of involuntary memory (the sort of emotional 
responses often stirred by smells and sounds) with frozen illustrations set in the 
past”.27 He goes on to assert that Barthes implies that photography “replaces the 
unpredictable thrill of memory with the dull certainties of history”.28  Considering 
this in relation to the important distinction made by Bergson between memory and 
remembering, I rephrase Batchen’s statement about Barthes’ concluding claim, to 
serve greater clarity of the distinction between memory and remembering.  
 
Barthes’ concluding claim that photographs block memory is based on the 
presumed capacity of the photograph to replace the immediate, physically 
embracing, unpredictable dynamic act of remembering with presumed static 
certainties of memory. 
 
What I am endeavouring to draw out here is Barthes’ implied distinction between 
memory and the feelings, or actions, associated with remembering. I will expand 
on this subtle yet important distinction with the aid of Bergson’s conception of the 
passage from pure memory (which I identify as more closely associated with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Batchen, Forget Me Not. Photography and Remembrance. 15 
28 Ibid. 15 
See Batchen’s lengthy endnote as to the origins of this idea, including a long extract from Gustave 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary in which, as Batchen describes, ‘Flaubert canvases the idea’.	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past), to memory image (which I identify as more closely associated with the 
present).  
 
The idea of the subtle distinction between the experience of seeing a photographic 
image and its capacity to generate feeling can also be found in Sontag’s writings 
on a different photographic genre, the atrocity image.  
 
In her discussion about the impact of the proliferation of images depicting the 
outcomes of subjective violence - war, crime, acts of terror - and all kinds of 
images that represent the suffering of others - Sontag suggests that it is the very 
exposure to the proliferation of pictorial violence that lessens our capacity to feel, 
not our capacity to remember.  
 
(I)n a world saturated, no hyper-saturated with images, those that 
should matter have a diminishing effect: we become callous. In the 
end, such images just make us less able to feel, to have our 
conscience pricked.29 
 
For Barthes however, the relationship between photography and violence is not an 
issue of representation, for him the relationship between photography and 
violence is different from those that I examined in the previous chapter. For 
Barthes photography’s relationship with violence is a kind of unconscious, 
ontological, systemic violence, in other words, it is the way that photography 
blocks memory that makes photography itself violent. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others. 105 
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The photograph is violent: not because it shows violent things, but 
because on each occasion it fills the sight by force, and because in 
it nothing can be refused or transformed.30 
 
For Barthes it is the role played by a photograph in blocking memory, or more 
succinctly, in blocking imagination, that is itself violent, and I suggest that it is 
perpetrated through an active and affective form of symbolic violence. 
 
It is important to contextualise Barthes’ conception of how memory and violence 
are related. He first presents the complex association at the end of a lengthy 
meditation on a photograph that remains unseen by the reader, an image that he 
demands us to imagine.  
 
This can been seen as mirroring the conditions through which Barthes had his 
initial psychic impression that was triggered by a realisation of his connection 
with a subject that he could never see; or in simpler terms, the conflation of the 
familiar and the impossible. Through his description of the image of his recently 
deceased, elderly mother as a child, he sets up or restages for the reader, the very 
set of conditions from which his earlier psychic impression emerged.   
 
Barthes draws us into a collision of the familiar and the impossible. We all have 
mothers and we are all in some way physically connected with them, this is met 
by the impossibility created by Barthes, of us ever seeing the image of his mother. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 91	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Some scholars have questioned the very existence of the image. 31 It is his refusal 
to block our imagination by showing us an image of his mother as a child, through 
his refusal to show us the very image that his entire meditation rests upon, that 
Barthes refuses violence. He thus maintains his mother in creation in the minds of 
all readers.  
 
Barthes’ thoughts come to us through his deep sadness. He uses his own 
immoveable grief to describe and distinguish the relationships between the 
immovable, static nature of the still photographic image, and the concept of 
dynamic futurity that is inherent in the moving photographic image. For Barthes it 
is the motionlessness of the still photographic image that denies it a future and 
imbues it with melancholy: 
 
Here again is the Winter Garden Photograph. I am alone with it, in 
front of it. The circle is closed, there is no escape. I suffer, 
motionless. Cruel, sterile deficiency: I cannot transform my grief, I 
cannot let my gaze drift; no culture will help me utter this suffering 
which I experience entirely on the level of the image’s 
finitude…the Photograph - my Photograph - is without culture: 
when it is painful, nothing in it can transform grief into 
mourning.32 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 47 
Hirsch points out the Margaret Olin’s identification of a ‘glaring mistake’ made by Barthes in his 
use of an image by James Van der Zee in his explanation of his concept of the punctum, and calls 
into question the very existence of the famous Winter Garden photograph. 
32 Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography. 90 	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Memory and remembering are caught up with the past, which by its very nature 
exists only because of the experienced present and an anticipated future. 
Culturally speaking, death is caught up with the past through our experience of 
the death of others, and it is caught up with our sense of the future, through our 
knowledge of our own inescapable death.  Death and memory are inextricably 
connected. 
 
As already explained, early photography emerged into a society in flux, and as the 
world modernised, the social attitudes toward longstanding cultural constructs 
such as ideas concerning the issue of faith and myth were being transformed. 
These were not the only types of cultural perceptions that were changing. I have 
already explained that the emergent medium played a role in eroding and 
reshaping certain existing class based, socio-cultural frameworks. The emergent 
medium also played a role in changing social perceptions regarding the concept of 
death, or more precisely, the way in which death was present in everyday life.  
 
The emergent medium opened a door that enabled death to take up residence in 
the private spaces in which people were living their lives, it did so through the 
presence of the material qualities of a photograph. Notably, this occurred at the 
same time as modern funerary methods and efficiencies took dead bodies away 
from homes and family contexts evermore quickly. The more that people had 
access to photographs of deceased loved ones, the less time did people spend with 
the actual bodies of the dead. The fixed image of the now dead, slowly replaced 
the physical presence of the recently dead body in mourning practices. This has 
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had a profound effect on western funerary practices and on contemporary 
approaches of dealing with the dead bodies. 
 
Early photography brought a touchable past into the present in a new way. In 
other words the thingness of the photograph gave the act of remembering an 
identifiable and lasting, present, static physicality. Memory did not come from 
photographs, rather remembering was brought to them, and their material 
presence functioned as facilitator. 
 
DISTINGUISHING MEMORY FROM REMEMBERING 
 
Although conventionally considered interchangeable, the words memory and 
remembering do not mean the same thing. In Sontag’s writings about the vast 
reservoir of images depicting the incomprehensible suffering of others, she makes 
the important statement: 
 
The images say: This is what human beings are capable of doing - 
may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, self righteously. Don’t 
forget.33   
 
Sontag then makes the point that this is not the same as asking people to 
remember, and she goes on to assert that a critical distinction between memory 
and remembering is that remembering involves an ethical dimension.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others. 115 
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Remembering is an ethical act, has ethical value in and of itself. 
Memory is, achingly, the only relation we can have with the dead. 
So the belief that remembering is an ethical act is deep in our 
natures as humans, who know we are going to die, and who mourn 
those who in the normal course of things die before us.34 
 
Extrapolating on this distinction provides me with an avenue to pursue greater 
understanding of the entangled relations between photographic images, material 
culture, remembering, and the ethical dimension.  
 
The following image, Spectral Materialism # 2. 2013, evidences the way that my 
theoretical investigations, my photographic fieldwork and my studio-based 
research have informed each other in my investigation of this important idea.  
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel  
Spectral Materialism # 2 (Julia Acquilia Severa) 2013 
Pigment print on archival cotton rag. 44 x 66 cm. 
 
Source object: Bronze portrait statue of the empress Julia Acquilia Severa A.D. 221-222 
Found at Sparta, Lakonia. X23321: National Archaeological Museum Athens. 
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Here we see the head of a badly damaged bronze statue representing a woman, the 
statue stands at approximately 1:1 human scale. Unlike the example that I used in 
the previous chapter, Spectral Materialism #1, here we know the identity of the 
individual represented. She was (and still is) Julia Acquilia Severa, the second and 
fourth wife of the emperor Elegabalus (A.D. 218-222).  
 
My interest in this object and my motivations for photographing it, are caught up 
with the issue of mythic violence, specifically the practice of damnatio memoriae. 
Briefly explained damnatio memoriae was the Roman State (and sometimes 
private) practice of defacing the representations of powerful public figures who 
had fallen from favour. It involved posthumous condemnation, including the 
destruction of images and erasure of names (usually of emperors, generals and 
their families) from public buildings and monuments.  As with the earlier example 
of Spectral Materialism #1, the didactic panel that accompanies this compelling 
object provides us with facts that run contra to our ‘sensed’ response to the object 
(and image). The archaeological record indicates that at least three other women 
in the Severan dynasty, to which Julia Acquilia Severa belonged, were subjected 
to the practice of damnatio memoriae, however the last three lines of this object’s 
didactic panel state: 
 
There is no evidence that Julia Acquilia Severa suffered damnatio 
memoriae. The poor condition of the statue is the result of the 
collapse of the building in which it was erected, caused by a fire, as 
it is clear from the excavation record. 
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I cannot get away from a sense of intent in the damage wrought upon this figure, 
it is visceral and brutal, and the lines quoted above have for me a sense of a legal 
proceeding. My experiences with the material object, and in making the image, 
are deeply connected with the issue of how our contemporary lives are caught up 
with subjective violence, symbolic violence and systemic violence. 
 
If we consider our relationship with photography as essentially one concerned 
with static memory, then perhaps when we consider the dynamic act of 
remembering, and its ethical implications, we should turn our attention to 
materials and material culture. 
 
Distinguishing between, and shifting focus from, memory to the act of 
remembering leads directly to the central concerns of this thesis which questions 
the role played by materials and material culture in the commingling of our 
experiences with the residues, traces and presences of other people’s pasts, 
presents and futures.  
 
By considering the very stuff of material culture as inextricably entangled with 
remembering and therefore, by Sontag’s assertion, ethics, we come closer to 
establishing an association between materials, remembering and the social 
dimension. 
 
 Further evidence of the critical distinction between memory and remembering 
can be found in Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to 
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memory image which he explains in great detail in his book Matter and Memory. 
35 I deploy Bergson’s concept as a way of explaining another subtle yet important 
distinction that can be made between memory and remembering. Bergson 
introduces the concept of habit as a means of separating memory from 
remembering, thereby positioning remembering as action, and associated with the 
lived experience of the body, which he once referred to as “an ever advancing 
boundary between the future and the past”.36 For Bergson memories are ‘not 
conserved in the brain as in a container’, rather he conceives of them as acts 
which can be facilitated or inhibited by our habits.37  
 
By using Bergson’s hypothesis as an example I am able to further distinguish 
memory and remembering, or as Bergson would call them the habitual memory of 
representation and the non-habitual memory of action. 
 
In his book How Societies Remember, Paul Connerton states, “Habit is a 
knowledge and a remembering in the hands and in the body, and in the cultivation 
of habit it is our body which understands”.38 
 
What I am endeavouring to draw out here is the idea that material culture and 
remembering are inextricably linked, an idea that points toward the concept of 
materially based social remembering. This concept has been identified and 
explored in the field of contemporary archaeological theory, specifically the field 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Bergson, Matter and Memory. 
36 Ibid. 78 
37 A Dictionary of Continental Philosophy ed. John Protevi(Yale University Press, 2006). 395 I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Protevi	  for	  the	  premise	  of	  this	  passage.	  
38 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 95 
For another engagement with the issue of ‘habit’ see Clare Carlisle, On Habit, ed. Simon Critchley 
and Richard Kearney, Thinking in Action (London: Routledge, 2014). 
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of Cognitive Archaeology. Colin Renfrew’s 2012 book chapter “Towards A 
Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of 
Society”,39 his 2004 essay “Towards a Theory of Material Engagement”,40 and 
Lambros Malafouris’ 2013 book How Things Shape The Mind: A Theory of 
Material Engagement,41 are investigations of the concept of materially based 
social remembering which I use to further investigate this complex idea in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
I begin my examination of Bergson’s concept of the passage from pure memory to 
memory image with a question posed by Paul Ricœur in Chapter 1 “Memory and 
Imagination” in his 2004 book, Memory, History, Forgetting,42 under the section 
headed “Memories and Images”. 
 
How are we able to explain that memories return in the form of 
images and that the imagination mobilized in this way comes to 
take on forms that escape the function of the unreal? 43  
 
In his attempt to untangle this “double imbroglio” 44 Ricœur adopts the 
Bergsonian concept of the passage from pure memory to memory image as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Colin Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early 
Development of Society," in Archaeological Theory Today ed. Ian Hodder(Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2012). 
40 "Towards a Theory of Material Engagement," in Rethinking Materiality. The Engagement of 
Mind with the Material World, ed. Colin Renfrew Elizabeth DeMarrais and Chris 
Godsen(Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, Univeristy of Cambridge, 
2004). 
41 Lambros Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material 
Engagement(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013). 
42 Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting.	  
43 Ibid. 50 
44 Paul Ricoeur, "Memories and Images " in Memory ed. Ian Farr, Documents of Contemporary 
Art (London Whitechapel Gallery, 2012). 66 
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working hypothesis. Although he works with Bergson’s concept, he indicates 
concerns with distinguishing between,  
 
the psychological description of memory and the metaphysical (in 
the strong and noble sense of the word) thesis concerning the role 
assigned to the body and to the brain and, consequently asserting 
the immateriality of memory.45  
 
A useful way of considering Bergson’s radical separation is through the metaphor 
of the ancient alliance between eikon and tupos.46 As Ricœur points out, 
considering Bergson’s distinction from a metaphysical perspective would be to 
separate the eikon from the tupos, however from a phenomenological perspective 
the eikon and tupos belong to separate related orders.  
 
(T)he eikon contains within itself the other of the original 
affection, while the tupos involves the external causality of an 
impetus (kinesis), which is itself at the origin of pressing the seal 
into the wax.47  
 
As I make clear throughout this chapter, distinguishing between the roles played 
by the body and the mind in acts of remembering, foregrounds another important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting. 50 
46 The ancient Greek conception of eikon and tupos describes the relationship between an object 
and a physical impression, or characteristic, of that object. An easy way to think about this 
complex relationship in sculptural terms is the relationship between a mould and the object that is 
made by pressing into it. Eikon - an image or effigy. Tupos - originally- the mark of a blow,which 
came to mean a stamp struck by a die, then a figure, a copy, an image, and now a ‘type’ 
prefiguring something or somebody.  
47 Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting. 51 
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aspect of this doctoral investigation which is designed to examine the function of 
the material traces of subjective and systemic violence; and also to question what 
roles these residual objects play in the commingling of our experiences with the 
residues traces and presences of others people’s pasts, presents and futures.  
 
In Chapter 2 “Of the Recognition of Images”, in his book Matter and Memory, 
Bergson defines two types of memory and seeks to make a systematic link 
between them. To achieve this he must first distinguish between them, he must 
first separate pure memory and the memory image.  
 
I begin my investigation of Bergson’s complex analysis of these two related yet 
separable forms of memory with very some simple terms from which I will then 
unfold a more complex understanding.  
 
One of the forms of memory that Bergson identifies, pure memory, is, as I see it, 
related with the making or layering down of memory. For Bergson, this occurs 
through a series of “motor mechanisms”,48 or in my terms, impulse exchanges, 
between an object, image or action and the brain.  
 
The second form of memory, the memory image, is the act of recalling the 
aggregated effects of the ‘motor mechanisms’, and it is somehow independent of 
the subject of a given memory.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Bergson, Matter and Memory. 78 
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This perhaps over simplified description provides a useful starting point in 
distinguishing between what Bergson termed pure memory and the memory 
image.  
 
As I have progressed through my studio-based, photo-archive based, photographic 
fieldwork and theoretical research, it has become clear to me that I am more 
interested in Bergson’s concept of the memory image, which I identify as most 
closely associated with remembering, and therefore the present, than in his 
concept of pure memory, which is most closely associated with the past. 
 
My interests in the concept of the memory image and its association with physical 
enactment and embodiment, have a direct relationship with my studio-based 
research which, in this doctoral undertaking, draws together archival photographic 
glass plate negatives with photographic images of broken ancient figurative 
sculpture and a range of related specific materialities in creating a series of objects 
and images that enact the same dynamic concertinaing effect that a photographic 
image has on the temporal dimension.  
 
To make this distinction between pure memory and the memory image clear, 
therefore enabling me to focus specifically on the concept of the memory image, I 
highlight Bergson’s example of a process that is used in learning a lesson in order 
to know it “by heart”.49 
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I read it a first time, accentuating every line; then I repeat it a 
certain number of times. At each repetition there is progress; the 
words are more and more linked together and at last make a 
continuous whole. When that moment comes, it is said that I know 
my lesson by heart, that it is imprinted on my memory.50 
 
 
 
Stepping back from these actions that characterise one of the two forms of 
memory in question, Bergson considers how the lesson was learnt. He outlines the 
successive phases of the process and states:   
 
Each successive reading then recurs to me with its own 
individuality; I can see it again with the circumstances which 
attended it then and still form its setting. It is distinguished from 
those which preceded or followed it by the place which it occupied 
in time; in short, each reading stands out in my mind as a definite 
event in my history. Again it will be said that these images are 
recollections, that they are imprinted on my memory.51 
 
 
In the form of memory involved in the learning of a lesson by heart, identified by 
Bergson as pure memory, he identifies the characteristic of a habit.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ibid. 79 
51 Ibid. 79 
For further engagement with the ‘mechanical’ aspects of Bergson’s conception of ‘habit’ see 
Carlisle, On Habit. 91-94 
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Like every habitual bodily exercise, it is stored up in a mechanism 
which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a closed 
system of automatic movements which succeed each other in the 
same order and, together, take the same length of time.52 
 
 
However, recalling each individual successive pure memory has for Bergson none 
of the characteristics of habit. 53 Simply put, each successive layer, or each pure 
memory, is habitual and is associated with representation, while the memory 
image is non-habitual and is associated with action. 
 
Herein lies the complex issue of distinguishing between these two forms of 
memory.  Through this example we are able to identify them as the recollection of 
the individually layered readings, or pure memory; and the recollection of the 
lesson learnt (or knowledge gained), the memory image which is the facilitator of 
action. Bergson explains the pure memory of the successive readings as 
representations thus.  
 
Its image was necessarily imprinted at once on the memory, since 
the other readings form, by their very definition, other 
recollections. It is like an event in my life; its essence is to bear a 
date, and consequently to be unable to occur again. All the later 
readings can add to it will only alter its original nature; though my 
effort to recall this image becomes more and more easy as I repeat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Bergson, Matter and Memory. 80 
53 Ibid. 80 
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it, the image, regarded itself, was necessarily at the outset what it 
always will be.54 
 
You might say that the memory image of the lesson, the non-habitual memory of 
action, is an aggregated image of all the individual successively layered, repeated 
pure memory.  The memory image then is a kind of aggregate of pure memory,  
perhaps it is better described as an accumulation, encrustation or coagulation of 
the individual layers, in which each is informed by the partial definition remaining 
from the layer that precedes it. 
 
Bergson goes on to state:  
 
(I)t is no less certain that each of them, considered as a new 
reading and not as a lesson better known, is entirely sufficient to 
itself, subsists exactly as it occurred, and constitutes with all its 
concomitant perceptions an original moment of my history. 55 
 
 
Bergson continues to push this line of argument suggesting that the memory of a 
given reading is a representation to which one can assign any duration; “and only 
a representation; it is embraced in an intuition of the mind which I may lengthen 
or shorten at will”.56 Here Bergson is using duration to distinguish between the 
two orders of memory.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid. 80 
55 Ibid. 80 
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The memory of the lesson, if repeated only mentally, “requires a definite time, the 
time necessary to develop one by one, were it only in imagination, all the 
articulatory movements that are necessary: It is no longer a representation; it is an 
action”.57 
 
 
For Bergson, the lesson learnt bears no trace of the past, rather it is part of one’s 
present, and functions in precisely the same way as the habit of walking or of 
writing, in that it is “lived and acted”58 rather than represented. The memory 
image is enacted in the present. 
 
SIX LONG MOMENTS 
 
To help explain this complex conceptual distinction between memory and 
remembering, I draw an example from my photo-archive based research, 
specifically six of nine glass plate negatives that represent different views of the 
same object. The following six images provide a visual way of understanding 
Bergson’s important premise and raises further questions about the differences 
and associations between representation and action. 
 
The following images are souced from the collection of photographic artefacts 
that were present at the inception of this doctoral inquiry. Each of the following 
images is a digital reproduction of one of the late 19th century, dry plate glass 
negatives comprising the Marshall Collection that is currently held in the photo-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid. 81 
58 Ibid. 81 
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archive at the British School at Rome, where my photo-archive based research 
that informs this project has been undertaken. 
 
I need to point out that my ‘first’ experience with the six images below was a 
tactile ‘hands on’ experience, and that somehow my ongoing experience with 
them continues to be directly related with their thingness, with the very 
materiality of the glass plates and shimmering silver salts held on them. 
 
 Each of the images represents a late 19th century, photographic glass plate 
negative measuring 39.5 x 29.7 x .3 cm, considerably larger than this sheet of 
paper. Each image represents a different view of a badly damaged 1st or 2nd 
century A.D. marble statue of a young Hercules seated on a rock.  
 
 
JM753                                                               JM754                                                      JM755 
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JM758                                                             JM759                                                         JM760 
 
Like Barthes’ inability to get away from the psychic impression that he had upon 
seeing the Jerome portrait for the first time, I am unable to get away from the very 
objectness of the these six images. I am unable to separate my experience of the 
material properties and qualities of the fragile glass plates that hold these images 
from these digital reproductions of them. It is important to appreciate that I have 
never seen the physical object that these images represent. 
 
If we look closely at these images we find a clue to the materiality of the glass 
that originally supported them, it is easily missed. Looking closely at the bottom 
left corner of JM758 we can identify a small, clean break. Studying the nature of 
that break we notice that it has characteristics unlike that of a tear which we might 
expect to find in sheet of old photographic paper. It is the physical properties of 
the break that provides a clue to the original materiality and the history of these 
photographic artefacts. It leads us toward a contemporarily, less anticipated, 
materiality of a photographic image - glass.  
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The break in the materiality of this small glass artefact exposes another 
unexpected resonance between image and its subject, one that emerges from the 
philosophical and mythological realms. It is revealed in the way that the break in 
the fragile glass negative mirrors the breaks in the body of the sculpted figure that 
the image represents. It is the mirroring of the damage caused by the passage of 
time (to both the sculpted figure and the glass plate) that enables us to sense an 
unexpected fragility in the representation of a figure that is mythologically famed 
for strength. What I am suggesting here is that there is a correspondence between 
the materiality of the subject and the object, between what has happened over 
time to the materiality of the represented sculpture and what has happened over 
time to the materiality that supports the image of it. This can be understood as a 
form of material semiosis, which is a concept that I will discuss at length in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Although I am very familiar with the glass plate representations of this ancient 
object, and I have made artworks based on it, I have not been physically present 
with the broken sculpted figure. In one sense I am not familiar with the sculpture 
itself, rather only with the various representations of it, yet I am already intimately 
involved with it. This brings us back to the idea of the conflation of the familiar 
and the impossible, to Barthes use of the Winter Garden Photograph, and how he 
uses it as a means of presenting the idea that photographs block memory. By 
considering this I am able to connect his use of the imagined image and its 
association with memory as a powerful aid in understanding Bergson’s 
conception of the passage of pure memory to the memory image.  
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Collectively these six images document not only a sculpted object, they also 
record a specific duration and an action. They do so in a different manner than 
Eadweard Muybridge’s famous images of running men and horses, here the 
camera (and the background) have moved around the subject and different views 
have been captured along the way.  The static nature of these views slows down 
the sensed duration of physically circling the statue. If one circled the sculpted 
object with a fixed gaze one would retain what Bergson calls a memory image of 
the object. Our memory image would be an aggregate of each successive moment 
of our action. Then, days or years later, when we recall the experience of circling 
the statue, we would remember the entirety of the material presence of the broken 
young Hercules and not the individual moments or static views of the experience. 
 
Looking again at the six photographic negatives reproduced here, we apprehend 
that each individually asserts a clear, potent association with the other five, yet 
each also exerts itself as an individual object; as Bergson would say as a pure 
memory, a “definite moment in my history”.59 
 
This example not only makes clear the distinction between pure memory and 
memory image, it can also be considered a practical example of what Michel 
Serres calls the commingling of time. What I mean by this is that the images that 
are printed here on this sheet of paper actively participate in an affective network 
of material correspondence in which each of the active elements occupies a 
different set of spatio-temporal coordinates. These six images are derived from a 
set of nine late nineteenth century glass plate negatives that are stored in boxes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid. 79 
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JM A1 + A2, they are effectively suspended in the temporal limbo of photo-
archive at the British School at Rome. The broken marble statue of the young 
Hercules that they represent is currently standing in temporal mash-up of the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, Gallery 162 to be precise, and on this 
white sheet of paper they are now also in your hands.  
 
CHAPTER 2: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION  
 
I began this chapter by building on the foundation that I established in the 
previous chapter concerning the relationships between early photography and 
subjective, systemic and symbolic violence.  
 
Turning my attention from early photography’s relationship with violence toward 
early photography’s relationship with memory enabled me to begin my 
examination of the entangled relationships between memory and violence as it has 
been mediated through photography. 
 
In the first half of this chapter I examined the ways in which early photography 
came to have close associations with the issue of death and by association, 
memory, a sense of loss and the melancholic tone that is so often associated with 
the medium. 
 
In the second half of this chapter I turned to Bergson, with whose help I 
demonstrated an important distinction between memory, which is closely 
associated with the past, and the act of remembering which is more closely 
associated with the present. 
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I set out by acknowledging the extensive corpus of work concerning the 
relationships between photography and memory that has already been generated 
within the scholarly fields of Memory Studies and Photographic History. Again I 
want to make clear that the intention in this chapter is not to create fresh 
understanding of that specific relationship, rather I have used it as a stepping-
stone toward the driving quest of this thesis, which is to create fresh 
understandings of the relationships between materials and remembering. 
 
The starting point for my analysis of the relationship between early photography, 
death, loss, mourning and memory, was provided by Sontag when she stated: 
 
Ever since cameras were invented in 1839, photography has kept 
close company with death. Because an image produced with a 
camera is, literally, a trace of something brought before the lens, 
photographs were superior to any painting as a memento of the 
vanished past and the dear departed. 60 
 
From this important statement I turned to Barthes’ well-known and deeply 
personal book Camera Lucida: Reflections On Photography, and through a 
process of detailed analysis I considered how Barthes arrived at the important 
conception that a photograph blocks memory. I considered this in relation to the 
distinction, made by Bergson between memory and remembering, and proposed 
that if photography is caught up with memory in such a way that it inhibits the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others. 24 
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dynamic and present act of remembering, perhaps materials and material culture 
are better suited to, or enjoy a closer relationship with, the cognitive act of 
remembering.  
 
Then, pointing out the importance of the unseen in Barthes framing of memory, I 
looked specifically at the unseen image described in the opening lines of his book, 
the Jerome portrait; and the unseen image of his recently departed elderly mother 
as a child, the Winter Garden Photograph, upon which his entire meditation rests. 
I did this as a means to re-examine ways that a viewer of a photograph is 
psychically and physically entangled with its subject. Analysing the parallels that 
I identified between Barthes’ description of his psychic experience with the 
Jerome portrait and the way he uses the unseen image of his recently deceased 
mother as a child, I proposed that in both instances he draws the reader (not 
viewer) into the confluence of the familiar and the impossible. I reflected on the 
evocative power inherent in the confluence of the familiar and the impossible by 
returning again to consider how a viewer is physically connected with, or 
implicated in, the Nsala portrait. The examples of how the conflation of the 
familiar and the impossible work in the Jerome and Nsala portraits brought us 
back to Benjamin’s concept of the image aura, and specifically to how a network 
of gazes is critical to its establishment. Using these two examples I identified a 
subtle yet important distinction between how the viewer’s gaze functions. In 
Barthes’ example the active impossibility is sensed psychically while in the Nsala 
portrait, the active impossibly is embodied and enacted by the viewer’s gaze. Here 
again we might consider Barthes’ famous dictum that a photograph actually 
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blocks memory, and therefore, as I have already proposed that remembering is 
best served by the absence of the photographic image. 
 
The following diagram represents the subtle yet important distinctions that have 
set in motion the turning of the concerns of this thesis from the relationship 
between early photography and violence, onto the relationships between early 
photography and memory, and now toward the relationships between materials 
and remembering.  
 
 
Figure 2: Distinguishing characteristics of memory and remembering.  
 
 In the second half of this chapter I examined Bergson’s conception of the passage 
from pure memory to memory image which lead to important developments in my 
thinking about the nature of the relationships between materials and remembering. 
This distinction maintains an important position throughout this doctoral research, 
largely because of the way that it enables me to see memory as less dynamic than 
remembering, and therefore more closely related with the past; whilst 
remembering can be understood as a series of active feelings caught up with the 
immediate present. In short, memory functions symbolically, and remembering 
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functions through participation. If we accept this premise and consider it in 
relation to my earlier proposition that acts of remembering are better served by 
materials than photographs, then we see a clear path to the central concerns of this 
thesis which question the roles played by materials and material culture in the 
commingling of our experiences with the residues, traces and presences of other 
people’s pasts, presents and futures.  
 
 
I examined the role played by habit in Bergson’s conception of the passage from 
pure memory to memory image, and thereby came to understand remembering as 
action and deeply associated with the lived experience of the body. Understanding 
remembering in this way led me to consider how we share our individual material 
mass with the rest of the material world, which is a complex idea that I will 
explore in great detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This form of relatedness, or 
between-ness, can be understood through the ancient alliance between the eikon 
and the tupos, whereby, in a phenomenological sense, although the tupos and the 
eikon belong to different orders, they are connected in a special way; the eikon is 
somehow present in the tupos and the tupos in the eikon. Although, as I have 
demonstrated, Bergson successfully and productively distinguished memory from 
remembering, he did not separate them, they are still connected, connected in 
much the same way that the eikon and the tupos are connected. 
 
To demonstrate this complex association in a visual way I used the example of six 
images drawn from my photo-archive based research and explained the role that 
these photographic artefacts have played in the inception of this doctoral research. 
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The six digitally reproduced images of late nineteenth century dry plate negatives 
also evidenced how the indexical marks left on a specific materiality expose the 
physical qualities of that material, and how this kind of information can be drawn 
into a contributory (or participatory) relationship with the imagery associated with 
it, thus informing our experiences with it.  In this way my example revealed a 
kind of mytho-material entanglement which has close association with the 
concept of material semiosis. The six images also led us into another more 
philosophically inflected consideration relating to how objects, the processual 
artefacts produced in generating images of them, and the representational images 
of them, are caught up together with the layered experiences of pure memory, and 
how these experiences aggregate as memory image. This has strong associations 
with Serres’ conception of commingled, crumpled time which plays an important 
role in the development of the next chapter in which I examine Marianne Hirsch’s 
conception of postmemory, and the notions of indwelling and wit(h)ness through a 
detailed analysis Michael Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowing. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INDWELLING AND WIT(H)NESS  
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
If there be memory, that is, the survival of past images, these 
images must constantly mingle with our perception of the present 
and may even take its place. 
 
Henri Bergson 1 
 
 
It is not by looking at things but by dwelling in them, that we come 
to understand their joint meaning.  
 
Michael Polanyi 2 
 
 
Because our body is involved in the perception of objects, it 
participates thereby in our knowing of all other things outside.  
 
Michael Polanyi 3 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. (authorised by) Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott 
Palmer(New York: Zone Books, 1991). 66 
2 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension(New York: Anchor Books Doubleday and Company, 
1967). 18 
3 Ibid. 29 
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In this chapter I investigate Michael Polanyi’s conception of the tacit dimension, 
specifically his concept of tacit knowing, and Marianne Hirsch’s conception of 
postmemory. Each of these complex structures is examined in relation to the other, 
and then both are reflected onto the habit concerning aspects of Henri Bergson’s 
conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image. 
 
Also in this chapter I bring focus to specific interest in the relationships between 
the materiality of objects and remembering in relation to the body of the observer 
/ rememberer. 
 
Furthermore, by elucidating the similarities and differences between tacit knowing 
and postmemory, both of which I identify as structures of memory and knowledge 
transfer, I foreground a critical framework for the concept of premembering, 
which I define as a materially triggered understanding of the events, 
circumstances or conditions that one may have not directly experienced, but 
which one’s culture already knows and stores up for all its future participants.   
 
The concept of premembering will be developed further and examined closely in 
the subsequent chapters as I explore how this form of embodied memory is 
informed by the sensed properties, qualities and histories of materials. 
 
The texts directly informing this chapter are Marianne Hirsch’s 2012 book The 
Generation of Postmemory, Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust; 4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the 
Holocaust(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
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Michael Polanyi’s 1966 book The Tacit Dimension;5 the 2008 English translation 
by Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley of Michel Serres’ 1985 book Les Cinq 
Sens, published as The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies;6 and Paul 
Connerton’s 1989 book How Societies Remember. 7 
 
***** 
 
POSTMEMORY, PREMEMBERING 
 
On page two of her book The Generation of Postmemory, Writing and Visual 
Culture After the Holocaust, Marianne Hirsch asks the following important 
question, “How are we implicated in the aftermath of crimes we did not ourselves 
witness?” 8  
 
Reconsidering Hirsch’s question in light of the research I have undertaken in this 
doctoral project, I propose an adjustment to it so that it better suits the central 
themes of my research. By replacing the word ‘implicated’ with the words ‘caught 
up with’, and the word ‘aftermath’ with the words ‘residue’ and ‘trace’, I rephrase 
Hirsch’s original question in a way that progresses my quest for fresh 
understanding of the relationships between the materiality of objects and 
remembering.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 
6 Michel  Serres, The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. Peter Cowley Mararet 
Sankey(New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008). 
7 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, ed. R. Goody Dunn, J. Hammel, and E.A. Hawthorn, 
Themes in Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
8 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 2 
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Throughout this chapter I ask the following question. How are our lives caught up 
with the material residues and traces of systemic and subjective violence that we 
ourselves did not witness? I do this by examining the concepts of tacit knowledge 
and postmemory. 
 
My argument throughout this thesis is that the condition of being caught up with 
the traces and residues of violence that we have not directly experienced, occurs 
through our engagement and practical involvement with the materials and material 
culture that surround us; the very same material and material culture that has born 
witness to the outbursts of subjective violence and the episodes of systemic 
violence that comprise the ongoing narrative cycles of mythic violence. 
 
AN EXERCISE 
 
Before moving into a detailed analysis of Polanyi’s tacit knowing and Hirsch’s 
postmemory, I begin this chapter by undertaking a semiotic exercise designed to 
enable a corporeal sensing of what I call the illuminating between-ness at work in 
tacit knowing and postmemory. The exercise has been conceived as a means of 
revealing the perceptual residues, associations and expressive relations between 
the individual subjects and entries in a series of lists below. In this exercise the 
words comprising the following lists function in the same way as the proximal 
term in Polayni’s conception of tacit knowing, meaning that each word occupies 
the position of something ‘known’ from which we attend to something hitherto 
‘known yet untellable’. 
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The methodology of this experiment borrows from Michel Serres’ characteristic 
literary device, the “variegated list”,9 which in this instance I combined with the 
foundational premise of Polanyi’s tacit knowing, which is that we attend from 
something known toward something else known, yet untellable.  
 
The following exercise uses three lists as primary data sources, and generates a 
fourth list.  Each of lists 1, 2 and 3 are drawn from the theoretical writings that 
have informed this chapter and represent one of the areas of conceptual concern 
that come together and shape this thesis - materials, memory and the body. Please 
read each list out loud. 
 
List 1. 
 
Pottery, glazes, glass, enamels, copper, alloys, iron, steel, gold, 
silver, lead, mercury, stone, wood, fibres, threads, textiles, baskets, 
hides, leather, antler, bone, horn, ivory, dyes, pigments, paints, 
adhesives. 10 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Serres, The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. 5 
In his introduction to The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, Steve Connor explains 
Serres’ motivation for invoking  “that most characteristic Serresian device, the variegated list,” 
he states that “ the listing impulse is stimulated whenever Serres evokes a complex or irregular 
surface,” and that in creating variegated lists Serres ‘allows the series of words for variety 
themselves to variegate, so that the soul, or centre of gravity of the sequence is to be found not in 
one particular location, but rather  in the ramifying array or spraying out  of the approximating 
terms themselves.’  
10 Henry Hodges, Artifacts: An Introduction to Early Materials and Technology(London: John 
Baker 1964). See Table of Contents  
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This is an index of materials used by ancient people in making things; its source is 
the Table of Contents of a small book published in 1964 titled Artifacts: An 
Introduction to Early Materials and Technology, written by Henry Hodges. 11  
 
Although short, this list spans vast temporal distances, it commingles time, or as 
Serres would say, “it crumples and folds time in multiple diversities”.12 Returning 
briefly to the preceding two chapters I reflect again on the medium of 
photography and suggest that photography does much the same thing as this list; it 
commingles time while simultaneously providing an indexical document of what 
was present and what happened.  
 
List 2. 
 
Absent memory, inherited memory, belated memory, prosthetic 
memory, mémoire trouée, mémoire des cendres, vicarious 
witnessing, received history, postmemory. 13 
 
These terms, coined by various scholars working in the relatively new field of 
Memory Studies, attempt to define a “sense of living connection”,14 a deeply felt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid.  
12 Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, trans. Roxanne 
Lapidus(Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1995). 59 
See Pages 57- 62 for a detailed explanation of Serres’ conception of time under the subhead A 
Different Theory of Time. 
13 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 
See page 3 for detailed attributions of the terms used in List 2 to the various scholars whose work 
is concerned specifically with memory transmission between generations of traumatic parental 
pasts. 
14 Ibid 1.  
This expression is first used by Hirsch in her introductory quote from Eva Hoffman’s, After Such 
Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. 
In the development of her argument Hirsch refers to it repeatedly. 
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and identifying relationship between those who have had a direct corporeal 
experience of the unimaginable atrocities of the Holocaust, and those we have 
come to know as the second generation or the generation after. 
 
The next list in this exercise is drawn from Chapter 1, “Veils”, of Serres’ book 
The Five Senses, A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Under the subheading of 
Tattoos, Serres composes a variegated list in an attempt to describe the 
relationship between the surfaces of our bodies, and as he puts it, our soul. 
 
List 3. 
 
Observe on the surface of the skin, the changing, shimmering, 
fleeting soul, the blazing, striated, tinted, streaked, striped, many-
coloured, mottled, cloudy, star studded, bedizened, variegated, 
torrential, swirling soul.15 
 
This list continues a few lines further along in Serres’ discussion about the 
relationship between our skin, and our soul. 
 
Historiated skin carries and displays a particular history. It is 
visible: wear and tear, scars from wounds, calluses, wrinkles and 
furrows of former hopes, blotches, pimples, eczema, psoriasis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Serres, The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. 
Preceding the Introduction written by Steven Connor to The Five Senses, A Philosophy of Mingled 
Bodies is a series of notes titled ‘Sense and Sensibility: Translating the Bodily Experience’ in 
which the translators Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley describe in great detail Serres’ love of 
and capacity for expressive language and style of writing; describing it as a hybrid whose 
‘connectivity and cohesion is as much literary as philosophical’..’frequently lyrical and 
rhapsodic.’ 
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birth-marks. Memory is inscribed there, why look elsewhere for it? 
And it is invisible the fluctuating traces of caresses, memories of 
silk, wool, velvet, furs, tiny grains of rock, rough bark, scratchy 
surfaces, ice crystals, flames, the timidity of touch, the audacity of 
aggressive contact. 16 
 
I apply Serres’ variegation methodology in this exercise as a means of invoking 
his motivation for generating such lists, which is explained by Steven Connor in 
his introduction to The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Therefore, 
in the same way that Serres attempts to relocate the “centre of gravity of the 
sequence not in one particular location in it, but rather in the ramifying array or 
spraying out of the approximating terms themselves”,17 in this exercise I am 
endeavouring to achieve the same outcome, but in specific relation to the central 
themes of this thesis: the entangled relationships between the materiality of 
objects, remembering, and the body. 
 
I want to make clear that my interest in Serres’ contribution to this exercise is less 
in the poetics of his language than in what I identify as the productive between-
ness at work in his variegated lists.18 This leads me to consider whether or not this 
expressive strategy, which is in some ways akin to collage, might be extended to 
the realm of images, objects, their materiality, and histories. As I reflect on the 
relationships between the studio-based research, photo-archive based research, 
photographic fieldwork and theoretical investigations that come together to form 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid. 24 
17 Ibid. 5 
18 Ibid. 
For a detailed explanation of Serres’ conception of the workings of ‘between-ness’ see pages 77-
78	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this doctoral project, I am able to identify that a kind of material manifestation of 
Serres’ variegated list is at work in my art making. 
 
It is important to again acknowledge that each of the three lists above is drawn 
from one of the complex conceptual domains that give form to this thesis. The 
first list is concerned with the materiality of objects and the ancient past; the 
second is associated closely with violence and is related to intergenerational 
memory transfer; and the third concerns the body, specifically the complex 
relationship between the surface of our bodies and, in Serres’ words, our soul.  
 
From these lists I create a new list, a mash-up, which I again ask you to read aloud 
thus enabling your habitual recollections of the sounds, feelings and thoughts of 
your very recent past to commingle with the sounds, feelings and thoughts of your 
immediate present. 
 
List 4. 
 
Observe on the surface of the skin, inherited memory, hides and leather, dyes, 
traces of caresses, absent memory, antler and bone, horn and ivory, received 
history, mottled, cloudy, star studded, tiny grains of rock, pottery, glazes, 
memories of silk, furs, velvet, wool, rough bark, mémoire trouée, ice crystals, the 
timidity of touch, flames, mémoire des cendres, baskets, threads, fibres, the 
changing, shimmering, fleeting soul, torrential, alloys, copper, silver, enamels, 
postmemory, mercury, lead, stone, the audacity of aggressive contact, vicarious 
witnessing, glass, iron, steel, blazing, streaked, pigments, variegated,  belated 
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memory, gold, lead, striated, scratchy surfaces, wood, many-coloured, tinted, 
striped, textiles, adhesives, bedizened, swirling soul, paints, prosthetic memory. 
 
 
BETWEEN-NESS AND TACIT KNOWING 
 
The dimension of between-ness that is central to the functioning of Serres’ 
variegated list is also central to Michael Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge. 
Regarding human knowledge, Polanyi states, “we know more than we can tell”.19  
This is foundational to his ideas concerning tacit knowledge. He demonstrates this 
with the example of how we are able to recognize a face that we know, among 
hundreds if not thousands of faces, although we may not be able to identify why 
or how we know that face. “We know a person’s face, and can recognise it among 
a thousand, indeed millions. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognize a face 
we know. So most of this knowledge cannot be put into words.”20  
 
Polyani introduces another example to clarify his point, he refers to the 
photographic genre of the forensic facial composite, which, as already discussed, 
was originally developed and deployed by various agencies and institutions 
concerned with social regulation. The facial composite is a tool to prompt the 
‘telling’ of the tacit knowledge that a witness may hold regarding the identity of a 
perpetrator of criminal activity but that they have not the means to tell. 21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 4 
20 Ibid. 4  
21 See Chapter 1 for my reference to the Bertillon System and the Galton Composite regarding 
early photography’s developing association with modes of systemic violence. The Bertillon 
System and the Galton composite can be identified as progenitors of contemporary Facial 
Composite methodologies employed by policing agencies around the world. 
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Here Polanyi is referring to the original PhotoFit, IdentiKit, and Portrait Pad 
systems that have now been replaced with the digital generation of these policing 
memory aides, such as SketchCop, FACETTE, and E FIT. Suggesting that the 
practice of their use has not changed much, he explains that a witness of a 
criminal activity is asked to recall, as best as possible, the suspected perpetrator of 
a crime, by selecting from vast archives of images containing a great number of 
variant isolated facial ‘features’. The witness chooses the eyes that they can 
remember, the nose that they can remember, the forehead that comes to mind, and 
so on.  These disembodied (or dismembered) features are then combined (or 
remembered) to form a reasonable likeness of a person’s face, the face that before 
undertaking this process, the witness ‘knew’ but could not fully envisage and 
therefore could not tell. In this example the individual features are recalled, 
however it does not change the fact that prior to undertaking this activity, the 
witness knew more than they could tell.  
 
To test if, and how, this concept of a special bond between what is known and 
tellable and known yet untellable can be extended from images and objects to 
systems and processes, I undertook a series of studio-based experiments designed 
to link geological processes and long established sculptural practices as a means 
to highlight the connective resonance between them. The experiment also 
represents my continuing investigation into physical manifestations of what I have 
been referring to as ‘productive between-ness’. In this example the productive 
between-ness exists in temporally commingled processes and the resultant 
physical outcomes of the experimentation. Because the immediate stage of my 
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theoretical research has concerned varying genres of portraiture, I designed my 
experiment around the portrait; specifically the sculptural portrait (or bust) which 
has resonance with both the 19th century and Antiquity, which are periods of 
history that are central to this doctoral inquiry. The following images detail the 
outcomes of that series of experiments which included, silicone mould making, 
casting in plaster of Paris, steel fabrication and working with stone.  
 
   
Andrew Hazewinkel          detail 
Two Figures (after Caillois) 2013.                              
Plaster of Paris, agate, steel. 
Each figure 170 x 30 x 30 cm. detail 
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detail           detail 
 
   
detail            detail 
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Andrew Hazewinkel 
2 figures (after Caillois) 2014 
Installation view The Piranesi Effect 
Ian Potter Museum of Art at Melbourne University. 2014 
 
Evidence of the productive conceptual and spatial between-ness explored in the 
above example can also be identified in the following image that was generated 
through my photographic fieldwork.  
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel 
Poseidon and Discobolus 2015 
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm 
 
Source objects: 2nd century A.D. bronze statuette rendering of Poseidon in Latern type of 4th century B.C. statue made  
by the Sikyonian sculptor Lysippos. 1st century bronze statuette rendering of 5th century Discobolus made by Myron. 
16772.16781. National Archaeological Museum Athens.  
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In this image it is also possible to identify the beginnings of another concept that I 
address in Chapter 6. I refer to it as the temporal paradox of unmaking. Looking 
closely at the surface of the bronze figure represented on the left of the image we 
can see that not only the surface of the bronze but the very material mass that 
comprises the figure has been transformed, not only by the passage of time but 
through exposure to a specific set of circumstances and conditions. 
 
It is pertinent here to acknowledge that I have employed photographic and 
sculptural experimentation to test ideas emerging from my theoretical research 
and to note that by working in both creative disciplines, the outcomes of one set of 
experiments has informed and indeed transformed the outcomes of the other set of 
experiments.  
 
Identifying links between Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowing and Bergson’s 
memory image, I argue that Polanyi’s example of the forensic facial composite 
can be read as another practical example of Bergson’s method for distinguishing 
between habitual pure memory and non-habitual memory image.   One way to test 
this link between the two concepts is to consider the role of habit in Polanyi’s 
conception of tacit knowledge.  
 
In the previous chapter I discussed how habit, in the context of the Bergsonian 
memory image, has a specific association with the physical body. Bergson used 
the habitual actions of walking and writing 22 as examples and proposed that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Bergson, Matter and Memory. 81 
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habitual characteristics of pure memory become embodied in non-habitual 
memory image.  
 
To identify a relationship between habit (in the physical sense) and tacit 
knowledge, I turn again to the productive between-ness found in Serres’ 
variegated lists, and in Bergson’s passage from pure memory to memory image.  I 
argue that this between-ness is reflected in the very structure of tacit knowing 
which involves two kinds (or terms) of knowing; and that it is between these two 
terms of knowing, the proximal and the distal, that we attend toward embodiment 
or ‘indwelling’.   
 
Polanyi uses the term subception to describe the processes by which we 
apprehend the relation between two events, both of which we know but only one 
of which we can tell.23 He repeatedly returns to the language of the body by using 
terminology from physiognomy to exemplify and explain his ideas. As I have 
already explained, he uses the features of the face and the performance of 
muscular actions to describe varying aspects of tacit knowing, in fact he chooses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 7 
In the field of contemporary psychology the term subception decribes the ‘level of perceptual 
activitity’ that occurs in instances where the speed of exposure  to stimuli is too rapid for 
conscious discrimination yet where the subject is still capable of  making discrimination. 
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/58/2/113/ accessed 22/09/2014 
In his lengthy footnote Polanyi refers to Lazarus, R. S.; and McCleary, R.A., published in both 
Journal of Personality (Vol.18 1949), p.131 and Psychological Review (Vol.58 1951) p.113. 
Polyani traces the development of this idea (and the counter argument) back to 1917 and the work 
of Otto Potzl. See Potzl,O. Preconscious Stimulation in Dreams , Associations, and Images, in 
Psychological Issues Vol 2. No 3. International Universities Press, New York, 1960. Potzl first 
presented his ideas in 1917 to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society; Freud was well aware of them 
and spoke of their “wealth of implications that went far beyond the sphere of dream 
interpretation.” This comment can be traced to Charles Fischer’s introduction to Preconscious 
Stimulation in Dreams, Associations, and Images in Psychological Issues Vol 2. No.3 New York: 
International Universtities Press, Inc., 11960. Polanyi goes on to make clear that he is relying on 
subception only as confirmation of tacit knowing in an elementary form. On page 95 he states 
subception is “the mechanism underlying the formation of Gestalt from which I first derived my 
conception of tacit knowing in Personal Knowledge.”  
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the language of anatomy to title the two kinds of knowing that are implicit to tacit 
knowing. He calls the first term proximal and the second distal. 24 Outlining the 
relationship between the somatic and semantic aspects of tacit knowing he states: 
“All meaning tends to be displaced away from ourselves, and that is in fact my 
justification for using the terms ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ to describe the first and 
second terms of tacit knowing.”25 He then uses these two anatomically inflected 
terms to describe what he calls the ‘Phenomenal Structure’ of tacit knowing, 
explaining that  “we are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit knowing in 
the appearance of its distal term; we are aware of that from which we are 
attending to another thing, in the appearance of that thing”.26 
 
To describe the functional structure of tacit knowing he uses the example of our 
reliance on our awareness of the combining of muscular acts for attending to the 
performance of a skill, he states that we attend “from these elementary movements 
to achieve their joint purpose, and hence we are able to specify the elementary 
acts”.27  
  
In much the same way that Bergson made the subtle, yet important distinction 
between pure memory and memory image, Polyani seeks to distinguish the 
meaning of a thing, “from that which has this meaning”.28 He introduces the 
example of the use of a physical probe to help distinguish between the meaning of 
a thing and that, which holds meaning. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 10 
25 Ibid. 13 
26 Ibid. 11 
27 Ibid. 10 
28 Ibid. 12 
	   125	  
We may take the example of the use of a probe to explore a cavern, 
or the way a blind man feels his way by tapping with a stick, and 
we can also observe here the process by which the separation 
gradually takes place.29 
 
 He goes on to state that when a person first uses either a probe or a stick for 
feeling the way, their awareness is of its impact against their hand, fingers and 
palm; but that as they learn to use the probe or stick the awareness of its impact on 
their hand is transformed into a sense of its point touching the objects being 
explored. They quite literally feel through the stick or probe. We might call it a 
sensory extender. Of this Polanyi states: “This is how an interpretive effort 
transposes meaningless feelings into meaningful ones and places them at some 
distance from the original feeling.”30 
 
This analysis of Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge reveals a reliance on 
precise associations with and through the body, thereby linking it with the 
habitual aspects of Bergson’s conception of the passage from habitual pure 
memory to non-habitual memory image:  
 
Because our body is involved in the perception of objects, it 
participates thereby in our knowing of all other things outside. 
Moreover, we keep expanding our body into the world, by 
assimilating to it sets of particulars which we integrate into 
reasonable entities. Thus do we form, intellectually and practically, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid. 12 
30 Ibid. 13 
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an interpreted universe populated by entities, the particulars of 
which we have interiorized for the sake of comprehending their 
meaning in the shape of coherent entities.31  
 
In Bergson, I find support for Polanyi’s idea, and importantly Bergson provides a 
way for us to consider it in terms of memory. Polanyi states emphatically that the 
continual expansion of our bodies into the world occurs through the process by 
which we assimilate our bodies with “reasonable entities”32 formed of sets of 
particulars to which we inscribe entity. In the context of this thesis I interpret 
Polanyi’s ‘reasonable entities’ as objects, and his use of ‘sets of particulars’ as the 
materials, specifically the qualities and properties of the materials of which those 
objects are made; through all of which we inscribe them with entity.  
 
Early in his investigation of tacit knowledge Polanyi introduces the terms 
‘indwelling’ and ‘empathy’, and by briefly tracing the history of their 
development he makes an important distinction between them. This distinction is 
significant in the development of the idea of wit(h)ness which is important in the 
progression of this thesis. He states,“indwelling as derived from the structure of 
tacit knowing, is a far more precisely defined act than is empathy”.33 
 
It is important to understand how, in Polanyi’s conception, we come to ‘dwell’ in 
something. This can be explained through the special relationship between the 
proximal and the distal terms of tacit knowing. Polanyi proposes that when we are 
awake we rely on “our awareness of contacts of our body with things outside for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid. 29 
32 Ibid. 29 
33 Ibid. 17 
	   127	  
attending to these things”.34 To put it another way, when we are awake our body 
functions as the proximal term of tacit knowing, and that it is from our bodies that 
we attend to the distal term. He explains a process of ‘incorporation’ of the distal 
term into the proximal term. Again he uses the example of a blind person’s use a 
cane, and how they come to understand the sensations at the tip of the cane rather 
than those at the point of its connection with the body. Polanyi makes clear that 
this is how we come to indwell with something when he states,  
 
we can say that when we make a thing function as the proximal 
term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our body - or extend our 
body to include it - so that we come to dwell in it. 35  
 
Bergson speaks similarly of the body in relation to duration and history when he 
refers to the body as “an ever advancing boundary between the future and the 
past”.36 
 
Polanyi goes on to suggest that his example only hints at the full range of this 
generalisation. His conception of indwelling is indebted to two late nineteenth 
century German thinkers, Dilthey and Lipps who postulated that “indwelling, or 
empathy, was the only ‘proper means’ of knowing man and the humanities”.37 For 
Dilthey, a person’s mind could only be understood by ‘reliving its workings’, 
while Lipps regarded aesthetic appreciation as a means of  “entering a work of art 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid.16 
35 Ibid. 16 
36 Bergson, Matter and Memory. 78 
37 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 16 
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and thus dwelling in the mind of its creator”.38 For Polanyi, Dilthey and Lipps 
were describing “a striking form of tacit knowing as applied to the understanding 
of man and of works of art and that they were right in saying that this could only 
be achieved by indwelling”.39  
 
However, he does not agree with their position that this separated the humanities 
and natural sciences, rather he uses their analysis to distinguish between 
indwelling and empathy.  
 
Indwelling, as derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is a far 
more precisely defined act than is empathy, and it underlies all 
observations, including all those described previously as 
indwelling.40 
 
I suggest that there are parallels between Polanyi’s conception indwelling and 
Benjamin’s concept of the image aura which I explored in Chapter 1. While 
describing an image aura as a “a strange web of time and space”, 41 Benjamin 
spoke of the importance of ‘resting’ with an image until “ the moment or hour 
begins to be part of its appearance”.42 It follows that Benjamin’s ‘resting’ with an 
image is a form of what Polanyi calls indwelling, which is closely associated with 
what I call wit(h)ness. As Benjamin’s concept of the image aura is contingent on 
the confluence of temporalities, it mirrors the concept of indwelling and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid. 17 
39 Ibid. 17 
40 Ibid. 17 
41 Walter Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography," (1931), 
http://scholar.google.com.au.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/scholar?q=walter+benjamin+a+short+h
istory+of+photography&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5. 209 
42 Ibid. 209 
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practice of indwelling’s capacity to enable one to understand the joint meaning of 
things.  
 
A good example with which to explain this important idea can be found in the 
experience of being with ancient statuary, specifically, the broken bodies of 
Antiquity which play a central role in this doctoral research.  
 
I propose that inherent in the material mass of damaged figurative sculpture is 
meaning that is associated with the deep past in which the object was made, and 
that in the between-ness of the bodily form of the sculpture and the bodily form of 
the viewer, there resides complex meaning in the viewer’s immediate present. 
 
This is made clear by the following image drawn from my photographic 
fieldwork, which represents a badly damaged fragment of a marble statue of a 
group of figures representing a battle scene. 
 
 
Fieldwork documentation. 
National Archaeological Museum Athens. 
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Indwelling and wit(h)ness are contingent not only on the confluence of 
temporalities, but also on the confluence of states of knowing. As Polanyi 
explains, “it is not by looking at things but by dwelling in them, that we come to 
understand their joint meaning”.43  
 
Another visual example of this complex idea can be found in the productive 
between-ness at work between the following two photographs that I created while 
investigating this idea. 
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel 
Kouros (1) 2015 
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm 
 
Source object: 6th century B.C Pentelic marble kouros.  
1904: National Archaeological Museum Athens.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 18 
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Andrew Hazewinkel 
Kouros (2) 2015 
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm 
 
Source object: 6th century B.C Pentelic marble statue of a kouros.  
1904. National Archaeological Museum Athens.  
 
 
Acknowledging these subtle distinctions between indwelling, wit(h)ness and 
empathy is another important development in the progression of this thesis as it 
enables me to apply the concepts of indwelling and wit(h)ness directly to the 
materiality of objects, objects that have associations with other people’s pasts. 
This is a more focused and critical activity than a more generalised understanding 
of empathy for other people’s experiences and memories. Simply expressed, 
indwelling and wit(h)ness are connected with the body, and therefore, through its 
association with physical objects, the rest of the material world, while empathy is 
associated with non-physical feelings, with affections or with psychological 
processes rather than with physical sensations. 
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In the following chapters I further my exploration of the concept of wit(h)ness in 
specific relation to the materiality of objects. Through that investigation I come to 
distinguish it from Polanyi’s conception of indwelling; however, first I explore 
Hirsch’s concept of postmemory in greater detail by examining the roles played by 
photographs and objects within its structure.  
 
 
POSTMEMORY 
 
I begin my analysis of Hirsch’s conception of postmemory by noting the 
specificity with which she subtitles her book The Generation of Postmemory: 
Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust.44 I acknowledge that she makes 
no reference to material culture, however, for me, material culture and visual 
culture are inextricably intertwined. This raises questions as to why objects (or 
more pertinently, why meaningful analysis of the materiality of objects) do not 
populate the pages of her text in any significant way. Through my analysis of her 
explanation of the workings of postmemory I identify that, Hirsch, perhaps 
unconsciously, privileges photography over other forms of postmemorial practice. 
Hirsch provides the most succinct articulation of the complexities of postmemory 
when she states:  
 
‘Postmemory’ describes the relationship that the ‘generation after’ 
bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 
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came before - to the experiences they ‘remember’ only by means of 
the stories, images and behaviours among which they grew up. 45 
 
Elaborating on this she makes the important point that postmemory is a structure, 
“not a movement, method or idea…rather a structure of both intergenerational and 
trans-generational return of traumatic knowledge and embodied experience”.46  
 
The structure of postmemory is not mediated by acts of recall, rather, in the 
Hirschian idiom, it is mediated by “imaginative investment, projection, and 
creation”.47 Therefore postmemory is characterised by the production of images, 
objects, performances and literary narratives by the generation that follows a 
community of individuals who have experienced unimaginable trauma.  
 
Postmemory is a structure of remembrance that is constructed by the generations 
that have been profoundly affected by exposure to the residues, traces and 
presences of the extreme violence that was experienced directly by the generation 
before them. The generation that come after, that create the superstructure of 
postmemory, have not themselves directly experienced the same acts (or habits) of 
extreme violence. It is because of this generational remove that postmemory 
“reflects the uneasy oscillation between continuity and rupture”.48  
 
Hirsch is herself a member of the generation who came after, she is the daughter 
of survivors of the horrific atrocities committed during the Holocaust; she arrived 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid. 5 
Hirsch’s parenthesis. 
46 Ibid. 6 
47 Ibid. 5 
48 Ibid. 6 
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at her term ‘postmemory’ through “autobiographical readings” 49 of the visual 
artworks and writings created by her own generation.  
 
Hirsch was motivated to coin the term by the need to find a language that 
described the “quality”50 of her relationship to her parents’ experiences of 
unimaginable trauma which were expressed to her through her parents “daily 
stories of danger and survival during the Second World War in Romanian 
Cernaut”,51 and also to shed light on the ways that her parents accounts 
“dominated”52 her post war childhood in Bucharest. 
 
While Hirsch dedicates an entire book to exploring her concept of postmemory, 
the following quote taken from the introduction to her book, provides a 
sufficiently nuanced understanding of the concept to enable its application to an 
examination of the function of the specific materiliaties of objects in the memorial 
structure that she defines below:   
  
Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus actually mediated not 
by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation. 
To grow up with overwhelming inherited memories, to be 
dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth or one’s 
consciousness, is to risk having one’s own life stories displaced 
even evacuated, by our ancestors. It is to be shaped, however 
indirectly, by traumatic fragments of events that still defy narrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid. 4 
50 Ibid. 4 
51 Ibid. 4 
52 Ibid. 4	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reconstruction and exceed comprehension. These events happened 
in the past, but their effects continue into the present. This is, I 
believe, the structure of postmemory and the process of its 
generation.53 
 
I have already explained that this thesis is not located in the important field of 
Holocaust Studies, however I do acknowledge the field’s contribution to the 
development of my thinking. I note also that Memory Studies emerged as a field 
of inquiry in the late twentieth century amid, and from, anxieties surrounding the 
potential for another significant loss of cultural knowledge caused by the 
approaching natural ending of Holocaust survivors lives.54  
 
As explained in the Introduction of this thesis, Benjamin’s conception of mythic 
violence describes, “the natural historical cycles of the rise and fall of empires and 
states – of the establishment, augmentation and decay of institutions”,55 and his 
conception is the basis for my interpretation of the term mythic violence. 
However, I use the term mythic violence to specifically mean the interdependent, 
visible and invisible forms of violence that manifest in the individual and 
collective actions and systems, through which one unconsciously comes to care 
more about property than life. The centrality of mythic violence in this thesis, and 
in the atrocities of the Holocaust is why a detailed analysis of Hirsch’s concept of 
postmemory is critical to the development of this thesis.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid. 5 
54 Ibid. 18 
55 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald(Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). 76 
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Hirsch uses the Holocaust as an example, and a historically defined frame of 
reference for postmemory; however, she acknowledges that in the middle of the 
second decade of the twenty first century, the Holocaust no longer serves as a 
“conceptual limit case”56 for considering the relationships between “historical 
trauma, memory, and forgetting”.57 Hirsch brings into the frame of postmemory a 
long list of atrocities perpetrated by humans on other humans; American Slavery, 
The Vietnam War, Argentina’s Dirty War, Latin American dictatorships, South 
African apartheid, communist terror in China, Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Block, The Armenian genocide, The Cambodian genocide, The Rawandan 
genocide, The Japanese internment camps in the United States of America, Indian 
Partition and the Stolen Generations of Aboriginal Australia.58 As the register of 
atrocities continues to crowd, the cycles of mythic violence prove ongoing. 
Therefore, as I see it, postmemory, as defined by Hirsch, is not alone in its deep 
entanglement with the cycles of mythic violence; however, in each given example 
the relationship is more complex than one of causality.  
 
 Most of the postmemorial work examined by Hirsch is located within the context 
of the image and the word production. This is exemplified in the proliferation of 
the photo-mediated practices, varying literary genres, and the archives that 
combine them all, that appear in Hirsch’s book. In my reading of her seminal 
book, Hirsch privileges the photograph above other media. In fact there is not an 
example used in her book that does not involve a photograph. For instance, at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 18 
57 Ibid. 18 
58 Ibid. 19 
Hirsch explains that it is this connective resonance that she was hoping for as she developed the 
concept of postmemory. Connective Histories, the final chapter in her book is dedicated to 
connective and intersecting analyses which she has come to see ‘ as absolutely necessary if we are 
to move forward in the field’. 
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beginning of Chapter 8, Objects of Return, she quotes a lengthy passage from Lily 
Brett’s 1999 fictional novel Too Many Men; in which Edek, one of the story’s 
protagonists, excavates “a small object” 59 from under the foundations of his pre-
war family home. It is a small, flat, rusty tin; a container that is later opened to 
reveal a small photograph, a photograph of his daughter’s mother holding the 
small child that they gave away while living in the German displaced persons DP 
camp Feldafing.60 The point that I am making here is that Hirsch is using an 
example of postmemory that involves a photograph and the specific materiality of 
the object it was buried in, however, in her analysis of this example, she relies 
solely on the photograph to progress the postmemorial narrative and thus excludes 
the potential for the materiality of the object to progress the postmemorial 
narrative, or to provide meaning. In this example materiality is ignored, neglected, 
and this proves to be the case in almost all of her examples. 
 
Although this thesis began with an investigation of how early photography was 
complicit in the development of early modern forms of systemic and subjective 
violence, the driving quest of this thesis is to provide fresh understanding of the 
relationships between materials and remembering. My reading of Hirsch has led 
me to question whether the structure of postmemory can provide a useful 
framework for examining how the residual traces and sensible presences of 
materials that have born witness to outbursts of subjective and systemic violence 
commingle with and shape our experiences of the present?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid. 203 
60 Ibid. 204	  
	   138	  
I have come to understand that what is critically at issue here is one’s direct 
exposure to the objects, their material surfaces and places where violence was 
enacted and experienced by others. It may seem pertinent here to refer to indexical 
signs, however, whilst I acknowledge their contribution to the perception of an 
object, the concept of material semiosis, which concerns the conceptual 
integration of the physical and cultural domains of a material, through the 
conflation of the properties and qualities of that material, is more pertinent to my 
argument in this thesis. I investigate the concept of material semiosis in my 
detailed explanation of the differences between the properties and qualities of 
materials in Chapter 5. 
 
If we accept, as my analysis of Hirch’s work suggests, that the photograph is the 
medium par excellence of postmemory, then perhaps objects and their specific 
materialities are better suited to an analysis of my concept of ‘premembering’.  
 
What I am trying to draw out here is that it is by our exposure to the objects, and 
their specific materialities, that have association with the habitual experiences of 
others (not only violent experiences) that enables us to premember. The important 
distinction between the physically associated properties of materials and the 
culturally constructed qualities of materials is helpful in understanding this 
complex entanglement. I propose that it is through the conflation of the properties 
and qualities of materials that we become able to understand that which is still to 
become more detailed and nuanced but which is ‘sensed’ ahead of full cerebral 
comprehension. By this I am proposing that one is capable of sensing a personal 
meaningfulness (some may call it a hunch) in what Polanyi refers to as the distal 
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term of tacit knowing, that which we know but can not yet tell; as well as the 
importance of indwelling, or entering into wit(h)ness with objects.   
 
In “Connective Histories”, the final chapter of her book, Hirsch draws together 
three works: two “return”61 stories from different sources; a 1969 novella from a 
Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani titled Return to Haifa which concerns the 
Nakba;62 Lilly Brett’s 1999 fictional novel Too Many Men which deals with the 
Holocaust; and a series of artworks titled The Eurydice Series by Israeli artist 
Bracha Lichtenberg-Ettinger, also a daughter of Holocaust survivors. Hirsch 
draws these works together to discuss the importance and function of images, 
objects and places in the processes of postmemory; however, I propose that her 
analysis is limited to the symbolic meaning of her examples.  
 
Having already suggested that Hirsch privileges the photographic as the primary 
driver of postmemorial narrative practice, I now point out that while she 
illuminates the symbolic function of the few objects that she does refer to, this is 
done without any significant attempt to describe the material properties or 
qualities of these objects; or the role that their material presence may have in 
generating a sense of living connection with those that had direct physical 
experience of unimaginable violence. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid. 205 
Hirsh points out that ‘return narratives’ are an increasingly prevalent genre in the Holocaust 
literary genre, in which the child of a holocaust survivor is accompanied by one of their parents on 
a journey to their parent’s former homes. 
62 Nakba, an Arabic word for catastrophe, is frequently used in reference to the displacement of 
over 700,000 Palestinians who became refugees upon the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. 
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In her analysis of the Kanafani story about Said S. and Safiya’s return to the house 
in Haifa that they had been forced to leave in 1948 as a result of the Nakba (which 
was created by the establishment of the state of Israel), Hirsch pays her closest 
attention to the materiality and spatial qualities of the contested sites of original 
dispossession and return. In describing Said S.’ journey back to his pre exile 
home, she draws together the concepts of habit and memory by stating Said S. 
“reanimates deep habits and sense memories ”.63 
 
When Said S. slows his car ‘before reaching the turn which he knew 
to be hidden at the foot of the hill’ when he looked at all the little 
things which he knew would frighten him or make him lose his 
balance: the bell, the copper door knocker, the pencil scribblings on 
the wall, the electricity box, the four steps broken in the middle, the 
fine curved railing which your hand slipped along. 64 
 
Through her analysis of these three works Hirsch acknowledges “images and 
objects mediate acts of return”,65 however she pays scant attention to the properties 
and qualities of the material presences embedded in those objects. Although she 
states, “these three works enable us to look in particular, at the role that objects 
(photographs, domestic interiors, household objects, items of clothing) play in 
return stories, marking their sites of implausibility and incommensurability”,66 I 
suggest that her analysis prioritises the photographic image and remains steadfastly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 208 
64 Ibid. 208 
Hirsch is quoting from Kanafani, G. Palestine’s Children:Return to Haifa and Other Stories. 
Translated by Barbara Harlow. London. Heinemann,1984. 
65 Ibid. 205 
66 Ibid. 206 
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focused on the symbolic function of the objects that she refers to. Hirsch goes on to 
say that “such testimonial objects, lost and again found, structure plots of return: 
they can embody memory and thus trigger affect shared across generations”,67 
again she prioritises the symbolic function of objects and excludes the potential for 
meaning (specifically meaning that relates to suffering and loss) to be resident in 
the properties and qualities of the materials of which the objects and spaces are 
made. 
 
Hirsch suggests that in the same manner that Said S. and Safiya’s need “to return 
to their former home and to reencounter the objects that trigger body memories 
and with them the emotions of inconsolable loss they had so long repressed”,68 
Edek and Ruth in Brett’s novel return to their familial pre war home in Lodz. Here 
again, although reference is made to the materiality of the objects that connect 
Ruth with her grandmother, and Edek with his father and lost son, they lack 
meaningful material consideration or description. I acknowledge that these stories 
were not written by Hirsch, however she has chosen them to explicate the nuances 
of her concept.  
 
If we accept that in The Generation of Postmemory, Writing and Visual Culture 
After the Holocaust, Hirsch privileges photography’s role in the intergenerational 
and trans-generational transfer of memory created by the direct experience of 
violence, then we must consider what implications does Barthes’ conception that a 
photograph actually blocks memory, have on this prioritising of the photographic 
image over other historically associated material culture?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid. 206 
68 Ibid. 210	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As I explained in the previous chapter, what makes photography violent for 
Barthes is the way that it blocks dynamic imagination, and replaces it with static 
perceptions of history, which I identify as a kind of unconscious ontological form 
of systemic violence. I consider that the tone and spirit of Hirsch’s analysis 
resonates with anti-violent sentiment, therefore I find her prioritising of the 
photographic counter-intuitive to the important motivation and content of her 
work.  
 
I propose, as is evidenced in my studio-based research, that it is in the conflation 
and between-ness of the photographic with the properties and qualities of 
historically associated materials, that the past, and acts of remembering, 
commingle with our bodily experienced present. 69 
 
While Hirsch’s analysis of the function of photographic images within the 
structure of postmemory is comprehensive, (not withstanding the omission of any 
reference to Barthes’ concept that a photograph actually blocks memory), I argue 
that her analysis addresses only the symbolic function of objects without 
addressing the cognitive impact that the viewer senses and understands through 
the properties and qualities of the object’s materiality: the resonant traces, the 
palpable, haptic communicative residues, the surfaces, substances and the 
expressive presences of these injured objects; which I argue are all active agents 
in the commingling of one’s experiences with the experiences of those that lived 
before us. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See Chapter 5 for images and a detailed description of the series titled Head Replacement 
Therapy (plundered) #1-6. 2012 
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In the following quote, drawn from Brett’s novel, Hirsch further privileges a 
specific genre of photography when she suggests that it is the photograph of a lost 
child that most succinctly articulates the impossibility of return: 
 
More than objects of intimacy - Ruth’s grandmother’s teas service, 
or her grandfather’s overcoat and the photographs that are in one of 
it’s pockets - The photo of the lost child figures the expulsion from 
home and the impossibility of return.70 
 
In her analysis of her three key examples in Objects of Return, Hirsch goes on to 
focus on the bodily implications of the return to the original site of the trauma; she 
identifies in Kanafani’s text an uncontrolled, and I suggest uncontrollable, 
automatic bodily ‘re-enactment and reincarnation’ of the events that took place on 
the day, twenty years earlier, in 1948 when Said S. and Safiya fled their home 
leaving their child behind.  
 
Said S. and Safiya respond viscerally, with trembling, tears, sweat, 
and overpowering physical feelings of torment. As the couple 
approaches their former house, the streets they cross, the smells of 
the landscape, the topography of the city all trigger bodily 
responses that are not exactly memories, but reenactments and 
reincarnations of the events of the day in 1948 when they left their 
home.71 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 210 
71 Ibid. 207 
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Here Hirsch is referring to the spatial and olfactory conditions of the site of 
trauma, but again she offers little consideration of the implications of the 
properties and qualities of materials present at, and constitutive of the site. Having 
already examined the function of objects and materials within Polanyi’s structure 
of tacit knowing, and how one might come to indwell with them, it follows that 
Hirsch’s quote reveals that Said S. and Safiya are experiencing bodily reactions to 
the form of tacit knowing about the past, the form of tacit knowledge that is 
known yet untellable. 
 
This brings me back to Bergson’s conception of the passage from habitual pure 
memory to non-habitual memory image. Focusing on the role of habit in 
Bergson’s conception, I identify that it is the ‘forgetting’ of that which is habitual 
in our experiences that transforms pure memory into the multi-dimensional 
aggregate of individual related experiences that is memory image.  
 
As cited in Chapter 2, Paul Connerton argues, in How Societies Remember, 72 that 
“Habit is a knowledge and a remembering in the hands and in the body, and in the 
cultivation of habit it is our body which understands.”73  
 
Considering this in relation to the structure of Polyani’s concept of tacit 
knowledge, we can say that it is in attending from the proximal term toward the 
distal term of tacit knowing (through the process of subception) that we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Connerton, How Societies Remember. 
73 Ibid. 95 
The Chapter 2 citation was made in direct relation to Bergson’s conception of the role of habit in 
the passage from pure memory to memory image. Here it is used in direct relation to Polanyi’s 
conception of ‘tacit knowledge’. 
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incorporate the distal into the proximal; thereby indwelling or entering into a state 
of wit(h)ness with an object, and that doing so requires not that we remember but 
that we forget.  
 
If as Polanyi states “indwelling, as derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is 
a more precisely defined act than is empathy”,74 then perhaps acts of empathy are 
best served by degrees of embodied forgetting. 
 
For Hirsch, in the moment when Said S. and Safiya approach the house they fled 
and left a child in, 20 years earlier, the past overpowers the present. She states that 
“at that moment we are with Said S. in 1948 as he desperately attempts to get back 
to his wife through the bullets and the confusion on the city streets”.75 I describe 
this situation differently. I propose that what Said S. and Safiya are experiencing 
at that moment is a return to the habitual, triggered by the conflation of the 
material properties and qualities of the habitual, and their spatial and olfactory 
aspects, in what can be described as a reversal of Bergson’s passage from pure 
memory to memory image. In other words Said S. and Safiya, through exposure to 
extreme trauma, passage from memory image to pure memory. 
 
Hirsch again acknowledges the importance of objects and spaces in processes of 
postmemory when she suggests that, “in returning to the spaces and objects of the 
past, displaced people can remember the embodied practices and incorporated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 17 
75 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 207 
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knowledge they associate with home”.76 Yet again, she does not meaningfully 
consider the function of the materiality of such objects. 
 
Central to Hirsch’s conception of postmemory is that it is not concerned with 
identity; rather it is connected with and serves transmission of memory and 
knowledge. She states, “I have argued that postmemory is not an identity position 
but a generational structure of transmission deeply embedded in such forms of 
mediation”.77 
 
In her book section titled “Returning Bodies”, she draws our attention to another 
important distinction that can be made when considering the role of objects and 
places regarding memory; she refers to the distinction made between ‘I memory’ 
and ‘me memory’ made by Aleida Assmann in her 2006 book The Long Shadow 
of the Past  (Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und 
Geschichtspolitik).  Hirsch explains that it is Assmann’s ‘me memory’ that speaks 
to the body and that ‘I memory’ speaks to language and reason: 
 
Invoking the German reflexive formulation of ‘ich erinnere 
mich’…she (Assmann) distinguishes what she calls the verbal 
declarative, active ‘ich- Gedächtnis’ (I - memory) from the more 
passive ‘mich - Gedächtnis’ (me - memory) , which appeals to the 
body and the senses rather than to language or reason. Assmann’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid. 207-208 
77 Ibid. 35 
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‘mich - Gedächtnis” is the site of involuntary memory that is often 
mediated by the encounter with objects and places from the past.78 
 
If we accept, as my analysis of her book suggests, that Hirsch’s conception of 
postmemory does not embrace the idea that the specific properties, qualities and 
histories of materials are active participants in the generation of meaning and 
memory by means of speaking directly to the body, then postmemory can be 
considered as aligned with Assmann’s conception of ‘I memory’ and it is 
therefore concerned with language and reason rather than the haptic realm. This 
runs counter to the central argument of my thesis which is that the properties and 
qualities of materials are foundational to the cognitive processes that we call 
remembering.   
 
 
CHAPTER 3: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I set out to examine Polanyi’s conception of tacit 
knowing and Hirsch’s conception of postmemory in relation to the habitual 
aspects of Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory 
image. 
 
By reflecting the differences and parallels identified in this chapter between the 
two conceptual structures of tacit knowing and postmemory, with specific 
reference to the roles that materials play in acts of remembering, I revealed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid. 211 
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reasoning for my focus shift from early photography’s relationship with violence 
to the relationships between materials and remembering.  
 
The question of how our lives are caught up with the material residues and traces 
of systemic violence and acts of subjective violence that we ourselves did not 
witness, permeates this chapter. 
 
Turning to Serres’ characteristic literary device of the variegated list, I designed a 
semiotic exercise which revealed the sense of a productive between-ness that 
exists between the conceptual concerns that give shape to the theoretical and 
studio-based research of this doctoral inquiry- memory, materials and the body. 
Through this exercise I drew to the fore issues related with the temporal aspects of 
memory, and began to lay the foundations for the concept of premembering 
which, at this point in my ongoing quest for its precise definition, I define as a 
materially triggered understanding of the events, circumstances or conditions that 
one may have not directly experienced, but which one’s culture already knows 
and stores up for all its future participants. 
 
Applying the idea of productive between-ness to my analysis of Polanyi’s concept 
of tacit knowledge, I revealed how the body can be understood as being entangled 
in the productive between-ness existing between the proximal and distal terms of 
knowing. This is evidenced by Polanyi’s language and through the examples he 
uses to support it. I used this premise of productive between-ness to identify and 
examine parallels between tacit knowing and the habitual concerns of Bergson’s 
concept of the passage from pure memory to memory image. This important 
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development brought memory and remembering clearly back into focus. Building 
on Polanyi’s distinguishing between indwelling and empathy, through which he 
proposes that indwelling is a “more precisely defined act than is empathy”,79 I 
introduced the term wit(h)ness, which is important in this thesis as it conceptually 
conflates the more passive act of bearing witness, with the participatory physical 
aspects of being with something or someone. Highlighting strong associations 
between Benjamin’s image aura, Polanyi’s indwelling and the concept of 
wit(h)ness, which suggests paradoxically the productive condition of coterminous 
passive and active states, I used the example of a contemporary viewer being with 
an ancient broken figurative statue as a means to demonstrate the idea of the joint 
meaning of things, which as Polanyi suggests is enabled through the state of 
indwelling, or in my own terms, wit(h)ness. 
 
My analysis of Polanyi’s tacit knowing has made clear a very important aspect of 
the development of this thesis, for it has drawn together the two main concerns 
that define this thesis, material culture and remembering. 
 
I began my analysis of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory by proposing that Hirsch 
has a tendency to prioritise the photographic image and literary examples over 
materials and material culture in evidencing her concept. I went on to present 
examples of her tendency to privilege the photographic image and the textual over 
the properties and qualities of materials as the primary drivers of postmemorial 
narratives. Through my detailed analysis of her book The Generation of 
Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust, I arrived at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 17 
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conclusion that postmemory is concerned more with language and reason than the 
haptic realm and that, unlike Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowing, postmemory 
does not serve well an investigation into the relationships between materials and 
remembering.  
 
Throughout this chapter I have continued my strategy of making subtle and 
important distinctions between related terms, and then, through the process of 
explicating these differences, I have set up a field of potential in which to 
reorientate the relationships between them. As in the preceding chapters, I have 
synthesized their more precise meanings in order to generate fresh understanding 
of the productive between-ness exposed between them, and sought ways to 
progress the central argument of this thesis, which is that the condition of being 
caught up with the traces and residues of violence that we have not directly 
experienced, occurs through our engagement and practical involvement with the 
materials and material culture that surround us; the very same materials and 
material culture that has born witness to the outbursts of subjective violence and 
the episodes of systemic violence that comprise the ongoing narrative cycles of 
mythic violence. 
 
In the next chapter I turn to the field of Cognitive Archaeology as a means of 
further examining the complex interactions between material culture and the 
human cognitive process of remembering.  
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CHAPTER 4 
  
MATERIALS AND BODIES COMMINGLE 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Things are active not because they are imbued with agency but 
because of the ways in which they are caught up in these currents 
of the lifeworld.  
 
Tim Ingold 1 
 
 
Prehistory, in addition to designating a vast span of time, also has a 
second, deeply philosophical sense: It is the discipline by which we 
study ourselves and investigate the way we have come to be as we 
are.   
 
Colin Renfrew 2 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
In this chapter I focus on contemporary archaeological theory, specifically the 
new field of research known as Cognitive Archaeology. I also draw on new 
theories emerging from the field of Social Anthropology, specifically those that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Tim Ingold, "Materials against Materiality," Archaeological Dialogues, Cambridge University 
Press 14 no. 1 (2007). 1 
2 Colin Renfrew, Prehistory. The Making of the Human Mind(London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
2007). viii 	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concern the relationships between materials, cognitive processes and the 
development of human societies. I turn to these perhaps unanticipated fields of 
scholarly research to reflect some of their concerns back onto the photographic 
artefacts that launched my early thoughts that have since developed into this 
doctoral inquiry. I am referring again to the small collection of late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century dry plate photographic negatives that cradle images of 
Archaic, Greek and Roman sculpture that I discovered in the temporal limbo of 
the photo-archive at the British School at Rome. These small plates of glass were 
not only present at my first thoughts about the relationship between materials and 
remembering, they launched the driving quest of this doctoral research that seeks 
to generate fresh understanding of the nature of the relationships between 
materials and remembering. 
 
From the field of Cognitive Archaeology I focus on Colin Renfrew’s research in 
which he precisely identifies and examines the concept of the Sapient Paradox.3  
Then I consider this area of Renfrew’s research in relation to the closely 
associated research of Lambros Malafouris, which concerns the delimiting of 
commonly held perceptions regarding the boundaries of the human mind, and the 
implications of this on understanding the role of the body in human cognition. It is 
through this complex and ground-breaking research that Malafouris began to 
develop the foundations for Material Engagement Theory,4 which I will examine 
in detail in the following chapter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of 
Society," in Archaeological Theory Today ed. Ian Hodder(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 125 
4 Lambros Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material 
Engagement(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013). 
Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory is indebted to the work Renfrew with whom he 
maintained a close professional relationship sustained by a shared conceptual framework regarding 
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Complementing Renfrew’s and Malafouris’ research I consider the research of 
social anthropologist Tim Ingold regarding the social implications of the 
materiality of objects, through which he proposes a reconfiguration of the 
understanding between human being and the material world.   
 
The texts that directly inform this chapter are C. Renfrew’s book chapter 
“Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early 
Development of Human Society ”, in I. Hodder (ed) 2012 book Archaeological 
Theory Today.5  L. Malafouris’ 2013 book How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory 
of Material Engagement,6 and his earlier book chapter “The Cognitive Basis of 
Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate” in E. Demarris, 
C. Godsen and C. Renfrew (ed) 2004 book Rethinking Materiality: The 
Engagement of Mind with the Material World. 7 T. Ingold’s 2012 essay “Toward 
an Ecology of Materials”, 8 his 2007 discussion paper “Material Against 
Materialities”, 9 and his 2013 book Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and 
Architecture. 10   
 
***** 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the study of Prehistory and the importance of its relevance to contemporary human being and 
society. 
5 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development 
of Society." 124 -145 
6 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 
7 "The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate," in 
Rethinking Materiaity.The Engagement of Mind with the Material World ed. Colin Renfrew 
Elizabeth DeMarrais and Chris Godsen, Mcdonald Institute Monographs (Cambridge: McDonald 
Institute for Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge, 2004). 53-62 
8 Tim Ingold, "Toward an Ecology of Materials,"  Annual Review of Anthropology 41(2012). 
9 "Materials against Materiality." 
10 Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture(Oxford: Routledge, 2013). 
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THE SAPIENT PARADOX 
 
The Sapient Paradox is a concept developed by archaeologist Colin Renfrew that 
concerns the evident temporal lag between the emergence of Homo sapiens and 
the spike of materially related new behaviours that led to the development of 
human societies as we have come to know them. 
 
Renfrew examines this temporal lagging of new behaviours, which is considered 
uncharacteristic of the emergence of a new biological species, and identifies two 
largely overlooked episodes in the development of human being and society. Both 
episodes centre on the relationships between human being and materials.  
 
Renfrew makes the point that while it is often asserted otherwise, or perhaps 
simply overlooked, there appears to be a thirty thousand year gap between the 
emergence of our species and any significant decisive material happenings in 
human existence. 
 
It is often asserted, rather than demonstrated, that with the 
emergence of our own species, Homo sapiens, perhaps 150,000 
years ago in Africa and certainly 40,000 years ago in Europe, there 
emerged not only physically modern humans, but also the 
formulation of fully developed language as we know it, a more 
sophisticated material culture, and fully human self consciousness. 
It should be stressed, however, that after this momentous 
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conjuncture (if such it was), looking at the question broadly and at 
a distance, there were few decisive happenings in human existence 
for another 30,000 years. 11 
 
We may consider words, as does Renfrew, “the most flexible symbols by which 
reality can be conceived, represented and communicated”,12 and that the 
development of language, in hunter-gatherer communities, as a form of “external 
symbolic storage”13 occurred 40,000 years ago; however, as Renfrew suggests, 
language itself did not make that much difference in new decisive happenings 
within our species.14  
 
This premise is central to Renfrew’s conception of the Sapient Paradox and it 
leads toward the two largely overlooked episodes that occurred in the 
development of human society, which Renfrew proposes as a means for 
rethinking the importance and nature of the relationships between materials and 
the social development of humans. 
 
The first episode is the development of sedentary societies which “allowed a 
much more varied relationship with the material world to develop”.15 The second 
episode is characterised by the “emergence of certain materials as embodying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development 
of Society." 125-126 
12 Ibid. 126 
13 Ibid. 127 
14 Ibid. 126 
For further engagement with the concept of the Sapient paradox see Prehistory. The Making of the 
Human Mind. 79-101 
15 "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of 
Society." 127 
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wealth and prestige”,16 which led to “fundamental changes in the nature of culture 
and society”.17  
 
The cultural constructs that began to be ascribed to specific materials are what I 
refer to throughout this thesis as the qualities of materials, as distinct from the 
physical properties of materials. The qualities of materials are socially 
constructed and collectively experienced. 
 
Considering these two episodes in the light of Malafouris’ Material Engagement 
Theory, a clear and important distinction emerges between them that helps to 
clarify the next important aspect of my argument in this thesis.  
 
Episode One concerns the properties of materials. 
Episode Two concerns the qualities of materials. 
 
It is important at this stage to reiterate the distinction between the properties and 
qualities of materials. A simple way to think about these two aspects of material 
culture is to understand the properties as the physical nature of a specific material, 
e.g. hard, soft, cold, flexible, granular, viscous and so on. The qualities of a 
specific material are the socio-cultural constructs that come to be understood as 
the values, or meanings, ascribed to a material. Diamonds, terracotta, gold, 
hessian, fur and silk are all useful examples. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid. 127 
17 Ibid. 127	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 In his 1968 book The Nature and Art of Workmanship, design theorist, 
woodworker and educator David Pye expresses it this way: 
 
The properties of materials are object and measureable. They are 
out there. The qualities on the other hand are subjective: they are in 
here: in our heads. They are ideas of ours. They are part of that 
private view of the world which artists each have within them. We 
each have our own view of what stoniness is. 18 
 
The two closely related episodes upon which the Sapient Paradox is founded are 
also foundational to much of the thinking that has given shape to Material 
Engagement Theory, and they offer a critical framework for my argument 
throughout this thesis which is that it is through the commingling of our 
individual, habitual experience of the properties of materials with the collectively 
experienced, socio-cultural qualities that we imbue them with, that we create our 
highly individual memory space.  
 
***** 
 
As a way of demonstrating how our habitual experiences with the physical 
properties of materials commingle with our non-habitual experiences of the 
collectively generated socio-cultural qualities of materials, I use the following set 
of materials to example the ways in which we interact with both their properties 
and qualities.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 David Pye, The Nature and Art of Workmanship(London: Cambridge University Press, 1968).  
47 
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Ice. Stone. Bronze. Copper. Iron 
 
This short list represents a range of substances that we are all more or less familiar 
with. Reading each of these words invokes a network of individual recollections 
that are associated with the physical properties of objects that we have seen, 
touched, held, and used. It is in this way that most of us have direct personal 
relationships with each of these materialities. Copper coins for example, and the 
ice in a gin and tonic. In the Bergsonian sense, we have habitual pure memory 
with each of these specific materials. 
 
However, the materials on this short list represent another set of cognitive 
reference points that relate specifically with their socio-cultural qualities. This 
second set of reference points is less related to an individual’s habitual pure 
memory experiences with a specific material, rather they point toward a historical 
framing of its social considerations and thus toward its qualities. 
 
Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper and Iron are terms that not only describe the very stuff 
of objects that we are physically familiar with, they also classify periods in the 
development of human society. Each materially resonant term articulates a period 
of significant human societal development facilitated through, and with, an 
increasingly complex relationship with a specific material.  
 
The Ice Age 19  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Oxford English Dictionary Online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), www.oed.com., 
s.v. "ice age" 
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The Stone Age 20  
The Bronze Age 21  
The Copper Age 22  
The Iron Age 23  
 
What I am attempting to draw out here is the idea that human engagement with 
specific materials at specific periods in history is foundational to the complex 
relationships between human cognition and materials, and that sometimes these 
associations appear to emerge from and occupy a subconscious dimension.  
 
While each of these materially resonant terms refers to a specific period in what is 
conventionally referred to as Prehistory, we can continue this list through a series 
of non-materially referent terms, The Dark Ages,24 and the Middle Ages,25 right 
up to our own post-industrial age, the Digital Age.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The fossils of several types of human, leading up to modern humans, have been identified from 
this period which is characterised by extensive and frequent glacial episodes.  
20 Ibid., S.V. "stone age"  
In this period we identify the first use of tools (stone, bone, wood or horn) by humankind’s 
ancestor (Australopithecus). Agriculture was invented in this period in which we identify the 
development of the first towns.  
21 Ibid., S.V. "bronze age" 
In this period (late 4th  - early 3rd millennium B.C.) weapons and tools were made of bronze, it is 
often associated with early European civilizations and the inception of urban life in China. It did 
not occur in Africa or Australia. 
22 Ibid., S.V. "copper age" 
In this period, (4th and 3rd millennia B.C.) some weapons and tools were made of copper. It is also 
sometimes called the Eneolithic or Chalcolithic period.  
23 Ibid., S.V. "iron age" 
As early as c.1400 B.C. the Hittites in Anatolia were working with iron however the term refers to 
a period conventionally understood as occurring between 800 BC and the emergence of the 
Roman period, however in the territories of the Roman Empire it continued until 4- 6th century 
A.D. During this period, weapons and tools came to be made of iron. 
24 Ibid., S.V "dark ages" 
The period between the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the Archaic period in Greece 
and other Aegean countries. It is sometimes applied to the period of the Middle Ages to signify the 
intellectual darkness of the early Middle Ages between the fall of Rome and the appearance of 
vernacular written documents.  
25 Ibid., S.V. "middle ages" 
Although sometimes the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages are grouped together it is conventionally 
understood in the European context as the period from c.1100 until 1453. This period is 
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 In doing so we are able to identify a paradigmatic shift in the language we use to 
characterise and classify periods of history. Identifying this shift away from 
materially referent terminology opens up a way for me to consider the 
contemporary social implications of the term the Digital Age and what this means 
in terms of the relationships between materials and remembering.  
 
At some point in time we moved away from direct material references toward 
other references that invoke other natural phenomena such as light; the Dark Ages 
and the subsequent Enlightenment are good examples. As we progress through 
this expanding list we arrive at the term Industrial Age which represents another 
fundamental shift in these unfolding linguistic signs. This term invokes a 
processual referent. Considering the Digital Age in light of this progression we 
might identify an end to what started as a material chronology of the development 
of human society; and we might consider that our Digital Age is somehow 
separated from the rest of the material world, yet that would be to fall into 
misconception.  
 
The term Digital Age may at first seem to continue a trend away from material 
association, however by mining even a superficial understanding of the 
functionality of most of the artefacts that characterise our Digital Age we arrive at 
the material known as Silicon. Silicon is a non-metallic element with 
semiconducting properties, in pure form it has a dark grey crystalline structure, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
characterised by the emergence of separate kingdoms, the expansion of trade and urban life, and 
the growth in power of monarchies and the Church. 
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also exists naturally as an amorphous powder; considering its abundance it ranks 
next to oxygen. 26  
 
Pushing a little further down this digital road, we soon arrive at Silicon Valley, a 
place that has no specific geological relationship to the substance Silicon, rather it 
has become known as Silicon Valley for economically inflected, socio-cultural 
reasons. It is home to some of the world’s largest technology companies that are 
responsible for the proliferation of the digital chip and the digital devices that so 
many of us have come to rely on. It is widely understood that the digital, and I 
propose by its association, silicon, characterises our Age. 
 
It is quite right to say that when we first consider the term the Digital Age, its 
material association with silicon, and therefore somehow the rest of the material 
world is disguised, hidden, or perhaps simply buried; however, a direct material 
association exists right at our fingertips as they glide, through time, across the 
screens of our now ubiquitous personal devices.  
 
There is another bodily association deeply embedded in the term commonly used 
to define our Age. Etymologically speaking, the term Digital refers directly to our 
bodies, specifically to our fingers, it’s origins can be traced back to the late 15th 
century when it developed from the Latin digitalis, meaning a finger’s breadth 
from digitus, meaning finger. 27 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., S.V. "silicon" 
27 Ibid., S.V. "digital" 
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It is therefore reasonable to say that the contemporary social dimension, that we 
have come to know as the Digital Age, has at its very core a direct, physically 
material relationship with the rest of the material world, and that buried in the 
term Digital Age are associations with the properties and qualities of the 
substance silicon. 
 
The Digital Age is often cited as a cause of an increasing sense of social isolation 
amongst digital natives and a looming sense of disconnection from the material 
world in digital immigrants. If we consider this social phenomenon in relation to 
Renfrew’s earlier quote that “words are the most flexible symbols by which 
reality can be conceived, represented and communicated”,28 and if we referred to 
our Age as the Silicon Age rather than the Digital Age, then perhaps we would 
identify greater resonance between our Age and the Ages that have come and 
gone before us, and thereby have a clearer sense of how our lives are materially 
associated with the past lives of others. 
 
The Ice Age 
The Stone Age 
The Bronze Age 
The Copper Age 
The Iron Age 
* 
* 
* 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development 
of Society." 126 
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The Silicon Age 
 
There is an issue of critical reflection to be considered here. Each of the terms 
listed above is a modern term, they were not used by the people that lived through 
the Ages that we have come to know by their material referent. These terms have 
been developed through processes of scholarship aimed at understanding how past 
peoples lived and therefore, by extension, where we have come from, and by 
inference, how we might live in the future.  
 
Considering these examples of the Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper, and Iron, it 
appears that the complex interaction between the physical and cultural aspects of 
materials (their properties and qualities) as well as their function in the 
development of human society comes to be understood only through 
retrospection.  Here I could be accused of stating the obvious given that the 
periods of history listed above have already occurred and therefore retrospection 
is implicit in thinking about them. However there is more at issue here, namely 
the long-standing premise that remembering requires a past experience. This idea 
has been largely accepted as an a priori truth, however I am no longer so sure. If 
this long-standing unchallenged perspective has to date been based solely on the 
human interaction with the properties of materials, then what happens to it when 
we conflate the collectively constructed non-physical, cultural qualities of a 
material? I propose that it is possible to ‘know’ the qualities of a material before 
having a physical experience with their properties. This complex and important 
idea will be examined in closer detail in the following chapter. 
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Returning again to the Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper and Iron Ages provides a 
powerful way to explain what I am trying to draw out here. By introducing the 
newly coined Silicon Age into the list above, I alter the diverse field of its 
associations by conflating its temporal frameworks and commingling the past 
with the present. 
 
This enables us to chronesthetically 29 consider the experiences of our own Age 
from a prospective perspective, and thus to question what role our understanding 
of, and connection with, materials plays in prospective cognitive activities. I 
propose that the materially related language that we use in our attempts to define 
our own Age plays a critical role in how we understand our experiences of living 
through it. I am proposing that the cultural qualities of materials not only play a 
role in shaping the social dimension of our Age, but that they also have a direct 
relationship with our individual processes of remembering and that sometimes 
these associations emerge from, and occupy, a subconscious dimension.  
 
If this is so, then the combined properties and qualities of materials are not only 
useful in examining the past, they may also be useful in considering the future. 
 
This discussion about how materials are implicated in both retrospective and 
prospective cognitive activities is a complex terrain; it is helpful here to separate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Endel Tulving, "Chronesthesia: Conscious Awareness of Subjective Time," ed. Donald Stuss 
and Robert Knight, Principles of Frontal Lobe Function (New York Oxford University Press, 
2002),  http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195134971.003.0020.  
Malafouris, L. How Things Shape The Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement. Cambridge MA. 
MIT Press, 2013. 1  
The term chronesthesia coined by E. Tulving refers to the form of consciousness that allows 
individuals to think about the subjective time in which they live and that makes it possible for 
them to ‘mentally travel’ in such time. It directly expresses the human capacity of being aware in 
the present of our pasts and possible futures. 
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some of the material implications in retrospective and prospective cognitive 
activities whilst maintaining memory as the focus of the inquiry.  
 
In order to examine more thoroughly the issue of how materials are implicated in 
both retrospective and prospective cognitive activities, I undertook a series of 
sculptural studio-based experiments designed to examine notions of the copy, 
individuation within the collective, and thereby notions of the past and potential 
futurity. The specific materiality through which I examine this idea is plaster of 
Paris, which is historically inflected and has cultural resonances with both the 
past, specifically the nineteenth century, and through the implications of 
reproduction, the future. 
 
The following images represent the outcomes of the experiment titled 12 figures 
(after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel  
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail) 
Plaster, steel.  
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable. 
Installation view Speculative Everything, Firstdraft Sydney 2014  
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Andrew Hazewinkel  
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail) 
Plaster, steel.  
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable. 
Installation view Speculative Everything, Firstdraft Sydney 2014  
 
 
The object source of my starting point is a numbered and dated 1885 plaster bust 
of a male head commissioned for the Bathurst School of Arts by the Sydney 
Board of Technical Education. It was made by Mr A. Murray, as is reported in the 
Sydney Morning Herald 16th May 1885.30  
 
The object source of Mr Murray’s starting point cannot be ascertained, however 
what is certain is that Murray’s undertakings were designed to create a faithful 
reproduction of the c.1430 terracotta bust of Niccolò da Uzzano attributed to 
Donatello,31 which is held in the collection of the Bargello Museum in Florence.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 "The Board of Technical Education,"  Sydney Morning Herald(16 May 1885), 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/13588693. 
31 "Bust of Niccolò Da Uzzano (1430)," Web Gallery of Art, 
http://www.wga.hu/html_m/d/donatell/2_mature/various/1uzzano.html. 
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Andrew Hazewinkel  
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail) 
Plaster, steel.  
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable. 
Installation view Speculative Everything, Firstdraft Sydney 2014  
 
Donatello’s object has been physically reproduced thousands of times, copies of it 
stand in Cast Galleries and traditional drawing schools world over. It is still used 
as a tool with which to teach the rendering of anatomical accuracy and character 
in portraiture. Acknowledging its long and noble history, I employed a strategy of 
the fractured multiple and undertook a series of casting experiments to draw out 
the sense of potential individuation in collective and like groups, thereby pointing 
toward a prospective sense while maintaining an acknowledged retrospectivity 
exercised though the properties and qualities of the materials used.  
In the resultant cast objects, the site of rupture, or ‘damage’ exposes clues to the 
specific materiality of these objects and therefore information which leads to the 
sensed knowledge that resides in the conflation of the properties and qualities of 
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materials. Precisely the same occurs at the break sites in broken ancient figurative 
sculpture. 
 
What I am trying to demonstrate in this example is how when the properties and 
qualities of materials conflate with the shared physical mutuality between subject 
and viewer they create an individual’s memory space.  I have identified this 
phenomenon at work in the experience that a contemporary viewer has in the 
company of a broken body of Antiquity, and I will expand on that issue in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel  
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail) 
Plaster, steel.  
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable. 
Installation view Speculative Everything, Firstdraft Sydney 2014  
 
 
As a result of the proliferation of the paster copies of Donatello’s terracotta 
‘original’, it is reasonable to consider that many more individuals have had 
habitual pure memory experiences with the plaster ‘versions’ than the terracotta 
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‘original’, and thereby many more individuals have non-habitual memory image 
experiences with the plaster versions. 
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel  
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail) 
Plaster, steel.  
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable. 
Installation view Speculative Everything, Firstdraft Sydney 2014  
 
 
The point that I am making is, considering Bergson’s conception of the passage 
from habitual pure memory to non-habitual memory image, the plaster versions 
have become more closely associated with the present and thereby potential 
futures, while maintaining a profound material based association with the past. 
This example evidences how the conflation of the properties and qualities of 
materials can function as a kind of memory-bridge between the past and the 
future. 
 
 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the relationships between materials and 
retrospectively focused cognitive activity, such as remembering; in fact that is the 
quest that we are on; however, as I have demonstrated above, opportunities exist 
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in this doctoral undertaking to consider the relationship between materials and 
prospective cognitive activity.  
 
This leads me toward my concept of premembering, which I again discuss briefly 
in this chapter before presenting a more detailed analysis of the idea in relation to 
Material Engagement Theory in the next chapter. 
 
If there is a direct relationship between our understanding of past experiences and 
the properties and qualities of materials, then how might that relationship be 
effectively examined, to serve the driving quest of this thesis? My example of the 
Silicon Age may be considered by some as a very long bow to draw, however it 
begins to shed light on an important shift in the thinking about the very nature of 
the relationships between human cognition and materials that is emerging from 
the fields of Social Anthropology and Cognitive Archaeology.  
 
This significant shift in thinking requires two momentous developments. One is 
concerned with the way we think about human cognition, and the other concerns 
the way we think about material culture. 
 
The following two quotes function as an axis around which the rest of this chapter 
revolves.  
 
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? 32  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Malafouris, "The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture 
Conflate."55 
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We can think of material culture as a means of propagating or 
extending persons beyond their specific time-space frame. 33  
 
 
The first quote is a simple and profoundly important question posed by 
Malafouris in his book chapter “The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: 
Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate”.34 It is the bedrock of his attempt to 
delimit the commonly held perceptions regarding the boundaries of the mind. 
Malafouris poses this question as a means of redressing some of the long held 
beliefs about human cognition and it opens up a way forward for rethinking the 
complex connections between materials and cognition. 
 
The second quote is a statement made by Andy Jones in his book chapter, “Matter 
and Memory: Colour, Remembrance and the Neolithic / Bronze Age 
Transition”;35 it points toward a more nuanced understanding of the complex 
relationship between individuals and material culture. It suggests that the 
relationships between individuals and material culture transcend physical 
engagement and are not defined exclusively by direct individual engagement. 
Here Jones is implying a socio-cultural relationship between the materiality of 
things and human cognition. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Andy Jones, "Matter and Memory.Colour, Remembrance and the Neolithic / Bronze Age 
Transition," in Rethinking Materiality.The Engagement of Mind with the Material World, ed. 
Elizabeth DeMarrais and Chris Godsen and Colin Renfrew(Cambridge: McDonald Institute for 
Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge, 2004). 174 
34 Malafouris, "The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture 
Conflate." 
35 Jones, "Matter and Memory.Colour, Remembrance and the Neolithic / Bronze Age Transition."	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The following diagram represents the distinctions between the properties and 
qualities of materials, and how they are caught up in retrospective and prospective 
forms of human cognition. It aims to make clear some of the specific relationships 
between materials and human cognition that I seek to draw out through this 
doctoral research. It is these relationships which lead me to question whether a 
complex relationship with materiality is a necessary precondition for 
remembering, and perhaps the capacity for premembering? 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  
Properties-Qualities. Pure memory-Memory image. Remembering-Premembering  
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Reflecting on the material concerns of my studio-based research activities, in the 
previous chapter, I identified a kind of material manifestation of Serres’ semiotic 
strategy of the variegated list at work in my art making. I have previously 
described this particular form of material manifestation as a cycling of materials 
through my art making, wherein associations between the physical materials that I 
engage in making objects, commingle with our highly individual, complex, 
embodied, non-habitual memory image of those same materials. 
 
In his discussion article, “Materials Against Materiality”,36 social anthropologist 
Tim Ingold “seeks to reverse the emphasis…. on the materiality of objects as 
against the properties of materials”.37 He makes the point that:  
 
Things are not active because they are imbued with agency but 
because of the ways in which they are caught up in these currents 
of the lifeworld.38  
 
It follows that things are caught up in the currents of the lifeworld through an 
inseparability of the properties and qualities of materials in relation to our 
experience of the world. It is our conflation of the properties of materials as 
experienced through the surface of our bodies, and the qualities of materials as 
experienced in the mind, that creates our highly individual memory space. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ingold, "Materials against Materiality." 
37 Ibid. 1 
38 Ibid. 1 
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This conception of the way things are caught up in the currents of the lifeworld is 
supported by Malafouris’s attempts to delimit the mind when he asks the question 
“where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?”39 
 
Moreover, Ingold effectively corroborates this approach when he states, “The 
properties of materials, then, are not fixed attributes of matter but are processual 
and relational.” 40 The reason for focusing my research on the broken bodies of 
Antiquity finds resonance with Ingold’s statement that “to describe these 
properties means telling their stories”.41 
 
With the support of Ingold’s research I acknowledge that although the properties 
and qualities of materials are distinct realms, they are not separable, rather they 
are co-actively relational; reciprocity occurs between them in much the same way 
that reciprocity occurs between the development of individual minds and human 
society. 
 
As he points out, Ingold’s argument is premised on anthropologist James 
Gibson’s division of the inhabited environment into three categories: mediums, 
substances, and surfaces. The three categories can be explained thus. 
 
Mediums afford movement and perception. For human beings the medium is 
normally air, that while offering little resistance allows us to move about, do 
things, make things and touch things.42 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 2 
40 Ingold, "Materials against Materiality." 1 
41 Ibid. 1 
42 Ibid. 4 
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Substances are resistant to movement and perception. They are the solid stuff that 
furnishes the physical foundation for life and we, generally speaking, cannot see 
through or move through them.43 Perhaps glass can be considered an exception. 
 
Surfaces are the interface between medium and substance, they are where radiant 
energy is reflected or absorbed. Surfaces are,“what our bodies come up against in 
touch”.44 
 
It is from the base of this tripartite view of the composition of inhabited 
environment that Ingold has evolved his conception of the complicity of materials 
with the emergence of, and the forms of things. 
 
The forms of things are not imposed from without upon an inert 
substrate of matter, but are continually generated and dissolved 
within the fluxes of materials across the interface between 
substances and the medium that surrounds them.45   
 
When Ingold states that “things are in life rather than that life is in things”,46 he 
points out that this idea is diametrically opposed to how conventional 
anthropology understands animism, insofar as that animism is commonly 
understood as an ethnographically related belief wherein the elements of the 
material world possess souls or spirits. The premise that ‘things are in life’ is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid. 5 
44 Ibid. 5 
45 Ibid. 1 
46 Ibid. 12 
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significant to my investigation into the relationships between materials and 
remembering. I argue that our profound embodied relationship with materials is 
shaped by the conflation of our habitually experienced personal histories with the 
properties of materials, and our individual, non-habitual memory image, which 
emerges from our exposure to the qualities of the same material. 
 
Accepting this argument is to acknowledge that our profound, embodied 
relationships with materials are both individually and socio-culturally formed. 
This conflation of our individual experiences with specific materials and the 
currents of the socially constructed conceptions of the same specific materials 
opens up an avenue for thinking about the nature of direct physical experience, 
and the role that it plays in memory making and remembering.  
 
Accepting this argument raises questions that relate to the temporal constructs 
associated with remembering, as well as the roles played by direct experience in 
processes of remembering.  
 
This argument is therefore critical to my concept of premembering, which in the 
abstract of this thesis, I described as a materially triggered understanding of 
events, circumstances or conditions that one may not have directly experienced, 
but which one’s culture already knows and stores up for all of its future 
participants. I return to and expand on the concept of premembering again and 
again throughout this thesis, and I explore it methodologically through studio-
based research, which is the other half of my doctoral research, and which is on 
display in the exhibition component of this doctorate. The sculptural artwork 
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titled 12 figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety 2014 is evidence of 
this methodological studio-based investigation. 
 
What I am trying to explain here is that remembering a physical experience tends 
to occur after a direct physical experience with the properties of materials. This 
dependency, however, need not apply to the qualities of materials. In fact, 
sometimes we sense and experience the qualities of materials before we have a 
direct bodily experience with their associated properties. If we accept this 
hypothesis then we must ask the question, how do the perceived qualities of 
materials shape our experience of their properties? And is there a sense of priority 
between our experience of the properties and the qualities of materials at work 
here? 
 
I propose that in the conflation of the properties and the qualities of specific 
materials there is a commingling of time. This brings me back to Serres and his 
conception of commingled time, and to Benjamin’s idea of the image aura, which 
he identified as contingent on the confluence of times. I propose that it is the very 
conflation of the properties and qualities of materials that enables a material to 
function as a kind of memory-bridge that links to materials and remembering.  
 
The socially and culturally generated qualities that we impress upon materials, 
inform our direct physical experience of the properties of materials, and this 
enables us to premember the nature of an experience.  I am suggesting here that 
when we conflate our haptic relationships with the properties of materials, and the 
socially constructed qualities of materials, we set up the conditions that enable the 
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process of premembering to occur, which can be described as a socially informed 
chronesthetic phenomenon. 
 
As I have already explained, the initial thinking that lead me into this doctoral 
research had its inception in my hands-on experience examining a small collection 
of late nineteenth and early twentieth century photographic dry plate glass 
negatives representing ancient sculpture. Considering the relationship between the 
materiality of the small photographic artefacts, I return briefly here to my earlier 
points about silicon and its role in the contemporary domain as a way to highlight 
the material impetus of my first thoughts that have since developed into this 
doctoral research, and to draw attention to how glass, the most ubiquitous of 
contemporary materials, as I see it, commingles time.  Silicon is a significant 
component of glass which, although familiar, is a curious substance, it is an 
amorphous solid with an ancient history. Glass can be traced back roughly 5,500 
years to Mesopotamian origins, and it is also a thoroughly contemporary 
substance, it curtain-walls our cities, our fingers glide across it opening internet 
browser windows in pursuit of knowledge, entertainment and a sense of 
connection with others as we flick through photographs on our phones, tablets and 
other proliferating devices that have come to characterise the Silicon Age. Some 
of us shave in front of its silvered form, or apply our lipstick with its aid; glass 
and therefore silicon, play a role as most of us decide each day if we are ready to 
publicly face the world. Glass also has a long and complex relationship with the 
science of optics and it continues to play an important role in the realm of 
photographic image making.  
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The dry plate photographic negatives that I have researched in both the theoretical 
and photo-archive based research components of this doctorate, form part of the 
Marshall Collection, which is held in the photo-archive at the British School at 
Rome. These photographic artefacts were created for the commercial enterprise 
associated with the international antiquities market, they cradle images of 
Archaic, Greek and Roman figurative sculpture, many of which are of great 
cultural significance to their cultures of origin. Today we might consider these 
small planar photographic artefacts as industrial artefacts, artefacts that speak 
clearly about the socio-economic and cultural practices of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries; they also maintain a direct connection to the deep past. 
It is in this way that this entire doctoral project is indebted to the commingling of 
time that I first identified, not so much on these small panes of old glass, but 
somehow in them; in the very stuff of their objectness which, for me, is somehow 
coterminous with the materiality of the ancient objects that they represent.  
 
In each of these small two or three millimetre thick transparent panes of varying 
dimensions, the making of Antiquity commingles with the material and social 
processes of the early industrial and modern periods; my engagement with them 
has made them ‘active’ in the contemporary realm by altering their temporal 
suspension of the past century during which  they ‘hovered’, largely forgotten, in 
the buried limbo of a photo-archive. 
 
These shimmering glass plates and the fugitive images captured upon them, 
ignited in me a quest motivated by questions about how materials are involved in 
the commingling of time, and how the physical, tangible properties of materials, 
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in concert with their cultural qualities are involved in the deeply human act of 
remembering. It is with, and through, these gelatin dry plate photographic 
negatives that I first began to see a way to draw together the two main areas of my 
art making practice -sculpture and photography- in a focused inquiry into the 
relationships between materials and remembering. 
 
This quest raises further questions, it asks how the individually and collectively 
perceived social legacies of the symbolic, subjective and systemic forms of 
violence (that contribute to the ongoing narrative of mythic violence) are 
associated with the materials that are entangled with our lives, and therefore, by 
extension, how our lives are caught up in the ongoing cycles of mythic violence. 
 
When I started my deep engagement with the 795 gelatin dry plate negatives that 
comprise the ‘glass’ component of the Marshall Collection, the Collection was 
uncatalogued, it was and remains little known. At that time, however, it was 
understood by a small group of people to hold significant relevance, in a 
traditional art historical context, toward furthering the understanding of the 
relationships between archaeological practices of the late nineteenth century and 
the means by which some of today’s most significant museums set about 
amassing their collections of Archaic, Greek and Roman antiquities.  
 
My research on the Marshall Collection began in a very different place to that 
from which the small group of traditional art historians, archaeologists and 
curators currently working with the Collection began. My research has always 
remained clearly focused on the glass plate negatives, while the small band of art 
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historians, curators and archaeologists currently engaged by the British Academy 
to write about the Collection have, to date, ignored this important aspect of the 
Collection; rather they remain, more conventionally, focused on the photographic 
prints that comprise the larger component of the collection.  
 
As I completed my detailed survey of the entire collection of glass plate 
negatives, I looked for new ways to consider this archaeologically associated 
material within a contemporary social context. In short, I sought new ways to  
consider the negatives themselves, and the ancient material that they represent, 
from the perspective of its contemporary social relevance.  
 
I began to sense profound relationships between all of the currents of inquiry that 
have shaped this doctoral research. The past made present through the 
commingling of time, remembering, materialities, how our bodies are caught up 
in remembering and in the modes of violence that are at times articulated in 
sanctioned systemic practices. As I made links between the objects captured in 
aging, shimmering silver salts and glass, and objects that I found on the websites 
of some of the worlds most prestigious museums, it became increasingly apparent 
that in some instances these glass plates and the commercial enterprise that 
generated them are caught up in practices that today would be considered 
culturally inappropriate, or as I suggest, systemically violent.47  
 
This line of inquiry makes some museum curators nervous, it raises issues about 
the provenance of certain objects and the associated legal implications, which of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Colin Renfrew, Loot, Legitimacy and Ownership: The Ethical Crisis in Archaeology, ed. 
Richard Hodges, Duckworth Debates in Archaeology (London: Duckworth, 2000).  
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course are economic concerns. This nervousness is not limited to learned scholars 
and curators, it also extends to some of the institutions that employ them.  
 
Although my research began with a focus on the associations between the 
materiality of the glass plates and the materiality of the objects that they represent 
and how this might be considered a commingling of time, I began to identify an 
avenue for considering how the material qualities of these objects has changed 
over the last 100 years, and how now they might be considered as being 
inextricably caught up in a very specific form of systemic violence that I suggest 
has significant cultural legacies that remain today. It is in this way that they 
commingle with our time. 
 
Through the process of thinking deeply about the properties and qualities of the 
materiality of these glass plates in light of the ideas associated with Cognitive 
Archaeology, I was able to look past, or through, the images held on the plates 
and I began to question the contemporary social meaning of the amassed plates as 
a Collection; and how the Collection itself might have a sense of contemporary 
relevance, how it might tell us something about the present as well as the past that 
it purported to preserve.  
 
Unlike some of the prints in the Marshall Collection, each of the 795 gelatin dry 
plate negatives were commissioned by John Marshall and his partner Edward 
Perry Warren. The commissions were motivated by the desire and need for 
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seemingly objective visual documentation for use in the proliferating commercial 
trade of antiquities, in what has come to be known as ‘the great collecting age’.48 
 
Photographic negatives tend to occupy a curious position of disinterest for many 
traditional art historians, photographic negatives are processual artefacts rather 
than ‘works’ in their own right.  
 
The tendency toward disinterest in photographic negatives (as processual 
artefacts) by traditional art historians is however not consistent with other 
processual artefacts produced through other art making disciplines. Sketches, 
studies and models for sculptures are also processual artefacts, however 
traditional art historians, museums and other collecting institutions and individual 
collectors express great interest in these forms of processual artefact.  Why then 
this tendency by traditional institutions and art historians to neglect a scholarly 
examination of photographic negatives, especially those that exert a profound 
material presence?   
 
All photographs can be considered as mnemo-technic artefacts in that they 
function primarily as aids to memory.  I suggest that the Collection of glass plate 
negatives that launched this doctoral inquiry can itself be considered artefact, an 
ideo-mnemo-technic artefact, and that over time, the function of the individual 
plates has been met, and perhaps surpassed, by the communicative potential of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Marshall, and his professional and life partner Warren, were largely responsible for establishing 
the holdings of Greek and Roman art at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, which at the beginning 
of the 20th C. was considered the premier Greek and Roman Collection in the U.S.A. Marshall was 
sole European agent to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York from 1905 to 1928 and 
played a significant role in establishing their Greek and Roman Collection.  	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Collection as a whole. When viewed from this perspective, the Collection can be 
understood as having a primary function related to new understanding of the 
social and commercial systems in which they actively participated. 
 
What I am suggesting here is that it is through the qualities of the Collection in 
conflation with the properties of the individual glass plates comprising the 
Collection that the ancient objects in question remain caught up in the 
contemporary realm. 
 
This significant shift in my thinking about photography and memory signposts the 
way toward the contemporary social implications of this Collection and others 
like it; and it finds support in the field of Cognitive Archaeology. I have always 
sensed something darker beyond the seductive shimmering images that hover in 
and on these plates. This trace of darkness that I identify in these plates can be 
found in my own artworks, especially those that I have developed and created 
over the course of this doctoral undertaking. If we consider the late nineteenth 
century gelatin dry plate negatives that comprise a significant component of the 
Marshall Collection as ideo-mnemo-technic artefacts, we can begin to consider 
them in relation to Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence; or as Žižek would 
say, within the context of systemic violence. 
 
Perhaps today’s traditional scholarly, art historical environment differs little from 
certain cultural practices that proliferated in the period during which the Marshall 
Collection was generated.  As with the processes of amassing the Collection itself, 
it appears that economic forces were influential in defining the very nature of the 
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Collection. It seems little has changed in this regard; today economic forces are 
again defining the nature of the research being commissioned on the Collection. 
These economic forces, in this instance the British Academy and their supporters, 
are at work shaping a particular recording of history, a particular history that they 
are caught up with. In opaque situations such as this there is the opportunity for 
much to be overlooked or left out, certain questions are off the table, the social 
aspects of a Collection such as this one might easily be somehow erased from 
sanctioned art history. 
 
I suggest that it is the potential for these processes of traditional scholarly 
exclusivity to remain in place, perhaps by an unwillingness to redefine the limits 
of research, that leads toward a commonly perceived position of contemporary 
indifference toward so much ancient material.  And perhaps this is why so often 
the ancient material represented on these small glass plates is commonly 
considered the domain of the privileged. 
 
In the following chapter I explore archaeology’s less conventional and newest 
defined field of research, Cognitive Archaeology, and expand on Malafouris’ 
Material Engagement Theory as a means to bring to this argument the productive 
associations between materials and social memory. 
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CHAPTER 4: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this chapter I turned from the fields of photographic history and memory 
studies toward Cognitive Archaeology and Social Anthropology, thus locating my 
examination on the relationships between materials and remembering in the social 
dimension. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I introduced three influential contributors to the 
development of my ideas. Renfrew and Malafouris from the field of Cognitive 
Archaeology, and from the field of Social Anthropology, Ingold. 
 
I began my analysis of the complex ways that materials are caught up with 
memory in the social dimension by examining Renfrew’s Sapient Paradox, which 
concerns with the temporal lag between the emergence of our species, Homo 
sapiens, and the spike of materially related new behaviours that led to the 
development of human society as we have come to know it. As explained, the 
Sapient Paradox is characterised by two much overlooked episodes in the 
development of human society. The first concerns the emergence and 
development of sedentary societies, and it relates specifically with the properties 
of materials. The emergence of sedentary societies meant that as groups of 
individuals remained for longer periods of time in a specific location they 
developed richer, more complex relationships with the material properties 
autochthonous to that location. The second episode concerns the development and 
ascribing of socio-cultural meanings to specific materials, therefore it is 
concerned specifically with the qualities of materials. This important distinction 
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between the properties and qualities of materials is the most recent in a series of 
distinctions that characterise this thesis. It is a critical development in the 
progression of my argument because it has enabled me to reconsider and reframe 
the commonly held assumptions related to the retrospective temporal aspects of 
memory in and through specific relation to materials. 
 
To example the differences and relatedness of the properties and qualities of 
materials I turned to Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper and Iron, pointing out that we all 
have habitual pure memory experiences with the properties of these materials as 
well, as well as non-habitual memory image experiences with the qualities of 
these materials. I made the point that the use history of a particular material is not 
solely responsible for the definition of the socio-culturally defined qualities of that 
material, and that the cultural qualities of materials not only play roles in shaping 
the collective social dimension but also our highly individual cognitive processes 
of remembering. Then, by adding our own Silicon Age to the materially defined 
chronology of human societal development, I expanded the temporal implications 
of the materially referent linguistic strategy, and by doing so I was able to directly 
question the issue of retrospectivity as a precondition of memory. 
 
The next important issue discussed in this chapter emerged from the field of 
Social Anthropology. By untwisting the cord of this issue we are better able to 
understand two of its closely related questions. How do we think about human 
cognition? And how do we think about material culture? This issue importantly 
asks how we think, not what we think. Addressing the first of these questions, I 
turned to Malafouris’ work on delimiting and expanding the boundaries of the 
	   188	  
mind beyond its physical limits; and I pointed out how his argument builds on 
Gibson’s tripartite subdivision of the inhabited world into mediums, substances 
and surfaces.  This led me to Ingold’s important quote that “things are in life 
rather than that life is in things”,49 and I explained how this idea runs counter to 
traditional anthropological perspectives of animism. On the basis of my analysis 
of all of this, I argued that our profound embodied relationships with materials are 
shaped by the conflation of our habitually experienced personal histories with the 
properties of materials, and our non-habitual memory image which is generated 
by our exposure to the socially enacted qualities of materials. This brought me 
back again to Benjamin’s conception of the image aura, and I drew parallels 
between it and how, through the conflation of the properties and qualities of 
materials, we commingle time. 
 
I returned to the materiality that was present at the very inception of this doctoral 
research, glass. I briefly outlined the historical emergence and development of 
glass and drew out its contemporary social associations. This led me directly 
toward the issue of how, through materials, our lives are caught up with the cycles 
of mythic violence. Through my analysis and conflation of the properties and 
qualities of the Marshall Collection as a whole, rather than as individual plates, I 
made clear that although individual photographs are understood as mnemo-techic 
artefacts, an amassed collection of photographic artefacts (both prints and 
negatives), can be considered as a singular ideo-mnemo-technic artefact. I went 
on to suggest that over time a Collection, perceived as an ideo-mnemo-technic 
artefact, can come to speak more loudly than the individual elements that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ingold, "Materials against Materiality." 12 
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comprise it, and that it is in this way that a Collection concerned mostly with 
ancient material remains caught up with the contemporary realm, and continues to 
exert its contemporary relevance. 
 
 I exposed how certain cultural disciplines and practices have a tendency to ignore 
photographic processual artefacts, although they embrace other discipline specific 
processual artefacts. This brought me back again to the issue of mythic violence 
and to question how the traces of the economic forces at work in generating a 
Collection can be reflected in contemporary, traditional approaches to examining 
it.   
 
Throughout this chapter I have examined the individual and collective 
implications of the exposure to, and involvement with, the properties and qualities 
of materials, in specific relation to memory. This complex terrain foregrounds 
Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory which I will explore in detail in the 
next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 3 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 5  
MATERIALS AND REMEMBERING 
______________________________________________________________ 
   
The mind is to be understood as embodied, indeed as extended 
beyond the body, and beyond the individual, and as interacting 
with the things of the material world.  
 
Colin Renfrew 1 
 
There is no sense in which the notion of a human can be 
disentangled from the nonhumans into whose fate it has woven 
more and more intimately over the ages.  
 
Bruno Latour 2 
 
If there is such a thing as human agency, then there is material 
agency; there is no way human agency and material agency can be 
disentangled.  
 
Lambros Malafouris 3  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lambros Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material 
Engagement(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013). xi 
This is drawn from C. Renfrew’s summary of Malafouris’ critique of cognitivism in the Foreword 
to L. Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement. 
2 Bruno Latour, "Pragmatogonies," American Behavioural Scientist 37, no. 6 (1994). 794 
3 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 119	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In this chapter I address the very crux of this thesis, and ask precisely how 
materials are caught up with remembering.  
 
In order to generate fresh understanding of the relationships between materials 
and remembering I examine the most recent theory to emerge from the field of 
Cognitive Archaeology, Material Engagement Theory. This theory occupies an 
important position in my research because it has provided me with a wholly new 
theoretical framework for thinking about materials, and it is tied in with both the 
established and new modes of material thinking that are evidenced in my studio-
based research, my photo-archive based research and my photographic fieldwork.  
 
I begin this chapter by tracing the slow development of Cognitive Archaeology 
from the broader and more traditional field of archaeological practice. In doing so 
I identify and reflect on the parallels between its emergence and the development 
of the central argument of my thesis, which is that the materiality of things play a 
significant role in acts of remembering. I then go on to analyse the three working 
hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory in specific relation to remembering. 
This analysis opens up new avenues for me to consider the relationships between 
materials and remembering, and importantly it provides me with ways to 
understand more thoroughly how the photographic and sculptural components of 
my studio-based research interact with the other and drive this quest forward.  
 
In Chapter 3 I raised the idea of ‘productive between-ness’ and noted its presence 
in my art making. As I analyse the three working hypotheses of Material 
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Engagement Theory, I examine the productive between-ness that exists between 
them as a means to understand more clearly how my photographic and sculptural 
practices transform one another and can be considered as a hybridised practice 
that involves analogue and digital photographic methodologies, object-based 
sculptural methodologies and photo-archive based research activities. As is made 
clear throughout this chapter, my photo-archive based research is the nexus 
through which my photographic and sculptural practices merge. The following 
unfolding analysis of Material Engagement Theory’s three working hypotheses 
also sheds light on how the discoveries that I have made through my theoretical 
research has transformed my studio-based research.  
 
The three working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory are, 
 
1. The hypothesis of the extended mind, “which explores the constitutive 
intertwining of cognition with material culture”.4  
 
2. The hypothesis of enactive signification, “which explores the nature, of the 
material sign not as a representational mechanism rather as a semiotic 
conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth 
the world”.5  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid. 50 
5 Ibid. 51 
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3. The hypothesis of material agency, “which explores agency not as a 
human property, but as the emergent product of situated activity asking 
not “what is an agent” but “when is an agent”.6  
 
 
The texts that directly inform this chapter are C. Renfrew’s book chapter 
“Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early 
Development of Human Society” in I. Hodder (ed) 2012 book Archaeological 
Theory Today. 7  L. Malafouris’ 2013 book How Things Shape the Mind, A 
Theory of Material Engagement, 8 and his earlier book chapter “The Cognitive 
Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate” in E. 
Demarris, C. Godsen and C. Renfrew (ed) 2004 book Rethinking Materiality: The 
Engagement of Mind with the Material World. 9 T. Ingold’s 2012 essay “Toward 
an Ecology of Materials”, 10 and his 2007 discussion paper “Material Against 
Materialities”.11  
 
*****         
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 51 
7 Colin Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early 
Development of Society," in Archaeological Theory Today ed. Ian Hodder(Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2012). 124-145 
8 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 
9 "The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate," in 
Rethinking Materiaity.The Engagement of Mind with the Material World ed. Colin Renfrew 
Elizabeth DeMarrais and Chris Godsen, Mcdonald Institute Monographs (Cambridge: McDonald 
Institute for Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge, 2004). 53-62 
10 Tim Ingold, "Toward an Ecology of Materials,"  Annual Review of Anthropology 41(2012). 
11 "Materials against Materiality," Archaeological Dialogues, Cambridge University Press 14 no. 
1 (2007). 
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COGNITIVE ARCHAEOLOGY 
 
Cognitive Archaeology is a relatively new field of research located within the 
much broader field of archaeological undertaking. It is considered theoretical 
rather than practical in the sense that it is not concerned with digging potsherds 
from the earth, or rediscovering lost citadels; rather, cognitive archaeologists dig 
in the mind, exploring the prehistory of the mind, and how this has come to shape 
contemporary society.  
 
While cognitive archaeology shares many of the motivating desires of more 
traditional forms of practical archaeology, it approaches the quest to further the 
understanding of contemporary human society by advancing the knowledge of 
how past human societies lived, in very different and, some would say, radical 
ways. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF COGNITIVE ARCHAEOLOGY 
 
The nascent stages of the conceptual framework that gave rise to Cognitive 
Archaeology were developed largely by Colin Renfrew. Its conceptual inception 
however can be identified as early as 1962,12 when, in the paper that is today 
regarded by many as the inaugural paper of New Archaeology, Lewis Binford 
identified “ideo-technic artefacts”.13  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development 
of Society." 124 
13 Lewis R Binford, "Archaeology as Anthropology," American Antiquity 28, no. 2 (1962). 221 
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Ideo-technic artefacts have “their primary functional context in the ideological 
component of social systems”.14 Binford’s identification of ideo-technic artefacts 
was a critical development in archaeological thinking about the relationships 
between objects, their use histories, and human societies; I consider it the first 
stone laid on the very long road toward Lambros Malafouris’ Material 
Engagement Theory. 
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, the concept of ideo-technic artefacts 
provided me with a new way to approach my thinking, and my artistic practice, 
especially in relation to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century glass plate 
photographic negatives that have played a significant role in the inception and 
development of this doctoral research.  
 
My introduction to the concept of ideo-technic artefacts enabled me to consider 
not only the mnemo-technic function of the individual glass plate negatives that 
comprise the Marshall Collection, but also to consider the Collection itself as a 
ideo-mnemo-technic artefact. A ‘collective’ artefact that can be studied from the 
perspective of the ideological systems that were prevalent in the society in which 
the Collection was generated. 
 
The tensions between the ideo-technic and mnemo-technic functions of artefacts 
are at the very founding of Cognitive Archaeology; they also come together in my 
research and provide me with a new way to consider the contemporary social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development 
of Society." 124 
Here Renfrew is quoting directly from page 221 of Lewis. R. Binford’s 1962 article Archaeology 
as Anthropology, published in American Antiquity. Vol 28 No 2. (Oct 1962) published by Society 
for American Archaeology 217-225	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legacies of ancient objects, which is a theme I will explore further in the following 
chapter. 
 
While Binford identified and distinguished between how objects, and therefore 
materials, function in our understanding of human society, my research conflates 
these important functions and examines how artefacts might be considered in both 
frameworks.  
 
Conflating the two terms, I now refer to this aspect of my research as an 
examination of the ideo-mnemo-technic function of artefacts, a function that 
emerges from the constitutive intertwining of the properties and qualities of 
materials in relation to remembering and prevailing social ideologies. Simply 
expressed, the memo-technic functions of an artefact are more closely associated 
with the properties of materials, and the ideo-technic functions of an artefact are 
more closely associated with the qualities of materials. 
 
The constitutive intertwining that characterises the way that the properties and 
qualities of materials are understood in the frame of Material Engagement Theory, 
is reflective of how the theoretical research activities that have shaped this 
doctoral inquiry, have informed my ongoing, practical photo-archive based 
research, and in turn how this has informed the original artworks that I have 
created as a part of this doctoral research.   
 
Evidence of this can be found in the ways I have creatively employed the 
photographic artefacts comprising the Marshall Collection, and in the title of one 
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of the bodies of work that I have created as part of my studio based research, 
Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered) #1- 6 2012. My choice of the word 
‘plundered’ refers simultaneously to the darker side of the nineteenth century 
archaeological practices that proliferated at the time of the Collection’s creation, 
and to the way that I have creatively engaged with the Collection.  
 
My hands on photo-archive based research, and specifically the materiality of the 
small plates of glass that are held in Marshall Collection, have played an 
important role in a series of networked systems of thought that can be considered 
from ideological and sociological perspectives. This orientates my research 
toward questions regarding the ongoing contemporary social legacies of the social 
systems in which these photographic artefacts, and indeed many museum 
collections of important historical, cultural objects were generated.  
 
Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered) #1 - 6. 2012 
 
This body of work, comprising 6 planar, glowing, wall-based objects, represents 
my early studio-based experiments that were designed to find new ways of 
bringing together all three areas of my practical creative research. In this body of 
work my photo-archive based research, my photographic research and my 
sculptural research practices merge in an attempt to blend a hylomorphic ontology 
of “imposing form on matter”,15 with a hylonoetic ontology of  “thinking through 
and with matter”.16 I began this experiment by selecting a series of glass plate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 236 
The terms hylomorphic ontology and hylonoetic ontology, as well as their applied meanings, are 
drawn directly from Malfouris. 
16 Ibid. 236	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negatives from the Marshall Collection that represent Archaic, Greek and Roman 
figures, all of which have lost their heads. It is impossible to know how these 
stone bodies lost their heads, however it is pertinent to note that in the illicit trade 
of antiquities, that has existed from the nineteenth century right up to today, it is 
often easier to sell a fragment than a whole figure. My motivation for undertaking 
this experiment was to replace the figure’s missing heads while simultaneously 
using specific materials to commingle time. The absent, ‘original’, carved stone 
heads are replaced with an uncarved stone head. Agate is sometimes called an 
‘image bearing’ stone, and my selection of sliced agates was motivated by the 
face like features that I identified as occurring ‘naturally’ within the stone. By 
combining the uncarved stone with the carved stone I effectively conflate 
geological and human temporal indices. 
 
  
 
JM11    Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered #2) 2012 
17.8 x 12.9 cm Screen-printed image (from digitised negative) on sandblasted glass, sliced 
agate, electro-luminescent light panel. 79 x 48.5 cm 
 
 
 
 
The outcomes of these creative experiments evidence what I previously referred 
to as a ‘material cycling’ at work in my art making practices. The image on the 
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left is a digitised reproduction of one of the selected glass plate negatives, the 
image on the right documents one of the glowing, glass, wall based sculptures that 
comprise the series Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered) #1-6. I draw 
attention to the material relationship between the source material and the 
experiment’s outcomes; and identify the range of processes involved in the 
‘material cycling’ that takes the original image on a journey from hand-based 
methodologies, through the digital realm, then back to hand-based methodologies. 
 
 
  
 
JM164    Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered # 6) 2012 
23.8 x 17.7 cm Screen-printed image (from digitised negative) on sandblasted glass, sliced 
agate, electro-luminescent light panel. 79 x 48.5 cm 
 
 
 
 
First the glass plate negative is selected and digitised at very high resolution. 
The digital files are then used to make subtle adjustments, such as cropping the 
image. Then these files are used to create image specific dot screens in which the 
shape and scale of the dots are specifically designed to maximise the individual 
image quality. Next the images are screen printed onto the back of a sandblasted 
sheet of 6mm lead free glass. When the image is stable on the glass, a lux specific 
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electro-luminescent light panel is applied to the back of the glass, then when an 
electric current is applied the printed panel lights up. 
 
 
 
JM550 
8.9 x 11.9 cm 
  
  
 
JM550 (detail A)  Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered # 4) 2012 
   Screen-printed image (from digitised negative) on sandblasted glass, sliced agate,  
                  electro-luminescent light panel. 79 x 48.5 cm 
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JM550 (detail B)  Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered # 3) 2012 
   Screen-printed image (from digitised negative) on sandblasted glass, sliced agate,  
electro-luminescent light panel. 79 x 48.5 cm 
 
 
Through my theoretical research and, specifically, my introduction to the ideas 
that are central to Material Engagement Theory, I have come to understand what I 
previously referred to as a material cycling at work in my art making as a form of 
material semiosis,17 wherein the conceptual integration between material and 
cultural domains produce meaning.  
 
 
  
 
JM758               Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered # 5) 2012 
39.5 x 27.7 cm.                               Screen-printed image (from digitised negative) on sandblasted glass, sliced agate,  
  electro luminescent light panel. 79 x 48.5 cm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The term material semiosis describes the conceptual integration of physical materiality and 
cultural domains of a material in the production of meaning. The concept of material semiosis will 
be examined in detail in the following analysis of the hypothesis of enactive signification. 
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The development of Cognitive Archaeology as a defined field of research has 
been relatively slow;18 it was initially met with scholarly scepticism. Fifty-one 
years after Binford’s paper, Renfrew, in 2013, proposed this definition of 
Cognitive Archaeology.  
 
Cognitive archaeology is no longer seen as the attempt simply to 
reconstruct some early and elusive symbolic concepts, seen as 
situated at almost unattainable rungs up some notional ladder of 
inference. It is understood, rather, to be a program of exploration 
and investigation by which we can seek to understand the basic 
foundations of human society and culture. 19 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development 
of Society." 124 
19 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. xi 
 
	   204	  
It is helpful for those of us that are not archaeologists to consider the 
archaeological antecedents of Cognitive Archaeology, and to consider the reasons 
for its surprisingly slow development. Renfrew proposed a conceptual ‘relative 
neglect’ as the reason for its apparent slow emergence.  I identify parallels with 
his reasoning and the development of the driving quest of this thesis, which 
pursues fresh understanding of the entangled relationships between materials and 
remembering. I propose that there has been a ‘relative neglect’ in considering the 
roles played by materials in processes of remembering. The following is a brief 
outline of the emergence of Cognitive Archaeology, which I offer here as a means 
of highlighting the parallels that I have identified between its slow emergence and 
the reasoning behind the focus of my research topic.  
 
In the 1960’s New Archaeology emerged from more traditional, long-established 
approaches to archaeological practice. In the 1970’s and 80’s New Archaeology, 
which later became known as Processual Archaeology, tended to focus on the 
production of tools, subsistence economies, and sometimes on socio-political 
systems; but rarely did it examine the cognitive dimensions of societies.20 
Processual Archaeology led to what Ian Hodder defined in 1982 as Post-
Processual Archaeology.  
 
Renfrew suggests that it is the “relative neglect by early Processual Archaeology 
of the symbolic or cognitive dimension” 21 that led to slow evolution of Post-
Processual Archaeology toward Interpretive Archaeology, and in the mid 1990’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development 
of Society." 125  
This explanation of the development of New and Processual Archaeology is drawn directly from 
Renfrew. 
21 Ibid. 124	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onto Cognitive Processual Archaeology; which eventually paved the way for the 
arrival of Cognitive Archaeology in the mid 2000’s. 
 
Simply explained, Renfrew suggests that it was the relative neglect of any 
scholarly consideration of the cognitive dimension of societies and objects that 
resulted in the slow emergence of Cognitive Archaeology. 
 
While, as Malafouris points out, there has been a relatively recent spike in studies 
concerning the relationship between material culture and human cognition in the 
fields of archaeology, anthropology, philosophy and cognitive science,22 It 
appears that within the context of the relatively new field of Memory Studies, 
there has been a relative neglect of scholarly work undertaken with the specific 
concern of investigating the relationships between materials and remembering.  
 
In the Chapter 3, I argued that in her book The Generation of Postmemory, 
Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust,23 Marianne Hirsch displays a 
tendency toward the photographic image and written forms of remembrance.  One 
might argue that in much of Hirsch’s work to date there has been a relative 
neglect of the function of objects and the materials of which they are made in 
relation to remembering.  
 
In the introduction to his book How Things Shape The Mind: A Theory of 
Material Engagement, Malafouris sets out his reasons for developing a theory of 
material engagement. I suggest that his reasoning runs contra to Hirsch’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 10 
23 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory.Writing and Visual Culture after the 
Holocaust(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
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tendency, in fact it sets up a framework for examining a diametrically opposed 
position. I argue that it does this by highlighting the importance and primacy of 
objects and their materiality in processes of cognition. Malafouris explains: 
 
Material Engagement Theory represents the effort of many years to 
build an interdisciplinary analytical framework able to recast the 
boundaries of the mind and redress the balance of the cognitive 
equation by bringing materiality – that is, the world of things, 
artifacts, objects, materials, and material signs – firmly into the 
cognitive fold. 24 
 
He then goes on to explain how and why the development of Material 
Engagement Theory addresses the “unhelpful”25 cognitive dualism that Renfrew 
suggested “has been dominant in Western thought since Descartes”.26 
 
As I have moved back and forth between the studio-based research activities and 
the theoretical research activities that form this doctoral project, it has become 
increasingly clear to me that objects, and the very stuff of which they are made, 
are caught up in the cognitive processes of remembering. I propose that it is 
through the habitual experience of the properties of materials, in concert with the 
non-habitual experience of the qualities of materials that we come to create our 
highly individual memory space. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 2 
25 Ibid. x  
26 Ibid. ix 
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This is where my research differs from Hirsch’s work on the associations between 
photography and memory. In the instances where Hirsch does refer to 
photography, she demonstrates a tendency to focus on the qualities of her chosen 
photographic artefacts, while making little reference to the conceptual 
implications of their material properties. 
 
This thesis is intended to redress what can be perceived as a historical imbalance 
in the understanding of the function of objects and the materials of which they are 
made in relation to the cognitive process of remembering. It aims to do so by 
bringing materials to the fore in examining the cognitive process of remembering 
and knowledge transfer. Material Engagement Theory affords me a critical 
framework with which to further this investigation.   
 
 
MATERIAL ENGAGEMENT THEORY 
 
In his book chapter “The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, 
Body and Culture Conflate” in the 2004 McDonald Institute Monograph, 
Rethinking Materiality: The Engagement of the Mind With the Material World, 27 
Malafouris suggests that for the advancement of cognition oriented archaeological 
research, two main avenues exist. The first concerns a rethinking of materiality, 
the second, and a correlated one, concerns a rethinking of cognition. This is where 
Malafouris’ research and the central argument of my research come close 
together.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 "The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate." 
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Malafouris and I share the pursuit of rethinking materiality and how it relates with 
human being. We also share a desire for rethinking cognitive processes. Even so, 
whilst I draw heavily from Malafouris, it is important to note that my focus differs 
from his. My focus is less on embracing the ambitiously broad field of all human 
cognition; rather, I remain specifically focussed on memory, acts of remembrance 
and knowledge transfer.  
 
It is worth noting that Malafouris frequently uses memory related examples as a 
means to clarify this complex conceptual structure, which is based on the three 
working hypotheses mentioned earlier. 
 
Nine years of conceptual gestation exists between Malafouris’ essay “The 
Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture 
Conflate”,28 and his book How Things Shape The Mind: A Theory of Material 
Engagement. 29 In his early essay he begins setting out the foundations for 
Material Engagement Theory, which are the basis for his hypothesis of the 
extended mind.  He makes the two following key statements in his early essay: 
“Material culture is cosubstantial with the mind”,30 and “material engagement is 
the synergistic process by which, out of brains, bodies and things, mind emerges”. 
31 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 58 
31 Ibid. 58 
	   209	  
In attempting the gargantuan task of redefining the boundaries of the mind, 
Malafouris explores the hypothesis of the extended mind to conceive of cognition 
as a socially embedded, embodied process that is distributed beyond the 
individual.  
 
The following diagram is based of Figure 5.2, Mind Beyond Cognitivism in 
Malafouris’ book chapter “ The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where 
Brain, Body and Culture Conflate”,32 it represents Malafouris’ conception of an 
expanded field of cognition. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid. 
In generating the original form of this diagram, Malafouris draws on the work others who have 
suggested alternative definitions of cognition. As indicated in his footnote, for embodied See 
Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson 1980 Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
For situated see Suchman L.A., 1987. Plans and Situated Action. New York: Cambridge 
University Press . Sternberg, R.J and R.K Wagner., 1984. Mind in Context. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. McClamrock,R., 1995 Existential Cognition. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. Clancey,W.J., 1995. A boy scout, Toto, and a bird: how situated cognition is different from 
situated robotics, in ‘The Artificial Life’ Route to ‘Artificial Intelligence: Building Situated 
Embodied Agents, eds.L.Steels and R. Brooks. Hilldale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 227-36. 
Lave,J and E. Wenger,1991. Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. For extended see Clark, A., 1997. Being There: Putting Brain , Body 
and the World Together Again. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Clark, A., 2003. Natural-Born 
Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence. New York: Oxford 
University Press. Clark,A. and D. Chalmers, 1988. The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 [1] 7-19. For 
enacted see Maturana, H.R. and F.J. Varela, 1980. Autopoesis and Cognition: the Realization of 
the Living. Dordrecht: Reidel. Varela, F., E. Thompson and E. Rosch, 1991. The Embodied Mind. 
Cambridge. MIT Press. For distributed see Hutchins, E.,1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge. 
MIT Press. For mediated  see Lave, J., 1988. Cognitionmin Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Wertsch J.V., 1991. Voices of the Mind. A sociocultural Approach to Mediated 
Action. Cambridge MA. Harvard University Press. Wertsch J.V., 1998. Mind As Action. New 
York. Oxford University Press.  Cole, M., 1985. The zone of proximal development: where culture  
and cognition create each other, in Culture, Communication and Cognition: Vygotskyan 
Perpectives, ed. J.V Wertsc. New York. Cambridge University Press.Vygotsky, L.S., 1978. Mind 
in Society. Cambridge MA. Harvard University Press. Vygotsky, L.S., 1986. Thought and 
Language. Cambridge MA. MIT Press. 
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Figure 4: Mind Beyond Cognitivism. 
 
He suggests that if we accept these relational domains of human cognition then 
we  “are able to collapse the conventional mind / brain tautology and mind / body 
dichotomy”.33 
 
THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE EXTENDED MIND 
 
Analysing the Hypothesis Of The Extended Mind in relation to memory I ask the 
question, if the mind extends beyond the body, what does this mean in terms of 
memory and remembering?  Or to put it in another way, if the hypothesis of the 
extended mind is an attempt to alter commonly held perceptions of the boundaries 
of the mind, how might it be used to alter commonly held perceptions of how 
memory is formed, reformed, and transferred? and to consider its potentially 
active role in shaping the future.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid. 58-59 
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A useful way into this complex questioning is to return to Polanyi’s example, 
discussed in Chapter 3, of a blind person using a stick, to feel their way in the 
world, or to bodily ‘know’ their way in the world.  Through my analysis of 
Polayni’s example,34 I drew attention to a direct conceptual association between it 
and Bergson’s conception of memory, specifically, the role of habit in memory 
development. Now I draw out a direct relationship between the example of how a 
blind person uses a stick and the development of the hypothesis of the extended 
mind, thereby highlighting and deploying the productive between-ness between 
the research of Polanyi, Bergson and Malafouris. 
 
On page four of his introduction to How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of 
Material Engagement, Malafouris uses the same example as Polanyi as a means 
for setting up the questions associated with the task of delimiting cognition. In the 
epilogue he returns to the example and highlights the importance played by “the 
classical phenomenological thought experiment of the blind man with a stick”35 in 
paving the way for the main thesis of his book.36 
 
The example of the blind person and the stick, presents us with a powerful 
metaphor of the “ontological unity”37 between the human and the non-human. It 
enables us to think about minds and things as “continuous”.38 In this way, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension(New York: Anchor Books Doubleday and Company, 
1967). 12 
35 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 243 
36 Ibid. 243 
37 Ibid. 244 
38 Ibid. 244 
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example of the blind person and the stick, which has been used by several thinkers 
questioning where the mind stops and the rest of the world begins,39  
“encapsulates the spirit of Material Engagement Theory”.40  
 
Malafouris points out that throughout history, whatever form the ‘stick’ has taken, 
its main function has been that of an ontological pathway rather than a boundary. 
“Through the ‘stick,’ the person feels, discovers, and makes sense of the 
environment but also enacts the way forward.”41 In this example the stick does 
more than replace vision with touch, it becomes a kind of transformative interface 
that we might call a “brain-artefact interface”.42 
 
Remembering is a cognitive activity. While this may seem obvious, I want to 
point out that remembering and memory itself are active cognition; this is why 
and where Malafouris’ delimitation of mind, and more generally cognition, relate 
with the central quest of this thesis which concerns the relationships between 
materials and remembering.  
 
At this point in my analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind it is important 
to take a step back, and to frame this hypothesis within the broader context of 
Material Engagement Theory, thereby considering how it relates to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The example of the blind person using a cane has been used by a number of thinkers to ask 
questions about where the self ends and where the rest of the world begins. See Merleau-Ponty, 
M.1962. Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge, Polanyi, M. 1967. The Tacit Dimension. New 
York: Anchor Books Doubleday & Company Inc. Baterson,G. 1973. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 
Granada 
40 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 244 
41 Ibid. 244 
42 Ibid. 244 
In this paragraph not only the terms in parenthesis are drawn from Malafouris, the conceptual 
premise of the paragraph is also indebted to him.	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relationships between materials and remembering. The following quote is a 
summary of the overarching thesis of Material Engagement Theory.  
 
The functional anatomy of the human mind (which includes the 
whole organism, that is brain/CNS and body) is a dynamic bio-
cultural construct subject to continuous ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic transformation by behaviourally important and 
socially embedded experiences. These experiences are mediated 
and sometimes constituted by the use of material objects and 
artifacts (e.g., the blind man’s stick) which for that reason should 
be seen as continuous, integral, and active parts of human 
cognitive architecture. 43 
 
Returning to the now conceptually situated hypothesis of the extended mind, I 
examine how it relates with memory. If we accept Malafouris’ delimited 
conception of human cognition, and apply it to the long held idea that human 
memory resides in the mind, and that the mind is inside the head, and therefore, 
that the head functions as a kind of storehouse of experiences, we are able to 
conceive of material culture and the very stuff of objects as enactive agents in a 
dynamic reciprocal process of remembrance, whereby in remembering the traces, 
residues, and presences of an other’s experiences, co-create our experiences. 
 
With my studio-based research I resolved to test whether Material Engagement 
Theory and memory are inextricably linked, and how it might offer a way into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid. 244 
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more nuanced understanding of remembering. In his early essay, written nine 
years before the distillation of Material Engagement Theory, Malafouris states:  
 
I simply want to underline the need on the one hand for a more 
subtle classification of mnemonic operations enacted in the context 
of material engagement, and on the other for a shift in the basic 
analytic unit for the study of human memory beyond the 
boundaries of the individual.44 
 
This quote is important in the development of my thesis as it points toward the 
conception of social memory, which for the purposes of this research I associate 
with the qualities of materials. The idea of social memory will be taken up in 
detail in the following chapter; but, for now it is important to continue my 
memory related analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind a little longer. 
 
“What is outside the head may not necessarily be outside the mind.” 45 This 
statement may at first seem obvious especially when we are thinking about 
memory. Considering photography, which since its inception has been considered 
the aid mémoire par excellence, is a simple way to demonstrate this point. No-one 
will dispute that printed photographs exist as touchable objects that are outside of 
the head, however, most people would agree that the ‘image’ offered by a 
photograph, the ‘memory image’ as Bergson would say, remains in the mind. 
Many people would call the recalled internal image the memory itself. I suggest 
that in this instance remembering occurs in the transactional interface between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 "The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate."57 
45 How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 3 
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photographic object, which is outside the body, and the photographic image in the 
mind.  
 
In this example, the photographic object can be understood as functioning in the 
same way as the blind person’s stick, and it provides us with a memory specific 
example of the hypothesis of the extended mind. 
 
 
As the blind person’s stick represents a coalition between the human and the non-
human that generates a kind of “ontological unity”,46 printed photographs, and 
indeed other forms of photographic artefacts, can be seen in the same way; as a 
conflation between brain, body, and thing, through which, according to the 
hypothesis of the extended mind, cognition emerges. 
 
The example of the printed photograph is a useful way to frame the question, why 
is there a prevailing tendency to prioritise the mental over the material?  
 
This question leads us into an internalist, externalist dualism, which the 
hypothesis of the extended mind seeks to address. In forming this hypothesis, 
Malafouris argues that the common tendency to prioritise mentality over 
materiality is a “historical convention”,47 rather than an “a priori metaphysical 
truth”.48    
 
It is epistemological contingency, rather than metaphysical 
necessity, that makes us see, in various objects, marks, gestures, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid. 5 
47 Ibid. 3 
48 Ibid. 3 
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and lines of human prehistory, merely as external products of 
human thought rather than integral parts of it.49 
 
Material Engagement Theory does not seek to prioritise either the “internal” or 
the “external” factors in cognitive development, rather it is based on the principle 
of active participation characterised as a mutual process of exchange between the 
internal and external. 
 
The theoretical power of Material Engagement Theory lies 
precisely in providing a new means for studying the complex 
nature of the interactions between the internal and external 
resources of human cognition as well as the role of cultural 
practices in the orchestration of human cognitive processes. 50 
 
This quote brings us firmly back to memory, and succinctly expresses how I am 
able to draw upon the theoretical power of Material Engagement Theory to 
advance my argument that materials and remembering are caught up together.  
 
So what are the “internal” resources and what are the “external” resources of 
memory, and where does materiality fit in with this specific form of human 
cognition? The example I used earlier of photographic artefacts and how they 
function in generating memory is again helpful here.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid. 3 
50 Ibid. 38 
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At first glance the material aspects of the printed photograph may seem external 
to us, this is most commonly perceived when we consider only the properties of 
their materiality; however, when we consider the socially imbued qualities of their 
materiality a more complex entanglement is revealed. 
 
Returning to Figure 3 (page173) I now further explain, with the aid of another 
related diagram, the differences between the properties and qualities of materials. 
Figure 3 is reproduced again here, and the two diagrams should be read together, 
they visualise how the relationships between material culture and human 
cognition function in relation to memory. They also highlight the mirroring that I 
have identified between Malafouris’ distinction of the properties and qualities of 
materials, and Bergson’s distinction between pure memory and memory image. 
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Figure 3: (repeated) 
Properties-Qualities. Pure memory-Memory image. Remembering-Premembering  
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Figure 5: 
Material Properties - Material Qualities 
 
The final important discussion in my memory-related analysis of the hypothesis of 
the extended mind concerns the transactional exchanges between the internalism 
and externalism that are essential to this working hypothesis. A comparison of the 
basic principles of internalism and externalism is a good place to start. Internalism 
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is premised on the idea that the content of a mental state is “determined by 
features of the individual biological subject without recourse to ‘external’ or ‘non 
biological’ conditions”.51 Externalism acknowledges that elements of the world 
external to the biological subject play a part in generating the content of a 
biological subject’s mental state. Which means that an externalist study of human 
cognitive skills cannot be undertaken independently of the material, social or 
technological environment.  
 
Rather than prioritising either of these two approaches in thinking about the 
development of human cognitive processes, Material Engagement Theory 
proposes that human cognition is best studied through a conflation of these 
seemingly oppositional perspectives. This can be thought of as a deeper intra-
active temporal basis for human intelligence.  
 
Suffice it to say that for MET human intelligence is not situated 
simply in a basic interactive sense but in a deeper intra-active and 
temporally structured sense. This means that interaction elicited by 
our surroundings (human and nonhuman) not only influences our 
cognitive abilities and affective responses from the very beginning 
but also shapes the form and the constitutive mechanisms of 
interaction.52  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid. 74 
52 Ibid. 39 
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I again ask the question, what does this mean in terms of memory? And what are 
the implications of this on considering the relationships between materials and 
remembering? 
 
 As I have already explained, it is commonly perceived that memory resides 
inside the head. This internalist view of memory is one most likely to lead to a 
relative neglect of considering the roles played by materials (both their properties 
and qualities), in the formation of memory and processes of remembering. The 
concept of the embodied mind in concert with the concept of the extended mind, 
however, takes us a long way in the other direction. 
 
An externalist view of memory requires us to consider the material culture of the 
world outside of our bodies as reciprocal active agents in cognitive processes such 
as memory formation and remembering. 
 
Returning to the Hirschian conception of postmemory, I question where it fits in. 
Postmemory, as defined by Hirsch, is a significant departure from an internalist 
view of memory; her central argument that we are able to experience other 
people’s memories has at its core the belief that it is possible to experience 
memory of something you have not directly (or physically) experienced. 
However, as I have already pointed out, Hirsch has tendency to prioritise the 
visual and literary expressions of a material experience, which I consider as 
representative of the qualities of that material experience, goes only part of the 
way.  
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It is important to acknowledge that the photographic and literary artefacts that 
Hirsch uses as exemplars of postmemory were created with the intentionality of 
not forgetting, the intentionality of recording which can be understood as related 
to the qualities of her photographic examples. The properties of material culture 
however, are also bound up with and bear witness to the experiences that are 
being recorded. The properties of the materials that bore such witness, I suggest, 
have the powerful capacity for engendering a sense of wit(h)ness, which a more 
comprehensive externalist perspective of memory wants to embrace. I propose 
that no study of the development of cognitive processes, such as remembering, 
can be meaningfully undertaken without acknowledging the contribution made by 
the properties of materials.  
 
This is reflective of the concept of indwelling, expressed by Polanyi when he 
states, “indwelling, as derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is a far more 
precisely defined act than is empathy”.53 Simply put, ‘mainstream externalism’, 
the idea of external symbolic storage, implies that the content of a cognitive 
process involves external resources; ‘active externalism’, however, goes a step 
further, and it implies that the content and process of a cognitive activity such as 
memory are external.54 I therefore propose that Hirsch’s position, characterised by 
the prioritising of the qualities of materials, can be considered as a partially active 
externalist perspective.  
 
In summarising the hypothesis of the extended mind, Malafouris points out that a 
simplistic reading of the differences between internalism and externalism leads us 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 17 
54 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 74 
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toward ‘significant pitfalls’. He makes clear that Material Engagement Theory 
subscribes to a “locationally neutral account of cognition, but not a substrate-
neutral account of cognition”.55 In other words, the material culture that is active 
in an extended conception of the mind is not neutral in human cognitive function. 
He argues that what an extended mind is made of, the very stuff of that extended 
mind, matters as much as how it functions.56 
 
Thinking is not something that happens ‘inside’ brains, bodies and 
things; rather it emerges from contextualized processes that take 
place ‘between’ brains, bodies and things.57 
 
This statement is important to consider in relation to the studio-based experiments 
that I have undertaken in generating the main component of this doctoral research 
project. I have argued consistently that a between-ness is at work in my art 
making practices, between the materials that I employ and the ideas explored in 
each of the experiments. Through these experiments I have come to understand 
the power of material semiosis in facilitating attempts to apprehend how our own 
direct, personal experiences commingle with the experiences of those that lived 
and died long before us.  
 
With this premise in mind it is pertinent to consider my studio-based testing of the 
idea of active externalism that is manifest in the artwork Material Collision 
(staring together at the stars) Parts, 1,2,3. 2013. This artwork deploys the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ibid. 76 
56 Ibid. 76 
57 Ibid. 77-78	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productive between-ness and the psychological interplay between memory, 
materials and the body in an investigation of active externalism. 
 
Comprising three large format screen prints on carborundum sandpaper, each 
measuring 139 x 105 cm. with overall dimensions of 146 x 351cm., this work 
evidences the practical manifestation of a form of material semiosis.58  
 
The following three images are digitised representations of the nineteenth century 
glass plate negatives that form the basis of this investigative artwork. 
 
   
 
JM746                     JM196                                         JM167  
11.9 x 8.9 cm                                          26.7 x 20.6 cm                                           23.8 x 17.7 cm 
 
It is important to understand the direct material relationship between the support 
material of these photographic artefacts, glass, and the support material of the 
screen-printed images that comprise this artwork, carborundum sandpaper.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The concept of material semiosis will be examined in detail in the following analysis of the 
hypothesis of enactive signification. 
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Part 1. 139 x 105 cm                                Part 2. 139 x 105 cm                               Part 3. 139 x 105 cm  
 
 
Carborundum is a compound made of silicon and carbon, it is closely related with 
silica, which is an important component in glass. The processes involved in this 
experimentation involve not only an approach founded in the idea of material 
semiosis, which is central to the idea of active externalism, they also involve a 
range of methods that commingle time. What I am trying to explain here is that in 
the creation of this artwork I have moved back and forth between analogue and 
digital photographic processes, and I have moved back and forth between hand-
based and digital methodologies, which led to the process of screen-printing these 
images, that represent ancient and perhaps forgotten objects, onto large sheets of 
carborundum sandpaper.  
 
This series of ‘reverse portraits’ raises the issue of subject / viewer relations that 
was discussed at length in Chapter 1, and builds on the idea of wit(h)ness that was 
discussed in Chapter 3. The idea of active externalism is embodied in our 
experience of this artwork, this occurs through the conflation of our knowledge 
that we are looking at, and somehow with, a series of ancient figures, and the 
bodily ‘known’ mutuality that we share with their form. To use Benjamin’s 
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expression, by ‘resting’ with these images we somehow become active agents that 
are caught up in a mutli-layered commingling of time, whereby the ongoing 
continuum of collective human immortality is mirrored in the material semiosis at 
work in this artwork. 
 
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel 
Material Collision (staring together at the stars). Parts1, 2,3. 2013 
3 screen-prints on carborundum sandpaper (from digitised 19th century glass plate photographic negatives).  
146 x 351 cm  
 
 
 
 
 
Installation view Melbourne Now. 2014 
National Gallery of Victoria. 
	   227	  
 
The studio-based experiments that resolved into the work Material Collision 
(staring together at the stars) Parts 1,2,3 evidence how I have progressed this 
doctoral research through a back and forth investigation between theoretical and 
studio-based methodologies, designed to specifically investigate the entangled 
associations between materials and remembering. 
 
The oscillation between the theoretical and studio-based investigation slowly led 
me to another important issue inherent to this doctoral inquiry, the question of 
whether retrospectivity is a precondition of memory, which is the founding 
question that led me to the concept of premembering.  
 
I propose that premembering is a cognitive process closely associated with 
memory, I am not suggesting that it replaces the long established temporal 
framing of memory, rather that its prospective function has the potential to 
conflate with the retrospective function of memory.  
 
In my earliest attempts to define premembering, I defined it as a profoundly 
physical (embodied), radically empathic (emotive), corporeal understanding 
(extended mind) of events, circumstances or conditions that one may not have 
directly experienced, but which one’s culture knows and stores up for all of its 
future participants. It is important to note that as I define it now, premembering is 
a distributed system of cognition that extends beyond the individual and is 
enacted through a process of active externalism that embraces both the properties 
and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation. 
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To further understand the concept of premembering, important questions 
concerning agency need to be considered, both material agency and the agency of 
individuals and groups. I will address these questions later in this chapter in my 
detailed analysis of the third working hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, 
the hypothesis of material agency. 
 
I conclude my analysis of the first hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, the 
hypothesis of the extended mind, with the following important quote from 
Malafouris. 
 
If we are to understand the idiosyncratic abilities of objects, past or 
present, to make us forget and remember, to guide our everyday 
action, to channel and signify social experience, and to sustain our 
embodied routines, we should resist or bypass our modern 
representational or computational preoccupations and allow a truly 
meaningful sense of how the material world constitutes our 
existence as human beings to emerge. 59 
 
 
THE HYPOTHESIS OF ENACTIVE SIGNIFICATION. 
 
The hypothesis of enactive signification is the second working hypothesis of 
Material Engagement Theory; it is concerned with the semiotic dimension of 
materials, and more specifically, material semiosis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 87 
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As Malafouris explains, the hypothesis of enactive signification “explores the 
nature of the material sign not as a representational mechanism but as a semiotic 
conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the 
world”.60 
 
As this hypothesis is concerned with the semiotic dimension of Material 
Engagement Theory, my analysis of it in relation to memory is briefer than my 
analysis of the previous hypothesis, however important distinctions and other 
relevant points are made. 
 
A useful way to understand the concept of enactive signification, and therefore 
deepen our understanding of the relationships between memory and material 
culture, is to approach it as Malafouris does, by questioning how a sign means, 
rather than what a sign means. 
 
Enactive signification works in a way contra to the “dominant representational- 
computational view of mind”,61 and it is foundational to Material Engagement 
Theory’s premise of the constitutive intertwining of cognition and material 
culture. Central to the hypothesis of enactive signification is the understanding 
that the semiotic dimension of language and the semiotic dimension of material 
culture differ significantly.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid. 51 
61 Ibid. 89	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From a semiotic perspective language and material culture differ 
substantially in respect of the cognitive mechanisms that support 
their cognitive function. 62 
 
A simple way to explain this difference is that a material sign does not function 
though embodying a “communicative or representational logic” 63 rather it 
embodies an enactive one. 
  
For material semiosis, meaning is not the product of representation 
but the product of a process of ‘conceptual integration’ between 
material and conceptual domains. 64 
 
To further explain the idea of material semiosis, I borrow an example from 
Gregory Bateson’s 1973 book Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 65 The following 
example resonates with the idea of material semiosis through its material focus, 
and how that focus interacts with our own individual pure memory experiences of 
the two materials that are used in the example. I suggest, with the help of 
Bergson, that this is most clearly understood in an embodied way.  
 
The following example demonstrates what I have been proposing throughout this 
thesis, that it is in (and through) the conflation of the properties and socially 
generated qualities of materials that our individual memory space is created, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid. 90 
63 Ibid. 90 
64 Ibid. 90 
65 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind(New York: Ballantine, 1972).	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enables our individual memory space to have a constitutive role in the pool of 
knowledge that one’s culture knows and stores up for all of its future participants: 
 
The lions in Trafalgar Square could have been eagles or bulldogs 
and still carried the same (or similar) message about empire and 
the cultural premises on nineteenth-century England. And yet how 
different might their message have been had they been made of 
wood! 66 
 
I mentioned earlier that enactive signification works contra to the dominant, 
computational view of the mind. To explicate precisely how a sign is enactive it is 
useful to consider it in relation to the Saussurian approach to semiotics. Here is 
not the place for a treatise of Saussurian semiotics, rather, I will consider only two 
aspects of the Saussurian approach. 
 
The first of these is that the Saussurian position originates in what Malafouris 
refers to as a “nominalist” 67 basis rather than a “realist ontological basis”,68 
which means that the sign has a “disembodied and disengaged” 69 relationship 
with the signified concept. In this aspect of the Saussurian approach, the linguistic 
sign exists in the human mind “completely disassociated from and unaffected by 
external reality”.70 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ibid. 130  
Malafouris uses this quote in his discussion of enactive signification. 
67 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 92 
68 Ibid. 92 
69 Ibid. 92 
70 Ibid. 92	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The second point of difference between enactive signification and the Saussurian 
approach lies in the ‘arbitrariness’ of the internal bonds that link the signifier and 
the signified which characterise the Saussurian approach. This arbitrariness restricts 
the potential for meaning to arise from the materials and processes that are involved 
in the making of the sign. 
 
In order to demonstrate that my position is contra to the Saussurian idea of 
arbitrariness in relation to the roles played by materials in the making of meaning 
and remembering, I provide this quote of from his 1966 book, Course in General 
Linguistics.  
 
The means by which the sign is produced is completely 
unimportant, for it does not affect the system. Whether I make the 
letters in white or black, raised or engraved, with pen or chisel - all 
of this is of no importance with respect to the signification.71 
 
As the Malafourian concept of material semiosis and the hypothesis of enactive 
signification are premised on the absence of the Saussurian concept of 
arbitrariness, my position regarding the meaning in materials draws closer to 
Material Engagement Theory. 
 
Artists have known for a long time that a chosen materiality might conflate with 
the conceptual terrain of an artwork to produce its meaning, but how are the roles 
played by properties of materials and the roles played by the qualities of materials 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ibid. 92  
See also Saussure, F.D. 1966. Course in General Linguistics. McGraw-Hill. 66 
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caught up with remembering? How does their participation in meaning making 
differ, and how do these differences shape memory?  
 
A helpful way to approach this double sided question is to reconsider an example 
that Malafouris uses; by examining the differences between a hand signed letter 
and a digitally signed letter he addresses the important issue of the processes 
involved in the production of a sign. He then goes on to make a comparison 
between the kinds of paper most letterheads are printed on and a Post-it note thus 
illustrating the roles played by the properties of materials in the making of a 
sign.72   
 
Considering a hand signed letter from the perspective of material semiosis, we can 
identify a relationship between the person who signed the letter and the signature 
as a signified /signifier relationship. As Malafouris points out, if we were to 
accept Saussure’s notion that how a sign is made is irrelevant to its meaning, 
therefore whether the signature is handwritten, photocopied or digitally created 
makes no difference.  He suggests that both “ethnographies of the workplace 
environment”73 and common sense suggest otherwise, and that while an 
“artificially produced signature”74 maintains the same explicit meaning, the 
implicit meaning is changed.75 In his words, “ the artificially produced signature, 
not being cosubstantial with the signified person, has lost the element of 
sympathy. It has been transformed into a kind of commodity that no longer bears 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Ibid. 92-94 
73 Ibid. 92 
74 Ibid. 92 
75 Ibid. 92 
Not only the terms used in this paragraph but also its conceptual premise is indebted to Malafouris. 
	   234	  
any personal imprint”.76 In a pragmatic sense, the meaning of the signature 
remains the same but the “power of this signature to represent the person”77 has 
been altered. 
 
Considering the differences between the closely related yet significantly different 
kinds of paper that many letterheads are printed on and Post- it notes, enables us 
to examine the differences between their properties and their deeply embedded 
cultural qualities, both of which contribute to the meaning of the messages 
inscribed upon them.  
 
Most official letterhead paper has a slightly heavier weight than Post-it note 
paper; it is often slightly textured and is sometimes creamy in colour or at least a 
warmer white than other more common forms of A4 paper. This evokes the 
qualities of handmade papers that were produced at a time when paper had a far 
less common social presence than it does today. Long ago fewer people handled 
paper, there was a time when it was not a commonplace material. I argue that at 
that time, largely because of the systems that it participated in, paper was imbued 
with a sense of authority. Charters, treatises, documents of law, sacred documents, 
deeds of ownership, and the like, were the domain of paper. These documents 
often had other associated materialities, such as wax in the form of seals that 
provided security, they were often rolled rather folded and fastened with ribbon. 
What I am suggesting here is, that embedded in the paper of many of today’s 
printed letterheads is a historically associated set of qualities, which are not 
embedded in Post-it notes. The Post-it note however, with its ingenious sticky 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid. 93 
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back section, is pragmatically more aligned with today’s proliferated, far less 
authoritative use of paper, and to the way written language is used in the 
contemporary realm. As Malafouris has pointed out, “The distinctive properties of 
the material world bring about meaning in ways that language cannot, and vice 
versa.”78 
 
What then does the hypothesis of enactive signification mean in terms of memory 
and remembering? The hypothesis, as I understand it, is most useful in examining 
the relationships between materials and memory through its clear distinguishing 
between the nature and role of material signs and linguistic signs.  
 
The hypothesis also exposes what Malafouris calls “the fallacy of the linguistic 
sign”,79 which, he suggests, resides in the common practice of either implicitly or 
explicitly collapsing a material sign into the more broadly understood category of 
the linguistic sign. In short, the fallacy of the linguistic sign works against the idea 
of the enactive sign and, therefore clouds, or perhaps even better, buries the idea 
of materials having an active role in meaning and memory making.   
 
I believe that the conflation of “semiotic ontologies”80 that, in the Malafourian 
sense, constitute the fallacy of linguistic signification, has led to the dominance of 
the understanding of the linguistic sign, which in turn has led to the relative 
neglect of the specific functions of the material sign.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid. 95 
79 Ibid. 90 
80 Ibid. 91 
The language that I have used in attempting to describe the concept and memorial implications of 
fallacy of the linguistic sign is drawn directly from the second section of Chapter 5 in Malafouris’ 
book, titled The fallacy of the linguistic sign. 	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Material culture is not analogous with language, however when the fallacy of 
linguistic sign is invoked that is precisely what happens, an analogy between 
material culture and language is made. This is well demonstrated by Malafouris in 
the following quote. 
 
Put very simply…you assume that a real ceramic vase and the 
word ‘vase’ possess the same semiotic properties and affordances. 
In other words, you presuppose that both the material entity and 
‘vase’ as a word mean, or signify, in the same manner. 81 
 
I propose that the historical collapsing of the semiotic dimension of materials 
(including material semiosis and therefore all of its potential for knowledge 
production) into the more commonly understood realm of linguistic signification, 
has led us away from understanding the profound implications of our daily 
interactions with the rest of the material world.  
 
This is precisely where the hypothesis of enactive signification contributes 
directly to my investigation of the relationships between materials and 
remembering; it does so by exposing the way by which, over generations, our 
consciously identified relationships with the material world have faded.  
 
In order to examine this premise more thoroughly I undertook another series of 
studio-based experiments and made another series of screen prints. These 
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experiments were designed to test whether the physically experienced materiality 
of an object that supports a photographic representation of a like material, in 
association with the bodily ‘known’ mutuality of shared human form, could 
function as a kind of perceptual bridge across to long forgotten relationships with 
materials.  
 
In these experiments I drew again from a nineteenth century archival 
photographic source representing a broken figure. In these experiments I engaged 
a different materiality from my previous experiments with glass and sandpaper, in 
these experiments I worked with leather.  
 
This shift in materiality was motivated by three specific reasons.  
 
1. Unlike all previous experiments, the archival source for this experiment 
was not a glass plate negative, rather it was two small photographic prints 
representing different views of the same object. 
 
2. The test focused on one material aspect of the content of the source image 
rather than its material support. 
 
3. Leather (or skin) is common to all participants in this experiment - subject, 
object and viewer.  
 
The following images document the original photographic source used in this 
experiment and varying stages of the resultant artwork’s production. 
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The material outcome of these studio-based experiments is titled Suspicious 
Marble 2012-2014,82 it comprises six double sided, screen-printed leather hides 
each measuring approximately 270 x 100 cm. 
 
 
 
 
JM:B.1a 7.2                                                                       JM: B.1a 7 
 
 
 
In these striking source images of a female nude, we can identify the mythological 
attributions of Hercules; the female figure leans against ‘his’ olive wood club and 
wears ‘his’ lion skin cape. It first appears as though we are looking at a female 
Hercules; however, further research reveals that we are looking at a representation 
of another ancient mythological character, one that has been almost completely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The title Suspicious Marble refers to the label on the Solander box of the Marshall Collection 
that I discovered this source material in. Titled Suspicious Marbles, this box contains images of 
objects considered by 19th and early 20th century curators, scholars, and commercial agents to be 
copies of ancient objects likely to have been generated by the proliferating ‘fakes’ industry that 
blossomed during what is now described by some as the ‘great collecting age.’   
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erased from the Western Classical tradition. Omphale 83 was and still is her name. 
While her story is a compelling one, my experiments were not designed to address 
specifically the important socio-political and gender aspects embedded in her 
story, rather they centre on the materiality of the skin cape that is draped about her 
shoulders. 
 
 
 
JM: B.Ia 7.2    Studio-based research documentation.  
 
 
Identifying the commonality of skin between subject, object and viewer enabled 
me to test the hypothesis of enactive signification which, as Malafouris puts it 
“explores the nature, of the material sign not as a representational mechanism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 According to Classical Western mythology, Omphale, the queen of Lydia, had an intimate 
relationship with Hercules. There are conflicting stories about how these lovers came together, one 
suggests that Omphale purchased Hercules as a slave for a period that was decreed by the Delphic 
Oracle as atonement for his killing of Iphitus. Other versions suggest that Omphale seduced 
Hercules. The differing stories concur that Omphale entered into a gender based role swap with 
her famous partner, wherein she wore his lion skin cape and took his olive wood club and spent 
her days out hunting, whilst he stayed at home and spun wool. See Easterling, P. “Looking for 
Omphale” in The World of Ion of Chios, Jennings,V. and Katsaros, A. (ed) Koninklijke Brill NV 
Leiden 2007. Suhr, E. “Herakles and Omphale” in the American Journal of Archaeology, Vol 57, 
No.4. October 1953. 
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rather as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and 
brings forth the world”.84 I designed my experiment to specifically test the 
hypothesis of enactive signification in relation to remembering by activating a 
sensed bodily understanding of meaning through active participation with the 
material signifier. 
 
 
   
 
Studio-based research documentation.  Studio-based research documentation.  
 
 
 
Working on both the soft suede and tanned leather sides of the hides with front 
and back views of the draped figure at 1:1 human scale I maximised the full range 
of material potentials inherent in both the subject and the object whilst activating 
the productive between-ness of both the properties and qualities of the chosen 
material. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 51 
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This series of experiments evidence that it is how, rather than when, the 
hypothesis of enactive signification co-operates and participates with the 
hypothesis of the extended mind (which explains and exposes the functioning of 
our embodied knowledge of and interaction with the rest of the material world), 
and points toward the relevance of Material Engagement Theory in this study of 
the relationship between materials and remembering.  
 
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel 
Suspicious Marble. 2012-2014.  
Installation view All In Time. 2014.  
NEW 14. Australian Centre for Contemporary Art. 
 
 
Before I begin my analysis of the third working hypothesis of Material 
Engagement Theory I need to explain precisely why I have focused specifically 
on damaged ancient figurative sculpture as the main subject matter of my studio- 
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based research. As I have progressed through and developed my research via 
simultaneously deepening and expanding processes, I have come to understand 
that at the outset of my research I thought that my chosen subject matter would 
afford me the means to explore the practical intersections between the two main 
areas of creative activity that define my art making practice, photography and 
object-based sculpture. I have come to understand that there was something else 
deeply embedded and present at the inception of this doctoral research project, 
something that Polanyi might describe as ‘known yet untellable’. 
 
By undertaking a series of practical experiments and simultaneously uncovering 
and analysing a series of precise theoretical distinctions in relation to memory 
(Bergson), material culture (Renfrew) and modes of human cognition  
(Malafouris), I have come to understand that my focus on the broken bodies of 
Antiquity is motivated by sensing their enactive signification, and a questioning 
of their ongoing relevance and function within the contemporary social domain. 
In other words it is how these damaged stone bodies of Antiquity resonate with 
our soft bodies through being caught up in memory processes that these ancient 
objects continue to participate with us in the ongoing continuum of collective 
human immortality, which as I see it, is the basis of their contemporary relevance.  
 
It is important to appreciate that my specific interest is in the damaged, broken, or 
‘injured’ figures rather than the prized, pristine few which appear to be untouched 
by the passage of time. The few pristine pieces that do exist, that remain 
unaffected by time, seem to me a kind of fiction and have less to ‘say’ about 
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experience and cultural continuity than those that bear, as we do, the marks of the 
passage of time. 
 
The objects that I examine are body parts, or part bodies, that resonate with or 
‘speak’ directly to our own bodies, whilst at the same time functioning as material 
signs. In the semiotic context of Material Engagement Theory they are enactive 
material signs; and I suggest that they provide us with a means for considering not 
only the deep past, but also the present. 
 
I call the sites on these stone bodies where damage has occurred, and is evident, 
break-sites. The break-sites are important in my thinking about these ancient 
objects for two reasons. The first concerns their capacity to serve as facilitators in 
what I see as a commingling of time, via the properties of the materials that they 
are made of; the second concerns a kind of processual paradox related to their 
(un)making, or becoming. I call this the temporal paradox of uncarving, which as 
I see it, these ancient objects embody. 
 
 
 
Fieldwork documentation. 
National Archaeological Museum. Athens. 
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At the break-sites we are exposed to a paradoxical exchange of properties between 
nature and history creating a tear in the comportment of what is easily understood. 
The ‘natural’ state of the materiality of the stone is exposed at the break-site, it 
invokes a sense of geological time; the parts of the figure that remain intact and 
identifiable as having human form, invoke a sense of human time. In this way I 
have come to understand these figures as active in commingling time which 
occurs through the conflation of the properties and the qualities of the material of 
which they are made. What I mean by this is that the properties of the material are 
revealed at the break-sites, and they invoke the geological temporal index, which 
conflates with the human temporal index invoked by the qualities of the material 
and the parts of the figure that remain undamaged, and therefore identifiable as 
having human form.  
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel 
Kouros (2) 2015 
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm 
 
Source object: 6th century B.C Pentelic marble kouros.  
1904: National Archaeological Museum Athens.  
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These identifiably human body parts bring forth in us a profound understanding of 
the body parts that are missing. Our embodied knowledge, our non-habitual 
memory image, experienced and manifest through our own bodies, establishes, in 
a social way, what I argue is a profound bodily relationship between the present 
and the deep past. I suggest that it is looking at these objects from this perspective 
that imbues them with a contemporary social relevance and therefore makes them 
more accessible to a broader audience. 
 
The figures represent for me a strange conflation of carving and uncarving, doing 
and (perhaps unintentional) undoing, making and remaking, and it is in this way 
that the break-sites invoke the temporal paradox of uncarving. 
 
 
Andrew Hazewinkel 
Marsyas 2015 
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm 
 
Source object: 1st century B.C (unfinished) crater. Found in Athens.  
127. National Archaeological Museum. Athens.  
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The term ‘uncarving’ presents us with a perceptual conundrum, sometimes the 
process of carving a stone is spoken of as ‘working’ a stone, but how does one 
‘unwork’ a material? What does it mean to uncarve or unwork a material? I 
identify a usefulness in the conundrum of uncarving in the way it leads us toward 
the temporal implications that are enactively signified in these objects. What I am 
trying to draw out here is that the broken bodies of Antiquity, through their 
capacity to commingle time, instantiate a relationship between their materiality 
and our memory. 
 
A way for me to further explain this is to return to the Bergsonian working 
hypothesis of the passage from habitual pure memory to non-habitual memory 
image. I have already made direct associations between habitual pure memory and 
the properties of materials, and non-habitual memory image with the qualities of 
materials. Expanding on these alignments, I observe that it is through the 
properties and qualities of the materials that constitute the broken bodies of 
Antiquity, that our habitual pure memory and non-habitual memory image 
conflate, thus forming our highly individual memory space, which we inhabit 
with, and through, these objects. 
 
Returning now to my memory-specific analysis I crystallise the hypothesis of 
enactive signification with the following statements made by Malafouris.  
 
If materiality can be seen to affect the meaning of a message, even 
in the case where the message is clearly articulated through the use 
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of written language, one can easily imagine the impact of 
materiality on the vast majority of cases where the message is not 
explicitly inscribed on matter but rather embodied and objectified 
through matter.85 
 
These physical relations between the body and cultural artifacts 
should not be taken as mere ‘indications’ of ‘internal’ and invisible 
mental processes; they should, rather, be taken as an important 
form of thinking. These embodied engagements, not isolated in the 
brain, create mechanisms, for ‘Aha!’ insight, and for abstraction.86 
 
 
THE HYPOTHESIS OF MATERIAL AGENCY 
 
The hypothesis of material agency is the third and final working hypothesis of 
Material Engagement Theory.  It investigates agency “not as a human property 
but as the emergent product of situated activity asking not “What is an agent? but 
When is an agent?”87 
 
The two main themes inherent to the hypothesis of material agency are,  
 
1. The differences between traditional concepts of anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism, and the cognitive implications of the differences 
between anthropomorphic and anthropocentric world-views. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Ibid. 94 
86 Ibid. 105 
87 Ibid. 51 
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2. Fetishism. 
 
Malafouris begins his discussion of the third and last major dimension of Material 
Engagement Theory by saying: “If there is such a thing as human agency, then 
there is material agency; there is no way that human agency and material agency 
can be disentangled.”88 
 
To begin questioning the conventionally accepted framing of agency as a 
primarily human phenomenon, it is useful, as Malafouris has pointed out, to re-
examine the meaning of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, to help clarify 
the distinction between them, and to acknowledge their frequent misuse. 
Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human form or character to a god, animal 
or object. 89Anthropocentrism is the practice of centring in man, regarding man as 
the central fact of the universe, to which all surroundings facts have reference. 90 
 
How is this relevant to the central quest of this thesis, the pursuit of a fresh 
understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering? By 
following the ideas that are critical to Material Engagement Theory (that it is how 
we approach thinking about our rich and varied engagements with the materials 
and material culture) the relevance becomes clearer. The following example will 
demonstrate what I am trying to explain, and illustrate what I believe is a common 
misconstrual. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Ibid. 119 
89 Oxford English Dictionary Online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), www.oed.com., 
S.V. "anthropomorphism" 
90 Ibid., S.V. "anthropocentric" 
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There is a long history in Western culture of the personification of nonhuman 
elements. Rivers are a good example, as is evidenced by Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s 
1651 Fontana dei Quattro Fiumi (Fountain of the Four Rivers) in Piazza Navonna 
at Rome. It represents the Ganges, Nile, Danube and Rio de la Plata; each of the 
river gods is represented in human form. Rivers are not the only nonhuman 
elements to have a long history of representation in human form. Mountains, 
oceans, planets, stars, even winds and spirits populate the history of Western art in 
human form. These are generally considered to be examples of 
anthropomorphism, but like Malafouris, I suggest that they are anthropomorphic 
manifestations that represent an anthropocentric view of the world, a world-view 
that has been the dominant for a very long time.  
 
It can be concluded that this dominant anthropocentric view of the world has over 
time obscured the nature of our direct relationships with the properties and 
qualities of materials, and thereby, our understanding of the roles they play in 
remembering. Malafouris puts it this way: “To engage in anthropocentrism is to 
perceive humans at the centre of reality; to engage in anthropomorphism is to 
perceive reality in human terms.”91 My interpretation of this statement is that 
when reality is perceived from an anthropocentric perspective it is most likely that 
the concept of agency is perceived as a human property, which excludes the 
possibility of materials having agency. To view the world in human terms, 
however, to view the world from an anthropomorphic perspective, is to embrace 
the concept on nonhuman agency, which leads to the concept of material agency. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 131 
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Rethinking our relationships with the rest of the material world, and how we train 
ourselves to think about our relationships with the rest of the material world, is a 
critical aspect of Material Engagement Theory and my own research practice. 
 
Anthropocentrism is a bad intellectual habit, characteristic of 
Western modernity that we need to overcome. Anthropomorphism 
is a biological necessity of the human condition that we need to 
embrace, or else we run a constant risk of removing the human 
subject from the centre of the social universe only to place this 
subject in a god-like position on top and outside of it. 92 
 
It is important to understand that this is not an anti-humanist quest. Rather as 
Malafouris puts it, it is a “meta-humanist”93 quest. 
 
The concept of material agency is too broad a field to be neatly articulated 
through the above discussion about anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, 
though it goes a-long way toward explicating it. The other main theme used by 
Malafouris in explaining the concept of material agency is Fetishism; however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Ibid. 131 
For another engagement with the issue of how long standing, and often unchallenged, ways of 
thinking directly affect the biological and ecological realms, see Fèlix Guattari, The Three 
Ecologies, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton(London: Continuum, 2000). 
Another example of what Malafouris calls “a bad intellectual habit” can be found in Bateson, 
Steps to an Ecology of Mind. He states “There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an 
ecology of weeds” he goes on to suggest that for to long humanity has adopted the maxim - 
survival of the fittest - and proposes that if humanity is to survive the current threat to historical 
human immortality, we must reconfigure the idea of “survival of the fittest” to “survival of the 
organism plus environment”. 484 
93 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 132 
Malafouris explains that “aim is not to devalue the importance of the role of human subjectivity in 
the drama of life for the sake of some neo-materialism or neo-determinism, but to understand the 
nature of this subjectivity from a new symmetric point of view.” 
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not fetishism as conventionally perceived through the traditional anthropological 
framework, through Freudian discourses or through Marxist theory.  
 
Malafouris distinguishes his use of the term fetish from the three intellectual 
traditions mentioned above by relating it to processes and methodologies, rather 
than to objects. “Instead it relates to the underlying cognitive processes 
responsible for the generation of the objects or phenomena labelled as fetishes.”94 
 
In other words, in the Malfourian sense, the term fetish relates to a process, it is 
processual and can therefore be applied to methodologies, systems and 
ideologies. For instance, my example of G. L. Bernini’s Fountain of the Four 
Rivers can be described as an anthropomorphic manifestation that represents an 
anthropocentric system of thought or ideology. Viewed from this perspective, 
Rome’s most famous fountain can be understood as representative of a fetishist 
perspective. In its simplest possible expression, anthropocentrism, when viewed 
from the perspective of Material Engagement Theory, is itself a fetish. By 
accepting that fetishism relates to “the underlying cognitive processes responsible 
for the generation of the objects or phenomena”,95 it is also possible to argue that 
many forms of systemic violence caught up in the grand cyclical narrative of 
mythic violence are themselves fetishist.  
 
I conclude my analysis of the hypothesis of material agency by drawing, again, 
directly from Malafouris. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Ibid. 133 
95 Ibid. 133	  
	   252	  
Material agency is not a figment of a particular cultural 
imagination that I seek to understand, but a real, philosophically 
and ontologically defensible aspect of reality. Thus, my conception 
of material agency is not grounded in the gray zone of Frazerian 
‘contagious’ and ‘sympathetic’ magic where supernatural powers 
dwell and acquire material form and substance, but in the relational 
ontology of material engagement. 96 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this chapter I focused on Material Engagement Theory, the most recent 
conceptual development to emerge from the field of Cognitive Archaeology; my 
frame of reference remained steadfastly on the relationship between materials and 
remembering. This chapter summary is longer than previous chapter summaries 
due to the criticality of Material Engagement Theory to the driving quest of this 
thesis, which aims to provide fresh understanding of the relationship between 
materials and remembering. 
 
Firstly I examined Material Engagement Theory’s emergence from more 
traditional modes of archaeological research, and I highlighted Renfrew’s premise 
that it was the ‘relative neglect’ in scholarly studies into the relationships between 
the cognitive dimension of societies and objects that resulted in the new field’s 
slow emergence.  From this I drew out distinct parallels between Renfrew’s 
exampled ‘relative neglect’ and the reasoning behind my focus in undertaking this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Ibid. 146 
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doctoral research project. This brought me back to Hirsch’s tendency to privilege 
the photographic and literary forms of expression that are associated with memory 
transfer over the potential expressivity of objects and their materiality. I made it 
clear that, for me, the Hirschian perspective is diametrically opposed to the aims 
of Material Engagement Theory, and this thesis. 
 
Arriving at this conclusion set up the necessity for me to analyse the three 
working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory in direct relation to the issue 
of memory. It is important that we remind ourselves what the three central 
hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory actually are. 
 
1. The hypothesis of the extended mind - ‘explores the constitutive 
intertwining of cognition with material culture.’ 97  
 
2. The hypothesis of enactive signification - ‘explores the nature of the 
material sign not as a representational mechanism rather as a semiotic 
conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth 
the world.’ 98  
 
3. The hypothesis of material agency - ‘explores agency not as a human 
property, but as the emergent product of situated activity asking not “What 
is an agent ” but “When is an agent”.99  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid. 50 
98 Ibid. 51 
99 Ibid. 51 
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Before summarising my analysis of each of the three central hypotheses of 
Material Engagement Theory, I need to again point out that Material Engagement 
Theory is characterised by two main concerns - a rethinking of materiality, and a 
rethinking of human cognition – these concerns are also the main concerns of this 
of this doctoral inquiry, as is specifically expressed through my studio-based 
experiments and the theoretical research undertaken throughout this doctoral 
research project. As I have already explained the hypothesis of the extended mind 
is a means through which we are able to conceive of cognition, and therefore 
remembering, as a socially embedded, embodied process that is distributed 
beyond the individual. As Malafouris suggests, if we accept these relational 
domains of human cognition, then we are “able to collapse the conventional mind 
/ brain tautology and mind / body dichotomy”.100 
 
I began my analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind by asking the 
following question. If the hypothesis of the extended mind is an attempt to delimit 
the commonly held perceptions of the boundaries of the mind, how might it be 
used to delimit the commonly held perceptions of how memory is formed, 
reformed, and transferred between individuals? This brought me back to Polanyi’s 
example of a blind person using a stick as a means to ‘feel’ their way into and 
through the world. This powerful metaphor of “ontological unity”101 between the 
human and the nonhuman has direct associations with the hypothesis of the 
extended mind; in fact Malafouris also uses it to explicate this hypothesis, which 
enables us to think of the mind as “continuous”102 with the rest of the material 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 "The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate." 58-
59 
101 How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 244 
102 Ibid. 244	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world. So how does the hypotheses of the extended mind directly relate with 
memory? By accepting Malafouris’ delimited conception of cognition and then 
using it to question the long held idea that memory resides in the mind, which is 
inside the head, which functions as a kind of storehouse for memory, we can 
begin to conceive of the materials of which things are made as ‘enactive agents’ 
in the dynamic, reciprocal processes of remembrance, in which the traces, 
residues and presences of another’s experiences commingle with our own. I 
pointed out that nine years prior to the formalisation of Material Engagement 
Theory, Malafouris identified a need for more subtle classifications of the 
memory related aspects of material culture, and for a shift in the established 
individually based approach to analysis of human memory; the subsequent study 
of these two important related issues has led toward an understanding of memory 
that extends beyond the individual.  The conception of memory that extends 
beyond the individual is important in my research as it directs it toward a 
conception of social memory, which I now associate with the qualities of 
materials. I returned to photography as a means of exploring the implications that 
the hypothesis of the extended mind has on issue of memory. Turning to the 
photographic object, I highlighted its touchable properties and distinguished them 
from the image that the object ‘holds’. I used this example to demonstrate that in 
the same manner that a blind person’s stick represents a coalition between the 
human and the nonhuman; the printed photograph (or other photographic objects 
for that matter) also conflate the brain, body and thing; through which, according 
to the hypothesis of the extended mind, cognition (and therefore memory) 
emerges.  
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I propose that it is in the conflation of, and transactional interface between the 
photographic object, which is outside of the body, and its directly associated 
image, which resides inside the mind (that is the extended mind) that memory is 
produced and remembering occurs.  
 
This conception of memory raised the question of why there has, historically 
speaking, been a general tendency to prioritise the mental over the material, the 
psychic over the haptic. This question led me to consider another important aspect 
of the hypothesis of the extended mind, one concerning the internalist /externalist 
dualism. Of this dualism Malafouris proposed that ‘historical convention’ rather 
than a ‘a priori metaphysical truth’ is its basis. Responding to this I highlighted 
that Material Engagement Theory does not seek to prioritise either the internal or 
the external factors in cognitive processes; rather, that it is based on the principle 
of ‘constitutive intertwining’ of cognition and material culture, which occurs 
through the process of ‘active participation’ that should be understood as a mutual 
process of exchange between the internal and external. In other words, Material 
Engagement Theory is a ‘locationally neutral’ but not ‘substrate neutral’ account 
of cognition, 103 and therefore memory.  
 
This issue of the internalist / externalist dualism required further consideration in 
relation to how the hypothesis of the extended mind can be deployed and thus 
contribute to fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and 
remembering. I examined the very nature of the transactional exchanges between 
internalist and externalist perspectives by again returning to Hirsch. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Ibid. 76 
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While I recognise Hirsch’s conception of postmemory as a significant departure 
from a purely internalist view of memory, I argue that her exampled ideas are 
based only on the socially constructed qualities of materials and, therefore, she 
goes only part of the way. Her examples are bound up with the intentionality of 
not forgetting, which is different from remembering. I suggest that the properties 
of materials also have a significant role to play in the generation of memory and 
that they have the capacity to generate a sense of wit(h)ness, which a more 
comprehensive externalist view, than that taken by Hirsch, needs to embrace. The 
concept of active externalism is contingent on the conflation of the properties and 
qualities of materials, and it takes us a lot closer to the fresh understanding of the 
relationships between materials and remembering that this thesis pursues. 
 
I concluded my analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind by coming back to 
my concept of premembering. I consider premembering to be a distributed system 
of cognition that extends beyond the individual and is enacted through a process 
of active externalism that embraces both the properties and qualities of materials 
in processes of mutual participation. In some ways this entire thesis can be 
understood as an attempt to gain greater clarity of the complex concept of 
premembering which challenges some of the longest standing and commonly held 
views of ‘what’ and ‘how’ memory is. As I have progressed through this thesis I 
have found ways to explicate different aspects of my conception of 
prememebring, those expressed in this chapter relate specifically the social 
dimension of premembering, those examined in the previous chapter relate 
specifically with how it challenges and reorientates longstanding assumptions 
regarding memory’s temporal framing. 
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I then began my inquiry into the semiotic dimension of materials, specifically the 
issue of material semiosis, by analysing the second working hypothesis of 
Material Engagement Theory, the hypothesis of enactive signification. Critical to 
the hypothesis of enactive signification is that it explores the very nature of the 
material sign, and positions it as a ‘semiotic conflation’ and ‘co-habitation’ 
through matter that “both enacts and brings forth the world”.104 
This understanding of the material sign is oppositional to the conception of the 
material sign as a representational mechanism, and reinforces the idea that the 
semiotic dimension of language and the semiotic dimension of material culture 
are significantly different. As my frame of reference throughout this chapter, and 
indeed the entire thesis, is concerned primarily with remembering, my analysis of 
the hypothesis of enactive signification is briefer than my analysis of the 
hypothesis of the extended mind, which bears more distinct and direct relations 
with the issue of memory. 
 
The hypothesis of enactive signification asks a very simple but perhaps 
unexpected question, it asks ‘how’ is a sign rather than ‘what’ is a sign? With 
Malafouris’ help I explained the way that enactive signification works contra to 
the representational view of the mind, and that it is foundational to the 
constitutive intertwining of cognition and material culture which is the basis of 
the concept of the extended mind. I explained that the main difference between 
the semiotic dimension of language and the semiotic dimension of material 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Ibid. 51 
Here I am drawing directly from the language used by Malafouris in explaining the Hypothesis Of 
Enactive Signification, it is drawn from a passage that I have already used as a quotation in this 
chapter. 
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culture is that the material sign does not function through the embodiment of a 
communicative or representational logic, rather, through the process of material 
semiosis. This is reflected in my approach to art making, I have previously 
referred to a kind of material cycling at work in my studio-based experiments, my 
intended meaning in using that expression was to describe the cycles or loops of 
association between the conceptual concerns, material concerns and, at times, 
mythological concerns of my chosen subject matter. My expression of ‘material 
cycling’ is mirrored and more succinctly expressed by the term material semiosis.  
 
Considering how enactive signification actually works, I reflected it onto the 
Saussurian approach to semiotics, and again with the help of Malafouris I pointed 
out that Saussure’s approach has a nominalist base rather than a realist ontological 
base, and that this ultimately disembodies or disengages the relationship between 
a sign and what it signifies. The second main point of distinction between 
enactive signification and Saussure’s approach to semiotics is in the latter’s 
premise that arbitrariness characterises the internal bond that links the signifier 
with the signified. This policy of arbitrariness excludes the potential for meaning 
to arise from the materiality and the processes that are involved in the making of a 
sign. To help explain this I drew from and expanded upon Malafouris’ example of 
a hand signed letter and a digitally authorised letter. By looking at the specific 
materilaities of an embossed letterhead paper and a Post-it note, I demonstrated 
how the cultural and historically distant implications of a particular material can 
remain deeply embedded in their contemporary descendants and, indeed, how 
these socio-cultural qualities of a particular material can be deployed to attain 
desired associations. 
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Coming back to memory, I propose that the hypothesis of enactive signification 
contributes most to the generation of fresh understanding of the relationships 
between materials and remembering by clearly distinguishing the material sign 
from the linguistic sign, and by illuminating what Malafouris refers to as the 
“fallacy of the linguistic sign”.105 To really understand the fallacy of the linguistic 
sign requires acknowledging the common practice of either implicitly or explicitly 
collapsing the material sign into the category of the linguistic sign. I propose that 
because the fallacy of the linguistic sign works against the concept of enactive 
signification it has played a powerful role in burying the idea that materials have 
an active role to play in meaning and memory making. The collapsing of the 
semiotic dimension of materials, including material semiosis, and as a result its 
potential for memory and knowledge production, into the realm of linguistic 
signification, has led us further and further away from understanding the profound 
implications of our daily interactions with the rest of the material world. 
 
Before moving onto my analysis of the third working hypothesis of Material 
Engagement Theory, the hypothesis of material agency, I turned again to my 
studio-based research as a means to explicate the reasons for my focus on 
damaged ancient figurative sculpture as a subject field through which to examine 
the contemporary relationships between materials and remembering. 
 
I pointed out that at the commencement of this doctoral research I considered that 
my chosen subject matter would provide me with an avenue of investigation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibid. 90 
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through which I would arrive at a clearer understanding of the practical 
intersections between the two main areas that characterise my art making, object- 
based sculpture and photography. As I have progressed though my research it has 
become clear that something “known yet untellable”106 was present at this 
project’s inception. Through a series of precise distinctions in relation to memory, 
material culture, and human cognition I have come to understand that the enactive 
signification of the broken bodies of Antiquity enables me to examine the 
contemporary and ongoing social relevance of ancient objects. I pointed out that 
my interest lies in the injured or damaged figures only, and that the very few 
pristine unbroken sculptures appear to me as a kind of fiction. I asserted the 
importance of the break-sites of these stone and bronze bodies in the commingling 
of time, and the processual paradox that resides in their making and unmaking. I 
explained how at the break-site we are exposed to the geological index of time, 
through the exposure to the ‘raw’ material that is exposed, and the human 
temporal index that is invoked by the remaining, evident human form. It is 
through the conflation of these temporal indices and the profound embodied 
relationship that we have with what remains of the broken bodies of Antiquity that 
their contemporary social relevance emerges.  The perceptual paradox that is set 
in motion by their break-sites concerns a strange conflation of carving and 
uncarving. How does one uncarve something? This perceptual conundrum is 
productive when it leads us toward the temporal implications that are enactively 
signified in these broken bodies. Simply put, through their inherent capacity to 
commingle time, the broken bodies of Antiquity instantiate a relationship between 
their materiality and our memory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Here I am making a direct reference to Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing. 
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I began my memory-focused analysis of the hypothesis of material agency by 
making very clear that it investigates the premise that agency is not an exclusively 
human property, rather it is the emergent product of a situated activity. Moreover 
the key question is not ‘what’ is an agent but ‘when’ is an agent? My analysis 
focused on two main areas of consideration; the first is the differences between 
traditional conceptions of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism and their 
associated cognitive implications, the second, the concept of fetishism. 
 
Anthropomorphism, as we know, is the attribution of human characteristics to 
nonhuman elements, and anthropocentrism is the practice of placing humankind at 
the centre, or in the most elevated position, in a world-view. So exactly how can 
the hypothesis of material agency serve fresh understanding of the relationships 
between materials and remembering? As a way of explaining this, I used the 
example of the proliferation in Western art of anthropomorphism from an 
anthropocentric position. I propose that this has contributed to the obscuration of 
our direct relationships with the properties and qualities of materials. Malafouris 
states that “to engage in anthropocentrism is to perceive reality in human 
terms”,107 building on this comment I suggest that the dominant anthropocentric 
perspective in Western thought has led to the conception of agency as a human 
property that excludes the possibility of materials having agency. By applying this 
notion to thinking about the ways we train ourselves to think about the cognitive 
relationships between ourselves and the rest of the material world, Material 
Engagement Theory becomes critical. I explained that the issue of material 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 131  
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agency does not fit wholly into the discussion about anthropomorphic and 
anthropocentric world-views, and that the issue of fetishism provides us with 
another useful context through which we can come to understand it. To do so 
requires an understanding of fetishism that is outside of the framework of 
traditional anthropology, Freudian discourses and Marxist Theory; Malafouris 
positions it thus by relating fetishism with processes and methodologies, rather 
than with objects. I extend Malafouris’ perspective by relating fetishism with 
systems and ideologies; then by applying my conception of fetishism to my earlier 
example of anthropomorphic manifestations that are representative of an 
anthropocentric world-view, I propose that world-view, and the systems and 
ideologies that characterise it, as fetishistic. This brings us back to the systems of 
social regulation and law enforcement that developed conterminously with the 
emergence of the photographic medium, and enables me to position them as 
fetishistically inflected. 
 
Through this detailed summary of the memory-related analysis of the hypothesis 
of the extended mind, the hypothesis of enactive signification and the hypothesis of 
material agency, I have foregrounded the next important issue to be considered in 
this thesis; the issue of collectivity, specifically in relation to acceptance, 
complicity, and intentionality which, in the following chapter, I take up and 
examine within the framework of our relationships with death and remembering.    
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CHAPTER 6  
STATUES AND FORGETTING  
___________________________________________________________ 
   
We walk over the black box of fundamental death, trample on our 
dissolved ancestors in such a way that history and memory lie in 
the depths of dark excavation sites. The Earth is the ark for the 
dead at the same time as the set of objects.  
 
 Michel Serres 1 
 
The greatest tearing of our time comes from the formidable noise 
that language makes in order to claim that it produces the century 
even though we live, taciturn, dyslexic, drowned amongst objects, 
in the midst of statues that have come back, in a hard flood 
repeating the most ancient of idolatrous times, a strange state that 
the dying languages inveigh against so as not to understand it. 
 
Michel Serres 2 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In this chapter I examine the relationships between materials and remembering by 
turning to the field of contemporary philosophy. I focus specifically on the recent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michel Serres, Statues. The Second Book of Foundations, trans. Randolf Burks, The Foundation 
Trilogy (Bloomsbury, 2015). 17 
2 Ibid. 25 
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work of Michel Serres addressing statuary, through which he proposes a 
conception of statues as more than static entities, rather as the “basis of 
knowledge, society, the subject and object, the world and experience”.3 Through a 
series of mediations on examples that bridge prehistory and the contemporary 
realm, Serres proposes the centrality of death and the statufied dead body as 
central to the human condition and he exposes how sacrificial art was 
foundational to and still persists in society. 
 
Although the ancient sculpture that I have examined and worked with throughout 
this doctoral research was not chosen for its funereal association, rather for its era 
of origin and importantly its damaged state, much of the ancient material that I 
have focused on does have a funereal origin. Therefore my research implicitly has 
strong conceptual associations with Serres’ philosophical meditations on ancient 
statuary and death, and the legacies of this relationship in our contemporary social 
dimension.  
 
In this chapter I draw on Serres and Aleida Assmann’s research on the role of the 
arts in the production of the cultural memory of Western civilization. This extends 
my investigation into the contemporary social relevance of ancient figurative 
sculpture, and advances my pursuit of fresh understanding of the ways in which 
the broken bodies of Antiquity remain relevant to the everyday experiences of 
contemporary citizens.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid. jacket 
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The texts that directly inform this chapter are the first English edition of M. 
Serres’ 1987 book Statues: Le Second livre des foundations translated by 
Randolph Burks and published in 2015 as Statues: The Second Book of 
Foundations;4 and the first English edition of A. Assmann’s 1999 book 
Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses 
published in 2011 as Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, 
Media, Archives. 5   
 
As I progress through this chapter, which consists primarily of a detailed memory-
focused analysis of the two foundations proposed by Serres at the beginning of 
Statues: The Second Book of Foundations, I make reference to the Assmann’s 
text; however, I want to make it clear that this chapter is mostly concerned with 
the application of Serres’ philosophical approach to the consideration of the 
relationships between ancient statuary and remembering. While important, 
Assmann’s work is subsidiary in this instance. Although Assmann identifies a 
close relationship between the concept of cultural memory and the arts, she 
examines it through the media of writing, images, bodily practices, places and 
monuments.  As the driving quest of my research is fresh understanding of the 
relationships between materials and remembering, through an examination of the 
broken figurative statuary of Antiquity, the area of Assmann’s work that I draw 
most from is the section of her book concerning the body. 
 
***** 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid. 
5Aleida  Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives(New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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TWO FOUNDATIONS 
 
At the beginning of Statues: The Second Book of Foundations, Serres proposes 
two founding thoughts that lay the basis for considering the contemporary cultural 
legacies of ancient sculpture. 
 
Foundation 1 concerns collectivity, and puts the subject in relation with death.  
 
Foundation 2, consequent of, but not necessarily following Foundation 1, puts 
death in relation with the object. 6 
 
 
Both of these foundations can be understood as having conceptual connections 
with early photography, which is where this doctoral research project began, these 
conceptual connections are based in early photography’s relationship with death 
and memory. 
 
Before I commence my memory-focused analysis of Serres’ two foundations, I 
bring to the fore the etymological origins for the word matter and, by association, 
the words material, materials and materiality as used throughout this thesis. 
Although understood by some, the etymological relationship between the word 
matter and the word mother remain largely buried in conventional use of the 
English language. Excavating the origins and the changing meaning of the term 
matter, we uncover its origin in the Latin word mater meaning origin, source, and 
mother. The next development in the long line of meanings that deliver us today’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Serres, Statues. 22-23 
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contemporary understanding of the term is the Latin word materia, which 
described the hard inner wood of a tree and more generally the substance of 
which something is made. 7 The word matter is, therefore, closely associated with 
both mother and the notion of origin, which are both concepts inextricably caught 
up with remembering and loss.  
 
This association brings us back to photography and Barthes, specifically his well-
known, yet largely unseen photograph of his mother as a child, the Winter Garden 
Photograph. In Chapter 2 I examined this image and its importance in the 
development of Barthes’ hypothesis that a photograph actually blocks memory.  
 
Not only is photography never in essence, a memory…it actually 
blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory.8  
 
I return to Barthes famous hypothesis to reminds us that it is not the photographic 
image that serves best our memory, rather, as I proposed in Chapter 2, it is our 
embodied relationships with materials that better serves remembering. In 
reference to the philosophical legacies inherent in the etymological associations 
between the terms matter and mother, Serres makes the point that  “Materialism, 
never scientific, remains a philosophy at the breast.”9 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Oxford English Dictionary Online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), www.oed.com., 
S.V. "matter"  
8 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard(London: 
Vintage, Random House, 2000). 91 
9 Serres, Statues. 51 
For another engagement with the issue of the maternal, specifically, the womb, see Luce Irigaray, 
"The Bodily Encounter with the Mother," in The Irigaray Reader, ed. Margaret Whitford(Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
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THE FIRST FOUNDATION 
 
Serres’ First Foundation is explained via three examples. The first example is the 
1986 explosion of the Challenger Space Shuttle. Serres deploys it to highlight the 
role played by the media in shaping our collective remembered experience of the 
event. The second example is the 6th century B.C. howling, enemy incinerating, 
bronze bull statue that was commissioned by Phalaris of Agrigentum. Serres’ 
third example is, historically speaking, only slightly younger than the second, 
namely the 6th century B.C. jewelled, bronze, mechanised, child devouring 
sculpture of the god Baal erected in Carthage. 10 Through these examples Serres 
establishes a timeless association between sculpture and death, and in each case 
examines the deeply embedded collective response to these specific associations. 
This leads me to conclude that these associations have not changed greatly in the 
last 2500 years.  According to Serres, the collective or social response at the root 
of the ongoing associations between sculpture and death has to do with the 
concepts of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality.   
 
The Space Shuttle Challenger example highlights the effect of repeated television 
broadcasts of the event’s iconic imagery on the memories of millions of viewers 
around the world. It reveals a kind of media misguidance, or obscuration, of the 
intentionality at work. This multiple bearing witness to the event, in real time, 
over and over again has a profound effect on our remembering. When we 
experience an event in this way we experience it not as a singular, isolated event 
within our personal, historical, human time; rather, through our repeated exposure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Serres, Statues. 2-3 
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to the imagery of the event across days, weeks, months, years, it continues to 
explode into the different circumstances of our daily lives. You can watch it right 
now on YouTube. 
 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSTrmJtHLFU 11 
 
It is in the habitual way that the media representation of lift-off and the seventy 
four seconds of hopeful futurity and faith in progress that precedes the 
momentous explosion, that the event enters (in the Bergsonian sense) our non-
habitual memory image. In this example, the repeated television and now Internet 
broadcasting of the event, fulfils the function of the habitual in Bergson’s 
conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image. Through the 
event’s proliferation, we cease to bear witness to the event; rather, we develop and 
experience a sense of wit(h)ness with the event.  
 
In Chapter 3 I examined Polanyi’s conception of the tacit dimension in relation to 
the Bergsonian hypothesis of the passage from pure memory to memory image. 
Through my analysis of Polanyi’s conception of the tacit dimension I proposed 
that the concept of indwelling is closely related with the human body, and 
therefore, the rest of the stuff of the material world. According to Polanyi, we 
come to indwell with something in this way, “we can say that when we make a 
thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our 
body - or extend our body to include it - so that we come to dwell in it”.12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 "Space Shuttle Challenger Explosion Live Tv," YouTube, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSTrmJtHLFU. 
12 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension(New York: Anchor Books Doubleday and Company, 
1967). 16 
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Although indwelling and wit(h)ness are closely associated terms, a subtle yet 
important distinction can be made between them. Simply explained, indwelling is 
more closely related with the body, things, and therefore the tangible and tactile 
properties of materials; wit(h)ness, as I see it, is more closely related with the 
social dimension, and therefore the collectively constructed and experienced 
qualities of materials or an event. 
 
indwelling - properties 
wit(h)ness - qualities 
 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that it is through the conflation of our experiences 
with the properties and the qualities of materials that our individual memory 
space is formed. Therefore, indwelling and wit(h)ness are potential responses to 
(or experiences with) the properties and qualities of materials. I propose that in 
the same manner as the active participation between the properties and qualities 
of materials (which occurs in their conflation), forms our individual memory 
space, the active participation between wit(h)ness and indwelling, has much the 
same generative effect. In short, indwelling, in conflation with wit(h)ness, gives 
shape to how we enact our highly individual memory spaces, and perhaps what 
we choose to do with it. 
 
The First Foundation concerns a timeless collective acceptance of violence that is 
enacted upon others, in the name of a common good. Throughout his book Serres 
	   272	  
posits rockets and missiles as sculptures.  He uses these chosen examples as a way 
to expose the role that intentionality plays in the collective acceptance of violence 
enacted upon others in the name of the common good. This leads him to liken the 
missiles and warheads that are currently pointed at each of us in a criss-crossing 
network between tolerant and civilized societies, as statues. “We attend to our 
daily affairs, threatened, some would say protected, by the power of these statues, 
ready for blast off.”13 
 
By conceiving the proliferated, ready to fire missiles that surround us (and the 
Challenger Space Shuttle) as statues, a direct link can be drawn to the embedded 
cultural implications of ancient figurative sculpture, thus making clear their 
ongoing association with loss, death and remembering. This is especially so in the 
case of the Challenger Space Shuttle, and for all of us that maintain a sense of 
wit(h)ness with those seventy four seconds of January 28th 1986: 
 
There is a history of science or of these technologies, certainly, and 
even several, but more profoundly there is an anthropology of 
them. The humanities teach this anthropology, without knowing it: 
when they speak of statues, they shed light on those of our 
museums or cemeteries, but also and above all on torpedos and 
missiles.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Serres, Statues. 6 
In addition to the premise of collective acceptance in relation to death, loss and mourning, Serres 
uses his examples to highlight the material likeness between rockets, missiles and his exampled 
ancient sacrificial sculpture.    
14 Ibid. 6 
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This brings us back to Žižek’s concept of systemic violence, discussed in Chapter 
3, and specifically to the role that it plays in the interconnected triumvirate of 
subjective, symbolic and systemic violence, and in the ongoing cycles of mythic 
violence as defined by Benjamin. For me the broken bodies of Antiquity are 
manifestations of a violently inflected material semiosis, and they somehow bear 
silent wit(h)ness to the systemic violence enacted by super powers on others, 
under the guise of protecting the ‘innocents’ in their charge; and in forming the 
collective acceptance, maintained by those innocents, of the violent acts that are 
designed to ‘protect’ them. 
 
By what unfathomable mystery do we tolerate so many deaths for 
the sake of progress of the happiness of the greatest number? 15 
 
Another important memory-related aspect of the First Foundation relates, 
specifically, to the idea collective forgetting. The concept of immortality is 
conventionally perceived in relation to the individual, and it is usually considered 
within the realm of the spiritual; however, as Serres points out there is also an 
historical, collective conception of immortality. The historical, collective 
conception of immortality can be understood as the ongoing continuum from 
generation to generation, of human time “over the centuries of centuries without 
rupture or break”.16 
 
My fieldwork led me to discover that this was well understood and respected in 
Antiquity as evidenced by the epigram of a fourth century B.C. grave stele that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid. 13 
16 Ibid. 7 
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represents Andron, an elderly Athenian, bidding farewell to one of his sons. 
“Andron is buried here, who looked on one of his own sons, dead, and, dead 
(himself), welcomed the other.” 17 
 
  
 
 
 
Fieldwork documentation  
Marble funerary stele, second quarter of the 4th century B.C. 
1161. Archaeological Museum of Piraeus. 
 
 
Serres posits that over time, and particularly through certain events of the 20th 
century, such as the 6th of August 1945 bombing of Hiroshima,18 we have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Archaeological Museum Piraeus, "1161. Funerary Stele,"( Archaeological Museum Piraeus 4th 
century B.C.). 
The translation from ancient Greek is drawn from the didactic panel accompanying the object. 
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forgotten this form of immortality. He suggests that it is not just the passage of 
time that is responsible for this very particular collective forgetting; rather, it is 
the result of a proliferation of ‘effective technologies’ in rupture with society and 
culture: 
 
For having forgotten this immortality, we put it in danger of being 
interrupted. This forgetting has resulted in the opposition of 
effective technologies and those of society and culture. The former 
construct the world, the latter construct time. On their own the 
latter without the former tend to abandon real things: isolated, the 
former without the latter push up or close duration.19 
 
The following diagram outlines the ‘functioning rupture’ of the relatively new 
dualism between effective technologies and society and culture as proposed by 
Serres. 20 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Serres, Statues. 8 
For further engagement with the issue of the contemporary social implications of the 1945 
bombing of Hiroshima, specifically in relation to death and collectivity, see Mary  Zournazi, "The 
Art of Living: A Conversation with Michel Serres," in Hope. New Philosophies for 
Change(Annandale: Pluto Press, 2002). 193-194, 208 
19 Serres, Statues. 8 
20 For Serres’ description of the functioning rupture between effective technologies and society 
and culture, see ibid. 8 
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Figure 6:  
Effective Technologies - Society and Culture. 
 
 
 
The concomitant implementation and effects of this relationship of rupture, the 
‘power’ inherent in this schismatic relationship is, according to Serres, drawn 
forth by a quadriga of administration, media, science and technology.  
 
Administration holds the performative power of language, the 
media possess its seduction, science keeps its truth-value, and 
technology the monopoly on effectiveness. 21 
 
This brings us back to the issue of systemic and symbolic violence, which is, at 
times, deeply embedded in contemporary presentations of history, and of past 
cultures that persist in the realm of commingled time.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid. 9 
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THE SECOND FOUNDATION 
 
The Second Foundation puts death in relation with the object. Serres precedes this 
direct and straight-forward statement with the following temporal conundrum: 
“The second foundation, about which we don’t know whether it precedes or 
follows the first, ensues from it or deepens it.”22  This statement is important in 
terms of understanding the significance placed by Serres on the commingling of 
time. 
 
Jules Verne’s 1865 novel De la terre à la lune is the device with which the 
Second Foundation is introduced. In this story the Columbiad, a humanly 
inhabited military shell, a space gun pointed at the moon, is launched by a 
gigantic underground canon. On board are three humans and two dogs, a male and 
a female. One of the dogs dies from the shock of the blast-off, which quickly 
raises the issue of how to dispose of the now dead body. The issue of how a 
community (in this instance, an intimate, future focused community), chooses to 
deal with the physical remains of death is central to this story. This example sets 
us thinking about burial, cremation and other disposal methodologies, about the 
earth, the humus, and the social connections with (or, indeed, disconnections 
with) the remnant bodies of the no longer living. 
 
The Second Foundation sets up three direct questions that concern the stabilising 
relationships between subject, object and death. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid. 22 
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1. Are the relations of the subject to the object stabilised by death? 
 
2. Are the relations of the subject to death stabilised by the object? 
 
3. Are the relations of death and the object stabilised by the subject?  
 
These three questions are helpful when considering the specific relationships 
between the broken bodies of Antiquity and remembering, in the context of death, 
loss and mourning. Applying these questions to the broken bodies of ancient 
figurative sculpture, I position the subject as viewer, the broken stone body of 
Antiquity as object, while death remains death. I now re-ask Serres’ questions. 
 
1. Are the relations between a viewer and a broken body of Antiquity 
stabilised by death? Or to put it another way, is it the fundamental 
knowledge of our own inescapable death, and therefore our participation 
in the collective immortality of human being, that stabilises our relations 
with these broken bodies of Antiquity? 
 
2. Are the relations between a viewer and the knowledge of their own 
inescapable deaths stabilised by the broken bodies of Antiquity? 
 
3. Are the relations between death and the broken bodies of Antiquity 
stabilised by the presence of a viewer? 
 
	   279	  
By reframing Serres’ questions in relation to the broken bodies of Antiquity, I 
highlight the parallels between the memorial function of early photography and 
the memorial function of much ancient sculpture. What I mean by this is both 
technologies can be characterised as having a relationship with remembering that 
is directly caught up with death, loss and mourning.  
 
In reposing Serres questions I positioned the viewer as subject as a means of 
directly questioning the nature of the viewer’s relationships with ancient 
figurative sculpture, death, loss and remembering. This is a helpful way to 
consider the complex idea of the material semosis of these carved stones and, 
thus, our shared material relationship with the earth and the humus with which we 
share bodily and etymological origins. 
 
Returning to Serres’ original questions, I again repose them. This time however, 
given the physical mutuality that exists between our bodies and the broken bodies 
of Antiquity, we are going to swap roles with the broken bodies of the deep past. 
In the following three questions the subject / object roles are inverted, the viewer 
now assumes the position of object, the broken bodies of Antiquity assume the 
position of subject, and again death remains death.  
 
1. Are the relations between a broken body of Antiquity and a viewer 
stabilised by death?  
 
2. Are the relations between the broken bodies of Antiquity and death 
stabilised by a viewer’s knowledge of their own inescapable death? 
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3. Are the relations between death and a viewer stabilised by the presence 
of a broken body of Antiquity? 
 
The complex consideration of these questions is manifest in another example from 
my photographic fieldwork, evidenced by the epigram on a 6th century B.C. 
kouros that was found in Anavyssos near Athens.  
 
“Stop and mourn at the grave of dead Kroisos, whom the raging Ares destroyed 
when he fought among the defenders.”23 
 
  
Fieldwork documentation. 
Kouros. Parian marble. 530 B.C.  
3851. Archaeological Museum of Piraeus at Athens. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 National Archaeological Museum Athens, "3851. Kouros,"(National Archaeological Museum 
Athens, 530 B.C.). 
The translation of the ancient Greek is drawn from the didactic panel accompanying the object. 
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Throughout this doctoral research I have asked these questions again and again as 
a means of drawing out what Hirsch describes as a ‘sense of living connection’ 
between the living and the experiences of those that came before us; specifically, 
with the violence experienced by those that came before us. I do not wish to 
diminish in any way the violent experiences that Hirsch is referring to when she 
makes this statement, rather in drawing this parallel I wish to expand on her thesis 
and to address her tendency to prioritise the role played by the visual and literary 
in second generation manifestations of such violence. I do so in the hope of 
providing fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and 
remembering and, therefore, knowledge transfer. 
 
What I am questioning here is whether, when viewed from the perspective of the 
extended mind, the broken bodies of Antiquity give shape to our memories though 
a profoundly physical sensing of the past experiences of others. Supported by the 
arguments of Serres, Hirsch and others, I propose that in the realm of commingled 
time, these silent and immobile damaged figures join us in our collective human 
being, and participate in, rather than represent, our collective immortality. 
 
 
In the Foreward of this thesis I referred to the concept of premembering as the 
understanding of events, circumstances or conditions that one may not have 
directly experienced, but that one’s culture already knows and stores up for all of 
its future participants. 
 
As I have progressed through the development of this thesis, I have repeatedly 
returned to the concept of premembering and reshaped its definition in specific 
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relationship to materials. What has remained constant throughout the evolving 
definitions is the premise, “ that one’s culture knows and stores up for all of its 
future participants.” In the previous chapter I described premembering as a 
distributed system of memory-related cognition that extends beyond the 
individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that involves 
both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation. 
 
If we consider the properties and qualities of the broken bodies of Antiquity as 
active participants in a distributed system of memory enacted by and through the 
extended mind, rather than as inert displaced artefacts of another time; we are 
forced to acknowledge them as contributing participants in the active externalism 
that shapes the social memory that our cultures know and store up for us; and 
through which we negotiate the life-world. 
 
SOFT BODIES, HARD BODIES 
 
Memory Studies, as we know, is a relatively recent field of scholarly activity. We 
also know that for a long time the atrocities of the Holocaust functioned as a limit 
case for considering the relationships between trauma (individual and collective) 
and memory (individual and collective). As I have already stated, this thesis 
should not be read as a deliberate contribution to the important field of Holocaust 
Studies, and I reiterate the point that the Nazi Holocaust is no longer understood 
as a limit case for examining the relationship between violence and remembering. 
The Stolen Generations of Indigenous Australians, the Armenian Genocide, the 
Rawandan Genocide and the atrocities of the Killing Fields of Cambodia are just 
some of the many other examples. This expanding list is evidence of real and 
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widespread distribution (across time and space) of what Benjamin has called 
Mythic Violence. 
 
As I have already explained, violence is used throughout this doctoral research as 
a prism, through which I focus on the driving concerns of this thesis, which is to 
generate fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and 
remembering. For this reason I am less concerned with the subject matter through 
which Assmann examines her ideas. (see quote below) Rather I am more 
interested in the ideas themselves. While this may seem like a dangerous 
separation between subject matter and content, in the following analysis of 
Assmann’s work I consider the stories and experiences of the Holocaust as 
examples through which I endeavour to go beyond their subject matter in order to 
consider the very principles that Assmann explicates; and then to consider these 
memory-focused principles in specific relation to materials. 
 
The field of memory studies is alive with new perspectives and theories. As 
Assmann puts it:  
 
We are currently facing, restructuring, and discussing new forms of 
memory that open up an access to the past that is distinct from and 
complementary to that which is provided by historical scholarship. 
Living memory thus gives way to a cultural memory that is 
underpinned by media - by material carriers such as memorials, 
monuments, museums, and archives.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives. 6 
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My aim has been to participate in this bristling field, and to offer fresh 
understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering by 
drawing together emergent thinking from the diverse fields of Cognitive 
Archaeology, Social Anthropology, Philosophy, and Memory Studies. To this end 
it is important to bear in mind Assmann’s assertion that there is “no self-
organisation and self regulation of cultural memory”.25 Rather, as she points out, 
cultural memory is reliant on the conflation of “personal decisions and selections” 
with institutions and media.26 Thus the concept of cultural memory challenges 
some longstanding beliefs that memory is an individual phenomenon that can at 
best be socialised through the sharing of individual memories.  
 
Applying the hypothesis of the extended mind to the concept of Cultural Memory 
reveals that the collectivity at work in generating Cultural Memory extends 
beyond the physical limits of an individual, to include all of the material culture of 
the life-world.  
 
Fresh perspectives, such as this, now characterise and energise the field of 
memory studies.  
 
The transposition of individual living to artificial cultural memory 
and thus from short-term to long-term memory is a highly complex 
process fraught with problems: it brings together temporal 
extension with the threat of distortion, reduction, and manipulation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid. 6	  
26 Ibid. 6 
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that can only be averted through continuous public criticism, 
reflection, and discussion. 27 
 
As Malafouris identified in his pursuit of a theory of material engagement, the 
complexity of the task is too great for any singular field of study operating in 
isolation to provide a meaningful understanding. Assmann suggests the same in 
relation to the phenomenon of memory: “The subject not only transcends the 
borders of individual disciplines, in the sense that there is no one profession that 
can provide an all-embracing concept of it."28 
 
Assmann, like Serres but from her own particular standpoint, discusses the 
relationships between the body and memory in Antiquity. She links the ancient 
stories of Simonides,29 made into the foundational legend of ‘new art of 
mnemotechnics’ by Cicero,30 with the tale on Melamphus 31 to highlight different 
forms of memory. Through this comparison she emphasizes that the “material 
structure”32 of “memory carriers”33 plays an “especially important role”.34 She 
then points out that both of the memory metaphors introduced by Aristotle and 
Plato connect the durability of an impression with its reliability and that, 
historically speaking, stone, although more expensive than wax or clay, was the 
most durable material even though acts of violence or exposure to weather would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid. 6	  
28 Ibid. 6 
29 For a detailed analysis of the story of Simonides see Jan Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early 
Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination(New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); Frances Amelia Yates, The Art of Memory(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969).  
30Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives. 230 
Assmann points out that these two ancient stories, both of which combine the collapse of a house 
with an unusual feat of memory, have previously not been linked. 
31 For a detailed analysis of the story of Melamphus  ibid. 230 
32 Ibid. 231 
33 Ibid. 231 
34 Ibid. 231	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remove the signs engraved upon them, and that these actions would remain visible 
in acts of reuse, motivated by economic necessity, or acts of damnatio memoriae 
founded in the social and legal response to falls from power or grace. 
 
The following example from my photographic fieldwork evidences a productive 
between-ness between the properties related durability of a material and the 
flexibility of the intended meaning of artefact created from it. What I am trying to 
explain here is that the durability of a material does not ensure the durability of 
the intended meaning of the artefact crafted from, and with, it. The following 
example demonstrates how an artefact’s use history can be modified for material 
and memorial purposes. It also demonstrates a curious commingling of socially 
motivated practical use histories. 
 
 
The sarcophagus represented below, was used twice. Originally a married couple 
were represented reclining on its lid that has the design of a mattress.  
 
 
 
Fieldwork documentation. 
Attic sarcophagus, Pentelic marble (second use) A.D. 230-240. 
1497. National Archaeological Museum Athens. 
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However, somewhere between A.D. 230-240, in a period of economic difficulty, 
the original male figure was cut away and replaced by a group of papyrus scrolls 
(visible on the right of the image). Then the head of the female figure was 
removed and replaced with the head of the man seen above. In this example we 
can identify that the original specific intentionality of the sarcophagus has been 
altered. This is a complex, multi-layered example in that it demonstrates a 
personal complicity in the violent act of cutting away individuals and body parts 
from a funereal mnemo-technic artefact to achieve the same intentionality as was 
already implicit to the object; this raises the issue of ‘conscience’.  
 
Nietzsche, it is noted by Assmann, can be acknowledged as responsible for 
turning the metaphor of memory from the traditional body soul opposition, in 
which the soul was a prisoner of the body, to the conception of soul fulfilling the 
function of the body’s jailer.35 This paradigm shift in thinking about memory 
meant that “now it was the sensitive and vulnerable body that became the writing 
surface, instead of the heart and soul”.36 In On the Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche questions how it is possible that individuals are able to develop what he 
calls a ‘memory of will’, which both passively retains a ‘once engraved 
impression’ and actively links with its content. In Nietzschean, terms the memory 
of will is ‘conscience’. 
 
Conscience can be considered in relation to Serres’ First Foundation which 
concerns, in my interpretation, the collective acceptance of a set of conditions that 
are usually associated with the violence experienced by others, in defence of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid. 234 
36 Ibid. 234	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self. Serres’ First Foundation is, for me, caught up with the idea of ethics and how 
it plays a role in both the generation and recall of memory. Considering 
Nietzsche’s conception of ‘conscience’ in relation to memory and will, Assmann 
writes: 
 
He calls this memory of will ‘conscience,’ and sees in it the basis 
in which cultures anchor their sense of morality and responsibility. 
It does not record autobiographical experiences; it is, rather, a 
cultural script that is written directly and indelibly into the body. 
With this reversal, Nietzsche releases memory theory from its 
history of internalization and individualization, and links it for the 
first time to institutions of power and to techniques of violence. 37 
 
I have already linked Nietzsche’s conception of ‘memory of will’ with Serres’ 
First Foundation, which concerns collectivity and puts the subject in relation with 
death. This link is important in the progression of my thesis as it draws violence 
and memory closer together within a social context.  
 
In the Chapter 1, I highlighted the relationship between systemic violence and 
early photography as a means of demonstrating the presence of a residue of 
violence inherent in photography. Much of the creative work undertaken as part of 
this doctoral research has involved photographic practices, including 
photographically capturing the broken bodies of Antiquity. Following the thought 
that material semiosis is a conflation of the properties and qualities of materials, I 
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have come to understand that something similar is at work in my art making, in 
that the violence inherent in photography conflates with, what I argue is, the 
physically evidenced and historical violence inherent in the broken bodies of 
Antiquity.  
 
Here two forms of violence conflate. What I am trying to explain is the way that 
the violence inherent in photography, (the way that it blocks imagination) 
conflates with the residues of mythic violence inherent in the broken bodies of 
Antiquity. 
 
I am referring not only to the intentional breaks, sometimes made by commercial 
agents who find it easier to trade illicitly in fragments rather than whole figures, 
but also the embedded signification of violent myths and mythic violence that is 
resident in the very stuff of the broken bodies of Antiquity.  
 
In the previous chapter I referred to a material cycling inherent in my work, and 
likened it to what we now understand as material semiosis, here, I am extending 
the idea of material semiosis by applying its characteristic intermingling of the 
physical and cultural domains, of materials, to processual and philosophical 
domains. 
 
Wounds and scars have often referred to as the ‘body writings’ of memory. 
Assmann points out that photography has also been used as a metaphor to 
“describe the phenomenon of bodily inscription”.38 It is the immediacy of the 
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imprint in the form of the photographic trace that she is referring to. The idea that 
I have raised a number of times regarding an inherent residual violence in 
photography, is also taken up by Assmann when she states: 
 
The metaphor of the photograph emphasizes not only the 
directness of the impression, but also the damage inflicted 
on sensitive material. Thus there is a correspondence 
between photography and trauma: the inscription of a 
section of the real on the silver bromide of the photographic 
plate may be compared to the inscription of a traumatic 
experience on the matrix of the unconscious. 39 
 
I do not see this as an abstract representation of violence.  Rather, I consider it a 
processual enaction of violence. Drawing our attention to a paradox in the 
metaphor of the photography, Assmann, in alignment with Barthes’ premise that a 
photography actually blocks memory, suggests that photography emphasises the 
exact opposite of a direct impression, namely an ‘indirection’. In other words, 
mediality (a term that refers to the directness of an impression) brings to the fore a 
range of potential activities involved in making an impression. For example, a 
photograph can ‘show’ an absence that can be appreciated bodily through a sense 
of remote yet understood tactility, invisible, having occurred elsewhere in time 
and not in the frame, but effective and affecting nonetheless.  
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This provides us with another way to consider Malafouris’ important 
distinguishing between the properties and qualities of materials. As I have already 
explained, properties are the physically tangible characteristics of a material and 
the qualities of a material are the socially constructed, sometimes temporally 
distant, formations of perceived realities that are associated with particular 
materials.  
 
Memories are fleeting, highly plastic, unreliable, ephemeral phenomena. Serres’ 
three questions, that I reposed earlier, directly address the stabilisation of relations 
between subject, object and death.  
 
It is possible to interpret them as attempts to stabilise a conception of memory that 
is related with loss and mourning. Assmann points out that the issue of 
stabilisation is at the core of “why people of different cultures and living at 
different times have constantly had recourse to technical stabilizers ranging from 
material objects and pictorial mnemotechnics to the medium of writing”.40 
 
Those that approach the phenomena of memory from a constructivist position are 
opposed to the traditional conception of memory as one of inscription and storage:  
 
They replace the static storage model with a dynamically 
constructive one of continuous reorganization, according to 
which memory of the past is adaptive and malleable, so that 
it can fit in with an ever-changing present.41 	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This approach has close associations with Malafouris’ Material Engagement 
Theory, specifically in terms of how material engagement occurs. Assmann states 
it most clearly when she says, “the argument that memories depend exclusively on 
the present and ‘not on the past’ strikes me as a gross exaggeration”.42 
 
Returning to the issue of plasticity and the desire for stability, three categories of 
memory stabilisers can be identified: material objects, pictorial mnemo-technics 
and writing. Assmann positions language ‘first and foremost’, when she says, 
“whatever we have captured in language is far easier to remember than something 
that has never been articulated”.43 I am not as certain about this as Assmann. As I 
have progressed through this doctoral research, and in reflecting on Renfrew’s 
Sapient Paradox, more and more I sense a primacy in our relationships with 
materials over language, and I propose that remembering is better served by our 
relationships with materials.  
 
In relation to the primary role played by language in stabilising memory, 
Assmann states, “what we remember then is not the events themselves but our 
verbal accounts of them. Linguistic signs function like names through which we 
recall objects”.44 
 
Considering this statement in light of Material Engagement Theory and, 
specifically, the hypothesis of enactive signification, I argue that Assmann’s 
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position, as I have argued of Hirsch’s within the context of her conception of 
postmemory, can be seen as a partially active externalist perspective. 
 
Assmann draws support from Maurice Halbwachs’ notion that “members of a 
group cannot perceive an object without giving it a name and thus subjecting it to 
the group’s conventions and ways of thinking”.45 However, by aligning my 
position more closely with Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory, I suggest 
that this conception of memory is based in a thought matrix that does not 
recognise the important role of the conflation between the experience of an 
object’s materiality and the socially constructed realm that accompanies it. In 
short, Assmann’s position is closer to a traditional perspective of the cognitive 
processes and phenomena that we call memory.  
 
Although displaying a tendency, like Hirsch, to prioritise language as the most 
powerful stabiliser of memory, Assmann acknowledges and examines what she 
calls  “other psychic stabilizers”. 46 These can be grouped under three category 
headings – trauma, affect, and symbol. The body is caught up with affect and 
trauma, while the symbol “entails the translation of physical experience into 
‘meaning”.47 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid. 239	  
46 Ibid. 239 
47 Ibid. 239 
Figure 7 is based on Assmann’s conception of the tripartite categorisation of memory stabilisers. 
See ibid. 252  
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Figure 7: 
Trauma – Affect - Symbol 
 
Each of the three categories of psychic memory stabilisers proposed by Assmann 
can be productively examined in relation to one’s experiences with the broken 
bodies of Antiquity. I propose that trauma, affect, and symbol are all active during 
an individual’s experience of being with the broken bodies of Antiquity. In the 
following paragraphs I explain how.  
 
TRAUMA 
 
Jean-Francois Lyotard exposed the paradoxical nature of trauma by considering 
representations of trauma in a collective historical context. 48 Focusing on the 
experiences of the atrocities of the Holocaust, Lyotard arrives at a paradoxical 
conception of trauma wherein, as Assmann puts it, “the trauma created by the 
most extreme act of disempowerment itself becomes the most suitable stabilizer 
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for remembrance”.49 For Lyotard, trauma is a form of “placeless and restless 
present that prevents closure”.50 
 
I identify conceptual associations between Lyotard’s conception of trauma and 
certain ideas of Serres. The first of these is the Serresian concept of commingled 
time. Assmann’s description of Lyotard’s conception provides a clue. By using 
the words ‘placeless’, ‘restless’, and ‘present’, she sketches an image of Lyotard’s 
conception of trauma that refers to the spatial, the emotional and the temporal.  
These three domains are also central to Serres’ conception of commingled time, 
which is caught up with the spatial, the emotional and the temporal. I propose that 
we also are caught up with, or hover in, a suspended state between the domains of 
the spatial, the emotional and the temporal when we are present with a broken 
body of Antiquity. 
 
Regarding the issue of collectivity, I identify a parallel between Serres’ First 
Foundation and Lyotard’s conception of trauma. Serres’ First Foundation, as we 
know, concerns collectivity and puts the subject in relation to death, thereby it 
moves toward the realm of ethics through the issue of the collective acceptance of 
violence perpetrated on others in the name of a common good. 
 
In the context of Lyotard’s conception of trauma and, more precisely, in dealing 
with that trauma in relation to memory, the relationship between the individual 
and collective response is very different; as Assmann explains, “although the 
individual is entitled to a therapeutic processing of his or her traumatic 	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experiences, such alleviation is excluded on the collective level”.51 This is where I 
see Serres’ collective acceptance and Lyotard’s ideas of trauma coming closest 
together. 
 
AFFECT 
 
To consider the role of affect in experiencing a damaged figure from the deep 
past, it is helpful to consider it in conjunction with the concept of agency. Here 
agency and affect are drawn into a kind of double imbroglio. I return to the third 
hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, the hypothesis of material agency as 
a means to explain the associations between agency and affect. The hypothesis of 
material agency investigates agency “not as a human property but as the emergent 
product of situated activity asking not ‘What is an agent?’ but ‘When is an 
agent?”52 What I am suggesting here is that the situated activity, referred to above, 
is the affect. I am endeavouring to explain that in the context of the experiencing 
the broken bodies of Antiquity, the affect is the conflation of what Polanyi calls 
indwelling, which is closely related with the body and therefore with the 
properties of materials; and what I call wit(h)ness, which is closely related with 
the psychological realm and the qualities of materials. 
 
SYMBOL 
 
The last category of memory stabilisers proposed by Assmann that I must address 
in relation to the chosen subject matter of this doctoral research is the symbol. 	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52 Lambros Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material 
Engagement(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013). 51	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Again I return to Material Engagement Theory, specifically the hypothesis of 
enactive signification, which “explores the nature of the material sign not as a 
representational mechanism rather as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation 
through matter that enacts and brings forth the world”.53 
 
How might we consider an enactive material sign as a memory stabilising sign? 
Better put, can an enactive material sign function as a memory stabilising sign? I 
have already explained that the concept of the enactive material sign is contra to 
the dominant representational and computational view of the world, and what 
makes it enactive is its activity, its presence and its participation in the process of 
meaning making.  
 
It is important here to disassociate the concept of stability from fixity or stasis, 
which a representational perspective might harbour. In trying to understand the 
complexity of the seemingly straightforward question that I have just posed, it is 
important to consider both the plasticity of memory and to understand the idea of 
stability within a dynamic, fluid context.  
 
To apply the idea of enactive signification to the category of memory stabilising 
signs, requires us to suspend the notion of a sign as a static, passive, 
representational symbol, and to consider it as dynamic and participatory in the 
plastic cognitive processes that we call remembering. This enables us to consider 
remembering as dynamically enacted through the extended mind in conflation 
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with, rather than a reflection on, the rest of the material world, including both 
material and linguistic signs. 
 
Returning to the collective implications of Serres First Foundation, I touch briefly 
on Nietzsche’s concept of ‘conscience’, which as Assmann explains, refers to as 
“a memory of will”. 54  Assmann highlights Nietzsche’s argument that culture has 
constructed morality and conscience in response to the ‘unjust’ forgetting that 
characterises the ‘man of action’ (he that is in control of what he remembers). To 
explain this she quotes directly from Nietzsche, “conscience needs the support of 
memory, but memory shows itself too weak for the purpose”.55 Thus the 
collective acceptance which is central to Serres’ First Foundation (as explained in 
relation to statuary and violence) can be seen as having associations with 
Nietzsche’s well known, following, passage: 
 
“I did that,” says my memory 
“I can’t have done that” says my pride, and remains unshakable 
In the end, memory gives in.56 
 
CHAPTER 6: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION  
 
 
I began the final chapter of this thesis by directing my attention to statuary, 
specifically the broken stone and bronze bodies of Antiquity that are the subject 
matter of the artworks that I have created as part of this doctoral research. In this 
chapter I considered the philosophical implications of the damage wrought over 	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time on these silent objects by undertaking a detailed analysis of Serres’ Two 
Foundations as developed and explained in his book Statues: The Second Book Of 
Foundations; 57 and Assmann’s notion of Cultural Memory as developed and 
explained in her book Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, 
Media Archives. 58 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the material aspects of damaged ancient 
figurative sculpture, in this chapter, I brought memory to the fore by examining 
the specific relationships between ancient statuary and remembering.  
 
As I approached the end of my quest for greater understanding of the relationships 
between materials and remembering, I have maintained my investigation into the 
contemporary social relevance of ancient figurative sculpture, and I have 
continued to pursue fresh understanding of the ways in which the broken bodies 
of Antiquity continue to resonate with a sense of ongoing human meaningfulness. 
 
I began this chapter by restating Serres’ overarching conception of statues which 
positions them not as static entities, rather as the basis for knowledge of society, 
subject object relations, the world and, more broadly, our experience of it. With 
Serres’ as navigator we have time travelled from sixth century B.C. Carthage and 
Agrigentum to 1986 Cape Canaveral and beyond, thus revealing a remarkably 
unchanged collective response to violence that is made manifest in, through, 
around, and indeed with statues. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Serres, Statues. 
58 Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives.	  
	   300	  
By excavating the etymological roots of the word material, I unearthed deeply 
embedded associations between it, our mothers, and the notion of origin. I 
proposed that through these deeply embedded, and at times invisible cultural 
associations, that the word material itself is mnemo-technically inflected and has a 
resonance with loss, mourning and remembering.  
 
This line of thought brought me back to photography, specifically, to Barthes’ 
Winter Garden Photograph, the described, yet unseen, image of his recently 
deceased elderly mother as a child. Through this unseen image Barthes attempts 
to explain the resonant grief and unchanging pain experienced at and beyond the 
death of his mother. Revisiting my Chapter 2 analysis of the implications of this 
unseen image brought me back to Barthes’ conception that a photograph actually 
blocks memory, and my proposal that it is our embedded relationship with 
materials and material culture that better serves remembering. Returning to the 
Winter Garden Photograph enabled me to demonstrate the philosophical legacies 
and etymological associations between the everyday terms - matter and mother.  
 
Then turning to Serres’ First Foundation which concerns collectivity and puts the 
subject in relation with death, I highlighted a social dimension of death and with 
Serres help I explained that ancient figurative sculpture is caught up with that very 
issue through the enactment of the concepts of collective acceptance, complicity 
and intentionality. 
 
I addressed the issue of intentionality by using the example of the repeated, and 
ongoing, television and Internet broadcasting of the 1986 Challenger disaster, and 
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how these multiple broadcasts enter our non-habitual memory image, and the 
broader collective Cultural Memory.  I explained that it is in the habitual way that 
the media representation of the lift-off and the seventy four seconds of hopeful 
futurity that precedes the spectacular explosion, that the event directly enters our 
non-habitual memory image. Simply put, the repeated broadcasting of the event 
assumes the role of the habitual aspect in Bergson’s conception of the passage 
from pure memory to memory image.   
 
Through this example I also demonstrated that the mediatising of the disaster 
represents a profound social attraction to events and objects that embody the 
spectacular pain and loss of others, and an ongoing morphology of the original 
intentionality. The issues of acceptance and complicity are also caught up with 
this. I returned to Chapter 3 and revisited Polanyi’s concept of indwelling and the 
concept of wit(h)ness; I made it clear that indwelling is more closely related with 
the body, things, and the tangible and tactile properties of materials, and that 
wit(h)ness should be considered as more closely related with the social dimension 
and the collectively constructed qualities of materials (or an event). I suggest that 
through the mediatised proliferation of the spectacular Challenger explosion we 
cease to bear witness to the event, rather that we develop and experience a sense 
of wit(h)ness with the event. 
 
Addressing the two closely related issues of complicity and acceptance, I returned 
to my argument in Chapter 5 that it is through the conflation of our experiences 
with the properties and qualities of materials that our highly individual memory 
space is formed. Extrapolating on that premise I proposed that the concepts of 
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indwelling and wit(h)ness are two potential responses to the conflated properties 
and qualities of materials. I went on to explain that the generative affect of the 
active participation between the properties and qualities of materials is mirrored 
by the active participation between indwelling and wit(h)ness, and that it is the 
conflation of indwelling and wit(h)ness that gives shape to how we enact, or act 
from, our individual memory space. 
 
Serres’ First Foundation concerns the timeless collective acceptance of violence 
that is enacted upon others in the name of a common good. To help us understand 
the role that intentionality plays in the collective acceptance of the violence 
enacted upon others, he likens missiles and warheads to statues. Building on 
Serres’ idea, I suggested that by conceiving of them as statues, the proliferated, 
ready to fire missiles surrounding us, and the Challenger Space Shuttle, we can 
draw a direct link to the embedded cultural implications of ancient figurative 
sculpture, making clear their ongoing association with loss, death an memory. 
 
This idea, supported by Serres’ likening of warheads to statues, brings us back to 
the issue of systemic violence and how it is entangled with subjective and 
symbolic violence. It also brings us back to the issues surrounding the ways in 
which systemic violence is caught up with mythic violence which were discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
 
I declared that the body parts and the part bodies of Antiquity manifest a violence-
inflected material semiosis, and that they bear silent wit(h)ness to the systemic 
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violence enacted upon others by empires, states and institutions under the guise of 
protecting the accepting, and therefore complicit, innocents in their charge. 
 
Next I turned to the issues of collective forgetting and immortality. I pointed out 
that the concept of immortality has a social dimension and that it is useful in 
considering the issue of ‘collective forgetting’. Conventionally the concept of 
immortality is considered in relation to the individual, however as Serres points 
out, there is also an historical, collective conception of immortality which can be 
understood as the ongoing continuum of human generation to generation, over 
centuries of centuries, without break or rupture. He points out that over time and 
through certain events of the 20th century, like the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima, 
that we have forgotten this form of immortality that we are all individually bound 
up with, and that ‘effective technologies’ have played a role in this very particular 
collective forgetting. 
 
Considering and accepting the duality between effective technologies, and society 
and culture, is to acknowledge, and accept, that effective technologies construct 
the world, and society and culture construct time. It is also to accept that effective 
technologies, without society and culture, tend to close duration, and that society 
and culture, without effective technologies, tends to abandon real things. 
 
As Serres’ points out, the power that is inherent in this relatively new dualism is 
propelled forward by the workings of administration, media, science and 
technology; this brings us back again to the issues of systemic and symbolic 
	   304	  
violence which, I have already stated, is deeply embedded in representations of 
history and is caught up with temporally commingled contemporary culture. 
 
Having addressed the issue of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality 
I turned to Serres’ Second Foundation, which puts death in relation with the 
object. Using another space-travel related example, Jules Verne’s 1865 novel De 
la terre à la luna, Serres brings to our attention the issue of how communities deal 
with the object remains of death. This set me thinking about burial and cremation, 
excavation and exhumation, about the humus, and it launched questions relating 
to our social connections and disconnections with dead bodies. 
 
The following three questions are asked by Serres in the Second Foundation. 
 
1. Are the relations of the subject to the object stabilised by death? 
 
2. Are the relations of the subject to death stabilised by the object? 
 
3. Are the relations of death and the object stabilised by the subject?  
 
Framing these questions with specific reference to the broken bodies of Antiquity, 
and by ascribing the subject status to a viewer, and object status to the broken 
bodies of Antiquity, while allowing death to remain death, I asked the following 
questions. 
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1. Are the relations between a viewer and a broken body of Antiquity 
stabilised by death? Or to put it another way, is it the fundamental 
knowledge of our own inescapable death, and therefore, participation in 
collective immortality of human being that stabilises our relations with 
these ancient objects? 
 
2. Are the relations between a viewer and the knowledge of their own 
inescapable deaths stabilised by the broken bodies of Antiquity. 
 
3.Are the relations between death and the broken bodies of Antiquity 
stabilised by the presence of a viewer? 
 
By ascribing the viewer (ourselves) with subject status, these questions address 
specifically the issue of how the relationships between ancient figurative 
sculpture, death and memory are caught up with our own experiences. 
 
Then I introduced the issue of material semiosis and the mutuality between our 
physical bodies and the broken bodies of Antiquity, which enabled me to repose 
the questions again, this time inverting the previous subject/object status. The 
reposed questions brought us closer to a fresh perspective on the nature of the 
relationships between materials and remembering. 
 
 
1. Are the relations between a broken body of Antiquity and a viewer 
stabilised by death?  
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2. Are the relations between the broken bodies of Antiquity and death 
stabilised by a viewer’s knowledge of their own inescapable death? 
 
3. Are the relations between death and a viewer stabilised by the presence 
of a broken body of Antiquity? 
 
Through the process of asking and re-asking these questions, I proposed that in 
the realm of commingled time, these silent and immobile damaged figures join us 
in our collective human being by actively participating in our collective 
immortality. 
 
This brought me back to my concept of premembering, and I explained that each 
time that I have reshaped and fine-tuned its definition it is its social context that 
has remained constant. I return to the definition that I proposed in the Chapter 5; 
premembering is a distributed system of memory-related cognition that extends 
beyond the individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that 
embraces both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual 
participation. 
 
Considering the properties and qualities of the broken bodies of Antiquity as 
active participants in a distributed system of memory enacted by and through the 
extended mind, rather than as inert displaced artefacts of another time, we are 
forced to acknowledge them as contributing participants in the active externalism 
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that shapes the social memory that our cultures store up for us; and through which 
we negotiate the life-world. 
 
Returning to the field of Memory Studies, I acknowledged that the atrocities of 
the Holocaust no longer provide a limit case in examining the relationships 
between individual and collective trauma, and individual and collective memory. 
By listing some of the many, and ongoing, examples of acts of systemic, symbolic 
and subjective violence, I evidenced the real and widespread distribution (across 
time and space) of what Benjamin called ‘mythic violence’. 
 
I explained that while violence in its many forms is an issue that courses through 
this thesis, I have used it as a lens through which I provide fresh perspectives and 
understandings of the relationships between materials and remembering. 
Reconsidering the habitual aspects of the Bergson’s conception of memory, as 
explicated in his book Matter and Memory,59 exposes the logic and reason behind 
my focus on Assmann’s book chapter “The Body” in her book Cultural Memory 
and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives. 60 
 
A Fundamental premise of Cultural Memory is that it provides no opportunity for 
self-organisation or self-regulation; rather it is contingent on an individual’s 
decisions and selections conflating with those of institutions and media. I 
explained that the concept of Cultural Memory generates a degree of nervous 
discomfort in some more traditional schools of thought in which memory is 
perceived as an individual phenomenon. However by considering memory within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. (authorised by) Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott 
Palmer(New York: Zone Books, 1991). 
60 Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives.	  
	   308	  
the context of the hypothesis of the extended mind I highlighted the issue of 
collectivity at work in the cognitive process of remembering. 
 
Assmann, like Serres (and myself), begins her discussion about the relationships 
between the body and memory in Antiquity. She draws from two ancient stories 
to highlight different forms of memory. Through her comparison between the 
stories of Simonides and Melamphus, she emphasises the material structure of 
memory carriers, and the authority associated with the durability of specific 
materials. Although more expensive than clay or wax, stone ‘speaks’ louder, 
longer. 
 
I briefly addressed Nietzsche and his role in turning around the oppositional 
memory metaphor of the body/soul duality, and how this resulted in the 
perception that the body was the place where memory is inscribed. In Nietzschean 
terms the memory of will is ‘conscience’, which has obvious associations with the 
issues of complicity, collective acceptance and intentionality. These obvious, yet 
perhaps unanticipated, associations are important in the development of my 
argument because they draw the problem of violence and the issue of memory 
together and into the social context. 
 
 
The three questions that I reposed earlier were designed to stabilise the 
relationships between subject, object and death; they can also be seen as attempts 
to stabilise a conception of memory that relates with loss and mourning. Assmann 
takes up the importance of the issue of stabilisation and suggests that it is at the 
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very core of why “people of different cultures and living at different times have 
constantly had recourse to technical stabilisers ranging from material objects and 
pictorial mnemotechnics to the medium of writing”.61 Considering the issue of 
stability, Assmann positions the effectivity of language first and foremost, for her, 
“whatever we have captured in language is far easier to remember than something 
that has never been articulated”.62 As I explained, my position on this is not as 
fixed as Assmann’s and I pointed out that as I have progressed through my 
research and by reflecting of Renfrew’s Sapient Paradox, I have come, more and 
more, to sense a primacy in our relationships with materials, and that therefore 
remembering is better served by our relationships with materials. 
 
Although Assmann, like Hirsch, has a tendency to prioritise language as the most 
powerful stabiliser of memory, she acknowledges three other ‘psychic stabilisers’: 
Trauma, Affect, and  Symbol. The body is caught up with trauma and affect, and 
the symbol involves the translation of experience into meaning. 
 
As I approach the end of this doctoral research I considered Assmann’s three 
psychic memory stabilisers in direct relation to the broken bodies of Antiquity. 
 
Considering the representation of trauma within a collective historical context 
enabled Jean-Francois Lyotard to reveal trauma’s paradoxical nature. As I have 
already explained, for Lyotard trauma is a form of “placeless and restless present 
that prevents closure”.63 Relying on the atrocities of the Holocaust, Lyotard 
arrived at the paradox that Assmann described as, “the trauma created by the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid. 238 
62 Ibid. 239	  
63 Ibid. 251 
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extreme act of disempowerment itself becomes the most suitable stabilizer for 
remembrance”.64 Using the terms ‘placeless’, ‘restless’ and ‘present’ in describing 
Lyotard’s conception of trauma points toward a conception of trauma, and 
therefore of psychic memory stabiliser, that is spatial, emotional and temporal. I 
suggested that these three domains are central to Serres’ conception of 
commingled time, and I proposed that a viewer is caught up in, or suspended 
between, the same domains when in present with a broken body of Antiquity. 
Which means that being in the presence of a broken body of Antiquity can be 
considered an action of memory stabilisation. 
 
Considering the role of affect in experiencing a damaged figure from the deep 
past, it is helpful to consider it in conjunction with the concept of agency. 
Returning again to the hypothesis of material agency, which investigates agency 
as the emergent product of a situated activity, rather than as a human property, by 
asking not ‘what’ is an agent? but ‘when’ is an agent? I proposed that the situated 
activity referred to here is the affect. To make this clearer I drew again from my 
earlier discussion about what Polanyi calls indwelling, and my understanding of 
the concept of wit(h)ness. What I am proposing here is that in the context of 
experiencing the broken bodies of antiquity, the affect, or psychic memory 
stabiliser, is the conflation of indwelling and wit(h)ness. 
 
The last of Assmann’s psychic memory stabilisers to be considered in the context 
of damaged ancient figurative sculpture is the ‘symbol’. This returned me to the 
hypothesis of enactive signification which “explores the nature of the material 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ibid. 251	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sign not as a representational mechanism rather as a semiotic conflation and co-
habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the world”.65 To apply the 
idea of enactive signification to the memory stabilising sign - the symbol- requires 
us to suspend the notion of the sign as a static, passive representational symbol. 
Doing so enables us to consider memory as dynamically enacted through the 
extended mind in conflation with, rather than through a reflection on, the rest of 
the material world, including both material and linguistic signs. When Assmann 
prioritises language as the most effective mode of external memory storage, she 
demonstrates a more traditional view of memory, one that excludes the potential 
for materials to play a meaningful role in the making and transfer of memory. I 
come back to Nietzsche, Serres and the broken bodies of antiquity to conclude 
this summary by proposing that it is through the associations between Nietzsche’s 
concept of conscience and Serres’ notion of collective acceptance, as developed 
and explained in relation to statuary and violence, that links the broken bodies of 
Antiquity with the cycles of mythic violence that we continue to be caught up 
with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 51 
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EPILOGUE 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Whoever has the gift of the senses speaks ancient languages,  
sings dead myths in forgotten cadences and dialects. 
 
Michel Serres 1 
 
 
Even outside consciousness, the past co-exists along with the 
present. 
 
Henri Bergson 2 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
As I approach the end of this doctoral research project, I am beginning to identify 
the green shoots of new research potential emerging from my ongoing quest for 
fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering. 
 
To conclude this doctoral submission I come back to, and address with new 
knowledge, the two questions that I have asked of myself, the broken bodies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michel  Serres, The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. Peter Cowley Mararet 
Sankey(New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008). 184 
2 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F. 
L. Pogson(New York: Dover Publications, 2001). 112 
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Antiquity, and the many theories that I have examined throughout this doctoral 
research.   
 
How are materials caught up with remembering? And how are the broken stone 
and bronze bodies of Antiquity entangled with our contemporary social 
dimension? 
 
Throughout this thesis I have progressed my argument, step by step, on a set of 
important distinctions that for a long time have remained obscured, unquestioned, 
or buried beneath long-established historical conventions and traditional 
conceptions entrenched in the diverse fields that I have drawn together. The 
productive between-ness that I have excavated between these diverse fields and in 
my studio-based research, photo-archive based research and photographic 
fieldwork has led me into a domain of new knowledge and understanding.  
 
In these final paragraphs I come back to the distilled issue of the importance of 
materials and material culture in acts of remembering, and the associated issue of 
its ongoing contemporary human meaningfulness. 
 
 
NUMBNESS 
 
 
The flash of photography’s arrival blinded the social order that it emerged into to 
the highly personal and collective expressive dominion of materiality.  
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With the emergence of photography the philosophically inflected tension between 
the authority of words and the authority of images gathered apace. This tension 
did not originate in the new medium, rather photography escalated the existing 
conflict from an intimate domestic scale to a global scale through the diverse 
applications inherent to its early development and it’s subsequent proliferation. 
 
The sense of touch - and its partner, materiality - that were present at, and critical 
to the first-ever photographic exhibition, has over time become numb in relation 
to memory. It is in this way that photography, acting with and through a kind of 
ontological systemic and symbolic violence, has come to play a significant role in 
the silencing of materials.  I am reminded again of Barthes dictum: “The 
photograph is violent: not because it shows violent things, but because on each 
occasion it fills the sight by force and nothing can be refused or transformed.”3 
 
With the sense of touch and the expressive memorial capacities of materiality 
silenced, the battle for memory-related authority became one between words and 
images, language and sight.  
 
Returning to Žižek’s premise that episodes of subjective violence erupt from a 
background shaped by systemic and symbolic violence, I question where and why 
did this conflict for authority between words and images come from? From what 
background did it erupt? Turning to Antiquity I find traces of its Western cultural 
origin in the ancient story of the fight between Hermes and Argus which, 
allegorically speaking, is a conflict between language and sight. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida.Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard(London: 
Vintage, Random House, 2000). 91 
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Hera, the wife of Zeus, whose authority is based on power rather than morality, is 
the mother of his legitimate children and she suffers jealousy. Zeus has many 
other loves, Antiope, Callisto, Danae, Io, Leda, Semele and Maia.  Hermes is the 
accepted illegitimate son of Zeus and Maia, for millennia he has represented 
language, words and communication. Zeus, protecting Io from the jealous wrath 
of his wife Hera, transforms Io into a radiant white heifer. Hera, wise to this, 
sends Argus, the one hundred eyed giant, to maintain watchful surveillance over 
Io, and Zeus, in retaliation, sends Hermes to kill Argus. 
 
Serres has suggested that there is “unease with this Hermetic victory”,4 and he 
describes this myth as representing “the beginning of the ascendancy of the word, 
of communication over things”.5  To help us understand this ancient story in a 
more contemporary way I replace each characters name with their symbolic 
characteristics and then retell the story in a de-anthropomorphised way. 
 
Hera - legitimacy and jealousy. 
Zeus - authority based on power rather than morality, a projection of law and 
justice. 
Io - disguise, camouflage and submissive acceptance. 
Maia – is etymologically associated with motherhood and midwifery.  
Hermes - words, language and communication. 
Argus - uninterrupted vision and ,more generally, sight. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Serres, The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. 10 
5 Ibid. 10 
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The story can be retold this way. 
 
Jealousy is married with authority based on power rather than morality. 
Authoritarian power loves disguise and camouflage that is predicated on 
submissive acceptance. Jealousy deploys uninterrupted watchfulness in the hope 
of acquiring irrefutable evidence of the crimes committed against it; authoritarian 
power responds by sending in words and language to kill vision, thus destroying 
the potential for evidence of jealousy’s suspicions.  
 
This timeless story doesn’t end there. Weeping Io leaves the violent scene that she 
is caught up in and little attention has been payed to her since, rather the focus 
remains on the gory implications of the murder itself.  Considering this in relation 
to the contemporary social realm it follows that a collective disinterest prevails in 
the revelation of disguise, or the expression of the background to acts of 
subjective violence. Rather, a fervent and frenzied interest remains in the 
spectacular act of violence.  Maintaining this perspective facilitates detachment 
from the sense of complicity in the systemic and symbolic issues that form the 
background from which subjective violence erupts. This progresses toward an 
uneasy collective acceptance of the violence enacted on others in the name of the 
common good, and thus minimises our inherent capacity for wit(h)ness. We are 
reminded here of Sontag’s words,  “in a world of saturated, no hyper-saturated 
with images, those that should matter have a diminishing effect: we become 
callous. In the end, such images just make us less able to feel, to have our 
conscience pricked.” 6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003). 105 
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There are further contemporary implications to be unearthed in this ancient story. 
Hera makes one more important, violently inflected, memorial gesture; she 
removes from dead Argus his multi eyed skin, “the panoptic skin of the watcher, a 
shredded, billowing rag of shut eyelids”,7 and drapes it upon the body of her 
favourite bird, the flightless peacock that today resonates with the issues of 
decoration and ornament rather than the meaningful. The other senses are also 
caught up in this story. As Serres has pointed out, Hermes continues to 
metaphorically play his flute lyrically while the decorative fowl squawks 
unharmoniously. In this way the assassin’s violent triumph is symbolically over 
sound as well as sight. Also, Hermes metaphorically continues to fly through our 
skies while the flightless bird remains on the ground. 8  Again the assassin’s 
triumph is ongoing, it retains dead sight in perpetual defeat. Serres puts it this 
way: “Sight gazes without seeing at a world from which information has already 
fled.” 9  
 
How does this ancient story serve the driving quest of this thesis, which aims to 
provide fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and 
remembering? The story prioritises words over images; the sense of touch is not 
easily identified within in it, yet it is there, at the very heart of Hera’s jealousy. 
The issues of origin, motherhood (and, therefore, when considered 
etymologically) matter, are entangled in the background of this famous story. The 
legitimacy of the sense of touch, and therefore matter, is at issue in this story. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Serres, The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. 51 
8 Ibid. 51 
9 Ibid. 51	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Coming back to the differences between the properties and qualities of materials, I 
highlight how the sense of touch is caught up with memory making and 
remembering, and propose that it is in the way that the sense of touch conflates 
with the internal dimension of materials. The properties of materials are 
individually experienced in episodes of habitual pure memory, therefore they are 
associated most closely with the external dimension. The qualities of materials are 
socially constructed and collectively experienced in episodic non-habitual 
memory image experiences, therefore they are most closely associated with the 
internal dimension. 
 
Conventional thinking tends to prioritise the external dimension of materials over 
the internal dimension of materials. As I approach the end of this doctoral 
research I propose that the internal dimension of materials have been neglected 
and that this has contributed toward the common perception that materials are less 
caught up in remembering than photographs and story telling. 
 
Photographic images and words have been acting with and through symbolic and 
systemic violence for a long time now, though, through the recent conceptual 
developments in the fields of Cognitive Archaeology and Social Anthropology, 
materials and material culture are coming to be understood as having a significant 
role in memory making and remembering.  
 
By thinking about our collective and individual pasts, presents and futures in a 
way that is not based on exclusivity, priority, or through oppositional dualisms, 
but rather through a perspective that mingles the dualisms, and combines them 
	   319	  
with processes of active participation enabled by the extended mind, we are able 
to acknowledge a new set of complex relations between materials and acts of 
remembering. 
 
Considering the contemporary social legacies of the broken bodies of Antiquity 
brings me to another two important issues, the issue of collective forgetting, and 
the issue of collective immortality. 
 
Conventional conceptions of the issue of immortality frame it in relation to the 
individual and connect it with the spiritual realm. For this issue to serve the 
driving quest of this thesis, I focus on it in relation to the historical rather than the 
spiritual realm, and consider it in relation to the idea of collective acceptance that 
leads toward the collective forgetting of our complicity in acts of systemic and 
symbolic violence. 
 
 I am referring here to the idea of a collective human immortality, one that we all 
participate in by playing our roles in the continuum from generation to generation 
in human time, “over the centuries of centuries without rupture or break”.10 
Broadly speaking, modernity, and more specifically, certain catastrophic events of 
the twentieth century have brought us face to face with the possibility of 
interrupting that continuum. The bombing of Hiroshima is used by Serres as an 
example,11 to which I add the real and felt possibility of nuclear disaster and the 
potential that we face of environmental collapse.12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Michel Serres, Statues. The Second Book of Foundations, trans. Randolf Burks, The Foundation 
Trilogy (Bloomsbury, 2015). 7 
11 Ibid. 8 
12 Ibid. 7-8  
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Through the arc of this doctoral research I have argued that the collective 
acceptance (enacted as a means of absolving individual responsibility) of the 
catastrophic mythic violence that came to pass in the twentieth and early twenty 
first century (as proliferated initially through the deployment of photography) has 
slowly eroded the concept and our physically sensorial and psychic understanding 
of collective human immortality and its associated responsibilities.  
 
Throughout this thesis I have questioned how the broken bodies of Antiquity are 
caught up with our contemporary social dimension? As I conclude this doctoral 
research project I propose that it is through embracing cognitive processes 
conjoined with material semiosis and the physical mutuality between the hard 
bodies of stone and bronze, and our own soft bodies, that we are able to 
understand these ancient broken figures as standing in silent address to the 
forgotten concept of collective immortality; and that by doing so they speak 
loudly to our contemporary society. It is in this way that the broken bodies of 
Antiquity remain the keepers, for the life-world, of such important knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In this paragraph, specifically in relation to the issue of collective human immortality, I am 
indebted to Serres.	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AFTERWARD 
 
THOUGHTS IN CLOSING 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Through this quest, I have I have come to understand that a productive between-
ness exists in the tensions between the perceived authority of words and the 
perceived authority of images. We might give it the name Poetry. Rainer Maria 
Rilke’s ‘thing poems’, specifically The Archaic Torso of Apollo, intertwine the 
internal and external dimensions of things and endow this conflation with a gaze, 
the gaze of the object, which Santner suggests, “is in turn reinvested with a kind 
of sublime, dazzling ‘thingness”.1   
 
The last line of the poem raises the issue of contemporary moral imperatives, “for 
here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life.”2 As 
Santner has said, it is “as if the poem is making a claim -indeed a moral 
judgement- about the nature of a life lived in ignorance of the object (or kind of 
object) evoked in the poem”.3 This brings me back to Barthes’ inability to share 
the Winter Garden Photograph.  
 
I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only 
for me. For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one 
of the thousand manifestations of the ‘ordinary’; it cannot in any 
way constitute the visible object of a science; it cannot establish an 
objectivity, in the positive sense of the term; at most it would 	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interest your studium: period, clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, 
no wound.” 4  
 
Santner proposes, in Barthes’ language, that for Rilke, “the object’s status as 
remainder allows him to experience its surface as a pure surplus over any possible 
studium, as the locus of a kind of wandering punctum”.5 
 
Drawing together the last line of Rilke’s poem, The Archaic Torso of Apollo,  
 “for here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life.” 6 
and Barthes’ last words about the Winter Garden Photograph, “but in it, for you, 
no wound”,7 I illuminate a sense of wit(n)ness between them. Santner states that 
the poem “exerts a moral pressure”8 and that it injects into the life of the reader  
“a disquietude about the shape and direction of the life lived before the aesthetic 
encounter”,9 at the same time Barthes’ last line evinces his refusal of violence. 
 
For me, the fourteen lines of The Archaic Torso of Apollo resonate with an 
illuminating between-ness, between words and images, not in the manner of 
ekphrasis, rather as space in which an ancient object hovers. It invokes, through 
association between a broken body of Antiquity and contemporary social and 
ethical imperatives, that time commingles, that bodies commingle, that our 
histories commingle, as do our desires, fears and futures. 
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49. JM758: Gelatin dry plate negative. 39.5 x 27.7 cm  Page 202. 
      The Marshall Collection. BSR   
 
50. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 202. 
      Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered # 5) 2012 
      Screen-printed image on sandblasted glass,  
      sliced agate, electro-luminescent light panel. 79 x 48.5 cm 
 
51. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 203. 
      Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered # 2 - 6) 2012 
      Installation view. 
 
52. Figure 4.         Page 210. 
      Mind Beyond Cognitivism. 
 
53. Figure 3.      (repeated) Page 218. 
      Properties-Qualities, Pure Memory-Memory Image, 
      Remembering-Premembering. 
 
54. Figure 5.         Page 219. 
      Material Properties-Material Qualities. 
 
55. JM746: Gelatin dry plate negative. 11.9 x 8.9 cm   Page 224. 
      The Marshall Collection. BSR 
 
56. JM196: Gelatin dry plate negative. 26.7 x 20.6 cm  Page 224. 
      The Marshall Collection. BSR 
 
57. JM167: Gelatin dry plate negative. 23.8 x 17.7 cm  Page 224. 
      The Marshall Collection. BSR 
 
58. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 225. 
      Material Collision (Staring together at the stars) Part 1. 2013 
      Screen-print on carborundum sandpaper. 139 x 105 cm 
 
59. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 225. 
      Material Collision (Staring together at the stars) Part 2. 2013 
      Screen-print on carborundum sandpaper. 139 x 105 cm 
 
60. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 225. 
      Material Collision (Staring together at the stars) Part 3. 2013 
      Screen-print on carborundum sandpaper. 139 x 105 cm 
 
 
 
61. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 226. 
      Material Collision (Staring together at the stars) Parts 1,2,3. 2013 
      Screen-prints on carborundum sandpaper. 146 x 351 cm 
 
62. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 226. 
      Material Collision (Staring together at the stars) Parts 1,2,3. 2013 
      Installation view. 
 
63. JM: B.1a.7.2       Page 238. 
      The Marshall Collection. BSR 
 
64. JM: B.1a 7       Page 238. 
      The Marshall Collection. BSR 
 
65. JM: B.1a.7.2       Page 239. 
      The Marshall Collection. BSR 
 
66. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 239. 
      Studio-based research documentation. 
 
67. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 240. 
      Studio-based research documentation. 
 
68. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 240. 
      Studio-based research documentation. 
 
69. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 241. 
      Suspicious Marble. 2012-2014  
      Installation view. Overall dimensions variable. detail 
 
70. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 243. 
      Fieldwork documentation. Broken female figure. 
  
71. Andrew Hazewinkel    (repeated) Page 244. 
      Kouros (2). 2015   
      Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm 
 
This image is one of a suite of 13 images presented in the examination     
exhibition. Not all 13 images are reproduced in this thesis.  
 
72. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 245. 
      Marsyas 2015 
      Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm 
 
This image is one of a suite of 13 images presented in the examination     
exhibition. Not all 13 images are reproduced in this thesis. 
 
73. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 274. 
      Fieldwork documentation. Funerary Stele. 
 
74. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 274. 
      Fieldwork documentation. Funerary Stele. 
 
75. Figure 6.         Page 276. 
      Effective Technologies-Society and Culture. 
 
76. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 280. 
      Fieldwork documentation. Kouros. 
 
77. Andrew Hazewinkel      Page 286. 
      Fieldwork documentation. Attic Sarcophagus. 
 
78. Figure 7.         Page 294. 
      Trauma-Affect-Symbol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTATION OF ARTWORKS 
_________________________________________________________________
The images on the following pages represent the original artworks exhibited in the 
final presentation of this doctoral submission. They include both documentation 
of individual artworks and documentation of how those artworks were presented 
within the exhibition context. 
























